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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal i s vested i n the Supreme
Court

•

• State ot Utah, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-

2

)

wlii i c h

iita Les :

(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any cour t of
record, which the Court of Appeals does not have
original appellate jurisdiction.
Pursuant to the rn1*» mak i ng power of the Utah -Supreme Court
this matter _may be designated as one to be heard by the Utah
L
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred by improperly shifting -

the

n

support of Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment.
standard of review -? - *=•.•* *vi

appea2

js

The

^^iti before the court in the

ftnap

to a summary judgment

presents only issues of law, 1 - Appeals Coi :i i:t gi v es no deference
t o t|ie

trial court's conclusions, but reviews them for

correctness.

Bonham v. Morgan, ; 88 P

(T Ita

(per curiam); Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d
(Utah 1993).
2

Whether the trial court erred in granting the

Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment when there existed a
1

)
)

genuine dispute as to material facts which would preclude Summary
Judgment.

The standard of review as to this issue on appeal is

that the Appeals Court reviews a trial court's grant of summary
judgment under a "correctness" standard.

Daniels v. Deseret Fed.

Sav. & Loan Assoc., 771 P.2d 1100, 1101-02 (Utah App.), cert,
denied, 783 P.2d 53 (Utah 1989).

The Appeals Court accords no

deference to the trial court's conclusion that the facts are not
in dispute nor as to the court's legal conclusions based on these
facts.

Wvcalis v. Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821, 824 (Utah App.

1989), cert, denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1990).

When determining

if summary judgment is proper, the Appeals Court views all
relevant facts, including all inferences arising from the facts,
in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.
Barlow Soc. v. Commercial Sec. Bank, 723 P 2d 398, 399 (Utah
1986) .
3.

Whether the trial court erred in granting the

Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment because the Respondent
was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law for reasons that:
(a) The Respondent had controverted Respondents proof of
essential elements necessary to establish a contract between
Respondent and Appellant and thus proof of the debt that was
suggested by Respondent's pleadings.
2

(b)

The Respondent fal

d

evidence, an unimpaired debt owed by Appellant to Respondent.
The standard of review respect. Lnq this issue on appeal froit a
summa?

>i.

HMIJ'UI

i i t;y

MM"

I

and a Li reasonable inferences i.
most favorable r

+ h-

impo s ed.

Warrei.

Hal-L

h" Appeal

I'MIIII.

view - -. :-\ • dence

i *> .\it->v-;\ therefrom i i

o . \ .-.\w

party upon which summary judgement is
accord

Blackhurst v, Transamerica Insurance Co, y 699 P.2d 688 (Utah
1985) .

It is only when the l a d s ,n<' \\\w\ i \\\ nil ed

reasonable conclusion,, can be drawn therefrom that such issues
become questions of law.

FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby

Insurance Co, , Ml"'l l» " I i "> '

) .

DETERMINATIVE LAW
Interpretation of the following statutes and rules will be
d e t er'in i.na11 v e n i 1 Iu • i t.sin>s pi <rii* *i11 fn 1:
( I ) R u le 5f> | c )

|P

111 ah Ru I os oi Civil Procedure which

provides that:
t*

^he record

demonstrates that:
| c ) there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Doubts or uncertainties concerning
issues to be drawn from the facts, are to be construed
3

in a light favorable to the party opposing the summary
judgment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(1)

This case arose as a result of a contract contemplated

between the parties with Appellee allegedly providing certain
products and services to repair machinery for the Appellant who
then allegedly, did not satisfy the debt or obligation whereupon
Appellee brought an action in the Circuit Court for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah;
(2)

In chronological order the record of the court below

discloses facts as follows:
(a)

A complaint was filed alleging that Appellant

contacted Respondent and requested that Respondent provide
certain products and services to repair machinery owned or
used by "Plaintiff" (sic).

Appellant responded by admitting

the above paragraph. (See Amended Complaint at 15 and Answer
to Amended Complaint at f4.)
(b)

Respondent allegedly provided said products and

supplies during said period, as requested, and had performed
all acts to be performed herein by Respondent.

Appellant

responded by denying the allegation and affirmatively
alleging that in fact Respondent did not perform requested
4

( So*-1 /Mivnded

repai i s ni |>i ov ide request <**! ni odiicf ^
Complaint at 16 and Answer
(c)

Responder

Amended Complaint at 15.)

<-, * fou^ij • ;;.r. *wp«- ,,s *

a

refused

*

n

made, and currently owec :« Respondent
$12 r*

together

A

LLIA

interest as specified by Utah Code

« L sea. from, June ]

collected

II 993 until

> ~ incurred herein.

Appellant

responded by denyincj the above paragraph w i M'i \ he limitation
of an admission

.

t-ho Appellant had refused and failed to

pay Respondent

Se\ Amended Complaint at 17 and Answer ~_

Amended
(d)

The pleading

defenses

the Appellant set up affirmative

considerate:*

^Hni^

1 consideration and
i in.) I IM.> A p p e l I .in in I

reserved

* right

^s^rt additional affirmative

defenses. (See Answer to Amended Complaint at 117,8,9,10.)
(

|)i« ;

Ifi nrel iminary

negotiations the Respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
and alleged that:

5

(a)

The Appellant contacted the Respondent and

requested that Respondent inspect certain machinery to
determine if the same needed a torque converter replacement.
(b)

Respondent next alleged that, in response to the

order of the Appellant, traveled to the site where the
machinery was located and determined that extensive repairs,
albeit none being required with respect to the torque
converter, would be required to put the machinery in order
and secured the consent of some unspecified third person who
was termed by Respondent as Appellant's "on-site
representative".
(c)

(Affidavit of Holt at 13,4,5.)

The response of Appellant was that this person was

unknown to the Appellant and not employed by Appellant and
did not have authority or apparent authority to enter into a
novation. (Affidavit of Appellant at 14.)
(d)

Respondent failed to contact Appellant to confirm

the questioned order even though five weeks elapsed between
the initial inspection and the actual repair.

(Affidavit of

Appellant at 12.)
(e)

On authority of the unspecified bystander

respondent provided repairs with a cost greatly in excess of

6

the limitation placed on his order by the Appellant,
(Affidavit of Appellant at fl)
(f)

Appellant alleged that the actual value of the

repairs provided by the Respondent was relatively minimal,
Appellant already having in his possession the required
replacement units which were ultimately required (ie: an oil
cooler and radiator) for which he had paid $1,500, a fact
which he would have related to Respondent if he had been
contacted; Appellant contemplated making these repairs
within his own organization. (Affidavit of Appellant at f4.)
(g)

Appellant alleged that the value of the machine

upon which the repairs were accomplished is and was
substantially less than the cost of the repairs claimed to
have been made by the Respondent.

(Affidavit of Appellant

at 15.)
(h)

Appellant alleged that no on site representative

of Appellant was in the area nor did Respondent deal with
any agent of Appellant.
(4)

(Affidavit of Appellant at 14)

After the filing a Motion for Summary Judgment together

with a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment with supporting
affidavits which pleading was received by Appellants counsel on
7

the 10th day of March, 1995, the Appellant did, on March 21st,
1995, file with the Circuit Court a Motion for Enlargement of
Time without any supporting documentation.
(5)

The next day, on the 22nd day of March, 1995 Appellant

filed with the circuit court a Memorandum of Points and
Authorities Resisting Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment
with a supporting affidavit,
(6)

Two months later, on the 23rd day of May, 1995

Respondent filed an Objection to Appellant's Motion for
Enlargement of Time, which in fact was not necessary as the
pleadings had been timely filed with the court but which made it
appear that Respondent had not the benefit of a response to his
motion.
(7)

Appellant's counsel reviewed the file and noted that

Respondent had not been served copies of the response to the
Motion for Summary Judgment and said deficiency was remedied by
service of copies of all pleadings on Respondent on the 25th day
of May, 1995 with a letter of apology.

A copy of which appears

in the addendum.
(8)

On the 26th day of May, 1995 Respondent filed a Notice

to Submit for Decision.

8

(9) The Trial Court judge sustained the Objection to
Enlargement of Time to Respond to Summary Judgment, and ordered
Appellant to file a response within 10 days and a copy of the
docket entry was sent by the clerk to each party.

A copy of the

said Docket is attached within the addendum.
(10) Upon receipt of the docket entry, the Appellant
confirmed that copies of all pleadings were on file with the
court and counsel.
(11) On the 8th day of June, 1995 the written Order
Sustaining the Objection of Respondent was signed and entered
into the docket.
(12) On the 10th day of July, 1995 the Trial Court Judge
granted Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and a copy of
the docket entry was sent to each party.

A copy of said Docket

is within the addendum.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Appellee, upon the record of this case is not entitled
to a grant of Summary Judgment.
ARGUMENT
The Appellee, upon the facts of this case, is not entitled
to a grant of Summary Judgment.

9

(1)

It seems apparent that the court did not credit

Appellants pleadings in response to the motion for summary
judgment and Appellant wonders if the Trial Court may have
granted summary judgment on the basis that Appellant had not
responded to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment at all,
even though the court docket discloses that Appellant had
responded to the Motion for Summary Judgment and the response had
been in the court file since the 22nd day of March, 1995. (See
Addendum at Page 34.)
(2)

Inasmuch as the Respondent was the movant for summary

judgmentsaftiafjc^ud^mEBtibatthBsbaHdsatBiateAppBibiBtihfidrBDted
drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
appellant.

The Utah Supreme Court in reviewing the case of

Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, 706 P 2d 614 (Utah 1985)
observed:
Issues [of negligence] ordinarily present questions of
fact to be resolved by the fact finder. It is only
when the facts are undisputed and but one reasonable
conclusion can be drawn therefrom that such issues
become questions of law. See also FMA Acceptance Co.
v. Leatherby Insurance Co., (Supra at Page
)
(3)

The appellant opposed summary judgment at the trial

level, contending that respondent had failed to meet the burden
necessary to establish that the Respondent was entitled to

10

Summary Judgment as a matter of law.

The question as to whether

Rocky Mountain Machinery Company was required under the contract
(See Affidavit of Appellant at fl) to clear any further charges
with the Appellant as opposed the contention that a novation had
occurred was an unresolved issue which should have been litigated
on the merits.
(4)

The contract between the parties (Invoice and Letter

submitted by Respondent in support of the motion for summary
judgment) discloses that Respondent considered the repair order
as limited by its own terms to $5,000.00; Appellant contends that
the oral contract relied upon by respondent was conditioned by
the term that appellant was to pay no more than $3,500.00 for
repairs.
(5)

(See Affidavit of Appellant at fl.)
To exceed that figure, Appellant contends that a

novation must occur and to prove novation the Respondent would
have been required, by a preponderance of the evidence presented
at trial to prove the following: (a) A previous binding
obligation; (b) which was extinguished by a new, valid contract ;
(c) with the consent of all parties, Tannhauser v Shea 83 Mont
562, 295 P 268, 74 ALR 1021 (1930).

Upon a Motion for Summary

Judgment the Respondent, in order to prevail, should have been
required to offer uncontroverted evidence as to each of those
11

elements while in fact the pleadings of Appellant controverted
any such contentions.
(6)

What evidence the respondent did offer in connection

with the Motion for Summary Judgment may be summarized as
follows:
1.

The repairman, upon diagnosing the problem,

discussed the situation with a person who he concluded
to be Appellant's on-site representative and received
permission to complete the repairs.

(Affidavit of Holt

at f5.)
2.

At no time did Appellant or Appellant's on-site

representative ask that rebuilt or remanufactured parts be
used in making the repairs, nor did Appellant make any
indication to Respondent that the costs of such repairs
might cause Appellant to consider replacing the dozer.
(Affidavit of Holt at 58.)

(7)

In response to that particular allegation appellant set

up facts indicating the
1.

He had no idea who the person that the repairman

spoke to in Oceola, Nevada but he suspected that it was one
of the employees of a gold mine which was operating in that
12

area.

Appellant further alleged that he could not justify

repairs of that magnitude and that he had the means to make
the needed repairs and that no novation had occurred in that
the determination of Respondent to make the more extensive
repair was never put to him.

(Affidavit of Appellant at 14)

CONCLUSION
It seems apparent that there was no meeting of the minds of
the parties as to what should have been repaired or how much
should have been expended.

The Appellant respectfully submits

that the Respondent at the trial level, as a matter of law,
failed to meet the burden necessary to enjoy a jgxant of Summary
Judgment because there remained genuine issues pfl fact which
should have been resolved by a f i n d ^ T of^act upoik a trial had on
the merits.
Respectfully submitted this
1995.

B:\MATTIN.BRF(3)

13
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ute, if the court determines that restitution
is either appropriate or inappropriate, it
shall make the reason for the decision "a
part of its written order." U.C.A., 1953,
§ 76-3-201(3Xa) (1978 ed.) (Supp.1983).
In the case before us, there is ample
record evidence, from which the trial court
could have found that restitution was proper. Notwithstanding the mandate of the
statute that the trial court's reasons be
included as part of its order, we believe
that the failure to do so in this case was
harmless error. Nonetheless, we draw attention to this requirement for future guidance of the sentencing courts.
Defendant's sentence is affirmed in all
respects.
(O f«YHUMM*SYST!M>

APACHE TANK LINES, INC., a
corporation, Plaintiff,
v.
Thomas R. CHENEY, Personal Representative of the Estate of Clifford
P. Cheney, Defendant and Appellant
Thomas R. CHENEY, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Clifford P.
Cheney and Pamela A. Cheney and as
Co-Conservator and Co-Guardian Ad
Litem of the minor children Signa Cheney and Keenan Cheney, Leslie Skelton, as Co-Conservator and Co-Guardian Ad Litem for Signa Cheney and
Keenan Cheney, Counterclaimant and
Cross-Claimant and Appellants,
v.
COWBOY OIL COMPANY and LeGrand
B. Brunson, Cross-Claim Defendants
and Respondent.
No. 19573.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Sept 20, 1985.

1. Judgment «»180
Summary judgment should be granted
with great caution in negligence cases.
2. Negligence <S=>136(9, 14)
Issues of negligence ordinarily present
questions of fact to be resolved by fact
finder; it is only when facts are undisputed
and but one reasonable conclusion can be
drawn therefrom that such issues become
questions of law.
3. Negligence «=»136(25)
Proximate cause is usually a factual
issue and in most circumstances will not be
resolved as a matter of law.
4. Judgment e=>181(33)
Questions of fact as to whether truck
driver was negligent in head-on collision
accident with automobile precluded summary judgment in favor of truck driver and
his employer in a wrongful death action
brought as a counterclaim on behalf of
estate and heirs of deceased occupants of
automobile.

Carl E. Malouf, Logan, for appellant
Tim Dalton Dunn, Salt Lake City, for
respondent
PER CURIAM:

Truck owner brought action for property damage and loss of use of tractor and

APACHE TANK LINES, INC. v. CHENEY

Utah 615

Cite aa 706 P J d 614 (Utah 1985)

trailer against personal representative of
estate of deceased occupants of automobile
involved in collision with truck; latter eounterclaimed for wrongful death and joined
truck driver and his employer, who moved
for summary judgment The Second District Court, Davis County, J. Duffy Palmer,
J., granted the motion, and appeal was
taken. The Supreme Court held that questions of fact as to whether truck driver was
negligent in head-on collision accident with
automobile precluded summary judgment
on wrongful death counterclaim.
Reversed and remanded.

Defendant appeals from a summary
judgment in favor of LeGrand Brunson and

his employer, Cowboy Oil Co., in a wrongful death action brought as a counterclaim
on behalf of the estates and heirs of Clifford P. Cheney and Pamela A. Cheney, his
wife. Brunson was the driver of a tank
tractor and trailer that collided with the
Cheneys' car, killing the Cheneys instantly.
The trial court found Brunson not negligent as a matter of law. We reverse and
remand for a trial on the merits.
On March 21, 1980, Brunson arose at
6:00 a.m., had a bowl of cereal and coffee
for breakfast, and went on duty at 11:00
a.m. He drove a loaded tanker truck and
trailer from Woods Cross, Utah, to Kemmerer, Wyoming, stopping for a hamburger and coffee between 1:00 and 2:00 p.m.
He proceeded to Nightengale, about three
miles southwest of Rock Springs, Wyoming, where the tanks were filled with
8,820 gallons of drip gas condensate, bringing the total weight of truck and trailer to
80,000-84,000 lbs. Brunson began his return trip at 9:00 p.m., stopped at Evanston
for a couple of beers, stopped at the port of
entry to help a friend with truck repairs,
and then began the last leg of his journey
to Woods Cross. It started to rain and
turned cold, and by the time Brunson left
the canyon and turned onto Route 89, he
knew he was on black ice, because it was
"slicker than hell" and people passing him
in the opposite direction had "hollered" at
him over their CB that the roads were slick
and icy.
At around 1:30 a.m., as Brunson was
ascending a long hill north of Layton, he
accelerated to maintain a speed of his truck
and went from sixth to seventh and then to
eighth gear. The truck started to slip, and
Brunson shifted down again to seventh to
maintain a speed of about 40 m.p.h. It was
at this point that he first noticed the headlights of Cheneys' oncoming car when it
crested the hill ahead of him.
Here the evidence becomes confusing.
In his deposition, Brunson testified that the
headlights of the car suddenly disappeared.
Without slowing down, Brunson got over
as far off to the right as he could -go,
thinking he could get away from the car.

He looked down at his speedometer, which
read between 40 and 45 m.p.h., and when
he next looked up, the headlights of the
Cheney car were right in front of him. His
truck crushed the car and its occupants
inside.
In the statement given to the police,
Brunson stated the Cheney car made a
U-turn and entered his lane, and he tried to
miss it He amended that statement the
following morning and added: "Car looked
like it was making U-turn. Lights were
aimed towards me when first saw him,
thought I wonder what he's going to do,
then I lost lights and almost as quick he
was in front of me and I hit him."
Defendant was sued by Apache Tank
Lines, owner of the Brunson truck, for
property damage and loss of use of the
tractor and trailer. Defendant counterclaimed for wrongful death and joined
Brunson and Cowboy Oil Co. in this suit.
Brunson and Cowboy Oil Co. moved for
summary judgment, claiming that undisputed facts established that Brunson was
not negligent as a matter of law. Defendant opposed the motion on the ground that
the evidence before the court showed material disputed facts from which a jury might
find Brunson negligent
[1-3] In an appeal from a summary
judgment, we view the evidence and all
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
losing party. Hall v. Warren, Utah, 632
P.2d 848 (1981); accord Blackhurst v.
Transamerica Insurance Co., Utah, 699
P.2d 688 (1985). Summary judgment
should be granted with great caution in
negligence cases. Williams v. Melby,
Utah, 699 P.2d 723 (1985). Issues of negligence ordinarily present questions of fact
to be resolved by the fact finder. It is only
when the facts are undisputed and but one
reasonable conclusion can be drawn therefrom that such issues become questions of
law. FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby
Insurance Co., Utah, 594 P.2d 1332 (1979).
Likewise, proximate cause is usually a factual issue and in most circumstances will
not be resolved as a matter of law. Uni-

616

Utah

706 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

APACHE TANK LINES, INC. v. CHENEY

Utah

617
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gard Insurance Co. v. City of LaVerkin,
Utah, 689 P.2d 1344 (1984). This case pos e s no exception.

3J3

[ 4 ] Summary judgment is proper where
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue a s to any material fact
and that t h e moving party is entitled to a
judgment a s a matter of law. Utah
R.Civ.P. 56(c). In granting summary judgment, the trial court based its ruling on the
parties' memoranda, affidavits, pleadings,
arguments o f counsel, and all other information contained in the court's file. The
court found that there was no genuine iss u e of material fact and that Brunson and
Cowboy Oil Co. were entitled to summary
judgment a s a matter of law. The trial
court concluded that even "if Brunson had
been a magician, he wouldn't have got out
of the road of that car." Defendant contends in his appeal before us that it was for
the jury to decide whether Brunson and his
employer w e r e negligent and that material
fact issues precluded summary judgment
Defendant introduced the affidavit of an

CD

expert witness whose credentials disclosed

rn
PO

that he was a professor of engineering at
Utah State University, had a masters degree from M.I.T. in structural engineering
and had a Ph.D. from Iowa State University. He worked as a consultant in reconstruction of structural and mechanical failure and accidents. The affidavit stated
that under one version of the facts as stated by Brunson, Brunson could have taken
evasive action against the Cheney car traveling towards him out of control. Under
Branson's second version of facts, that the
car was stopped or moving laterally, a
speed in excess of 38 m.p.h. would not have
permitted the truck to be stopped within
the distance revealed by the low beam
headlights under which Brunson claimed to
have been driving. We think that affidavit
was sufficient to controvert Branson's versions of the accident and raised an issue of
fact of whether Brunson was negligent under either version.
)**>»-<* r

The trial court had before it two additional affidavits by one witness. The first one
given by the witness to defendant on September 6, 1983, states that the car appeared to be stopped, pointing west, and
beginning to make the turn. It appeared
to be trying to go up the hill to the south
when it must have slipped and gone into
the outside lane where the collision took
place. The affidavit further states that
there was no other traffic in the north or
southbound lanes except for the car of the
witness. Nine days later, that same witness signed an affidavit for Brunson and
Cowboy Oil Co., stating that she did not
know which direction the Cheneys had been
traveling immediately prior to the accident,
that the truck driven by Brunson appeared
to be traveling at a speed appropriate to
the icy conditions, that there was nothing
whatever Brunson could have done to avoid
the accident, and that several approaching
vehicles lost control and slid off the road
when attempting to avoid the accident
Whereas the first affidavit describes the
actions taken by the Cheney car sufficiently to create evidentiary facts, the second is
couched in unsubstantiated conclusions.
Those two affidavits, standing alone, create
a material fact issue in favor of defendant
"A single sworn statement is sufficient to
create an issue of fact Clearly, it is not
for a court to weigh the evidence or assess
credibility." Webster v. Sill, Utah, 675
P.2d 1170 (1983).
Exhibits in the record show that tire
marks left at the scene of the accident
indicate no evasive action and belie Branson's statement that there was no emergency lane into which he could have
swerved and that he went as far to the
right as he could.
There was evidence in the record that the
maximum total shift time allowed by Cowboy Oil Co. was fourteen hours, which may
have been surpassed by Brunson if it can
be shown at trial that he went on duty at
11:00 a.m. on March 21st There was evidence in the record that the consumption of
alcohol on the job was against company
policy, which again has a direct bearing on
Branson's alleged negligence.
' • t;H

Section 41-6-46 of the Utah Traffic
Rules and Regulations commands:
(1) N o person shall drive a vehicle at a
speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and potential hazards
then existing. Consistent with the foregoing, every person shall drive at a safe
and appropriate speed when approaching
and crossing an intersection or a railroad
grade crossing, when approaching and
going around a curve, when approaching
a hill crest, when traveling upon any
narrow or winding roadway, and when
special hazards exist with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of
weather or highway conditions.
Whether Brunson breached the conduct
imposed by the statute w a s a question for
the jury. From the evidence before the

trial court, a jury could reasonably find
that Brunson was driving too f a s t for existing hazardous conditions; that he w a s overdriving the area illuminated by his
truck's two low beam headlights; and that
he w a s fatigued, took no evasive action,
and failed to keep a proper lookout The
trial court invaded the province of the jury
when it granted Brunson and Cowboy Oil
Co. summary judgment
The case is remanded for a trial on the
merits.
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erable. The case is remanded to the trial
court to amend the judgment to award the
buyers $7,054, less $1,000 awarded by the
trial court to the sellers on their counterclaim which is not challenged on this appeal. No interest or attorney fees are
awarded to either party inasmuch as the
trial court awarded none and neither party
has raised the issue on appeal.
HALL, C.J., and STEWART and DURiAM, JJ., concur.

C7>

ZIMMERMAN, Justice (concurring):
I join the majority in its disposition of the
various issues. However, the majority
quotes from Warner v. Rasmussen, 704
P.2d 559 (Utah 1985), to the effect that
contractual provisions for liquidated damages will be enforced unless "the amount
of liquidated damages bears no reasonable
relationship to the actual damage or is so
grossly excessive as to be entirely disproportionate to any loss that might have been
contemplated that it shocks the conscience." The Court then finds that the
amount of the liquidated damages provided
for in the agreement is "excessive and disproportionate" when compared to the actual loss suffered by the sellers, thus implying that in the absence of a disparity as
great as that which exists here (actual loss
is approximately one-third of the penalty),
the standard of Warner v. Rasmussen will
not be satisfied.
I think an examination of our cases
should suggest to any thoughtful reader
that, in application, the test stated in Warner is not nearly as accepting of liquidated
damage provisions as the quoted language
would suggest. In fact, I believe this
Court routinely applies the alternative test
of Warner—that the liquidated damages
must bear some reasonable relationship to
the actual damages—and that we carefully
scrutinize liquidated damage awards. I
think it necessary to say this lest the bar
be misled by the rather loose language of
Warner and its predecessors.

BARLOW SOCIETY ,
corporation, Plaintiff

Utah
and

non-profit
Appellant,

v.
COMMERCIAL SECf/RixY BANK, a
Utah corporation, **<i Edmund O. Barlow and John Do** i_10< Defendants
and Respondents.
No. 20155.
Supreme Coun 0 f Utah.
July 31, W86.

Organization to w»licn property had
been quitclaim deeded riled suit against
judgment creditor to ^.validate execution
sale and to quiet title \u organization. The
Third District Court, i,%|t Lake County,
Dean E. Conder, J., M.„eted title in the
judgment creditor. Ortmmz&tion appealed.
The Supreme Court hel«i t.hat (1) the judgment debtor had no ini* res t to convey by
means of the quitclaim <loed where a warranty deed had conveys a n 0 f ^e j u d g .
ment debtors right, ui| p a n d interest to
entire parcel to the purchasers and the
quitclaim deed was e x i t e d before the
purchasers reconveyed l,y warranty deed a
poraon of the property, (2 ) the warranty
deed to the purchasers was supported by
consideration; and (3) th« judgment debtor
was the fee simple own«r a t ^ time the
creditors judgment lien attached.
Affirmed.

1. Deeds «=»121
Judgment debtor's quitclaim deed to
organization conveyed n„ interest to organization where quitclaim Hn d was executed
after judgment debtor h«<i conveyed all of
his right, title and interem to purchasers by
warranty deed and quitct*j m deed was executed before purchaser* reconveyed portion of property to judgment debtor.
U.OAJ953. 57-1-13.

2. Estoppel <3=>39
Quitclaim deed does not convey afteracquired title. U.C.A.1953, 57-1-13.
3. Deeds «= 194(5)
Presumption of valid delivery arises
where deed has been executed and recorded.
4. Deeds «=>194(5)
Judgment debtor who alleged that
warranty deed was void for lack of consideration had to overcome, by clear and convincing evidence, presumption of valid delivery arising where deed had been executed and recorded.
5. Deeds <S=192
If valid on its face, presumption is that
deed conveys fee title.
6. Deeds «=77
Absent fraud, duress, mistake, or the
like attributable to grantee, competent
grantor will not be permitted to attack or
impeach his own deed.
7. Deeds «=»15
As between parties, deed is good, with
or without consideration.
8. Deeds <s=17(2)
Purchasers' payment of $17,500 and
judgment debtor's willingness to convey
entire parcel to purchasers, so that they
could finance purchase of portion of parcel,
constituted adequate consideration to support conveyance by warranty deed as between parties.
9. Judgment <3=»793(1)
Judgment debtor was fee simple absolute titleholder both before conveyance of
property to purchasers and after their reconveyance by warranty deed of portion of
property and, therefore, judgment creditor's lien which attached after reconveyance in fee simple absolute and before
judgment debtor quitclaimed his interest to
organization was valid and title to quitclaimed portion passed subject to lien.
U.C.A.1953, 78-22-1.

Grant G. Orton, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant
Jeffrey L. Silvestrini, Salt Lake City, for
defendants and respondents.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff Barlow Society appeals from a
summary judgment quieting title in Commercial Security Bank (CSB) to property
which plaintiff claims it owned free and
clear of CSB's judgment lien.
In reviewing a summary judgment, this
Court will view the facts in a light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion
and will allow the summary judgment to
stand only if the movant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on the
undisputed facts. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c);
Bushnell Real Estate, Inc. v. Nielson,
Utah, 672 P.2d 746 (1983); Aird Insurance
Agency v. Zions First National Bank,
Utah, 612 P.2d 341 (1980). We hold that
under the undisputed facts of this case,
CSB was entitled to summary judgment as
a matter of law.
On August 20, 1979, Edmund O. Barlow
(Barlow) conveyed by warranty deed to
Ballard and Midgley a fee simple absolute
in a parcel of land owned by him. The
conveyance included the northern portion
of the parcel, which Ballard and Midgley
were purchasing from Barlow, and the
southern portion which was not to be sold
to them. The parties agreed nonetheless
that financing on the northern portion
would be facilitated if the entire parcel
were conveyed and that Ballard and Midgley would subsequently reconvey to Barlow
the southerly ninety-foot portion of land
(the south portion) when financing had
been obtained.
On March 7, 1980, Barlow executed a
quitclaim deed to the entire parcel to plaintiff. On November 28, 1980, Ballard and
Midgley reconveyed to Barlow by warranty
deed the south portion of the land as previously agreed.
On May 7, 1982, CSB obtained a money
judgment in the amount of $11,516.38
against Barlow on an unrelated matter.
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On June 23, 1982. Barlow executed a
quitclaim deed to the south portion of the
land to plaintiff as a correction deed.
On November 7, 1982, CSB executed on
its judgment against Barlow. On December 8, 1982. the south portion was sold at
sheriffs sale in full satisfaction of the
judgment. Neither Bariow nor plaintiff redeemed the property after the execution
saie.

^j
i>

[2] The warranty deed from Ballard
and Midgley to Barlow reconveyed to him
in fee simple absolute the south portion at
issue here on November 28, 1980. Though
the date of August 20. 1979, was typed in
the deed, Midgley's unrebutted affidavit
stated that he signed, executed, and delivered the deed on November 28, 1980, and
the acknowledgment in the deed carries
that date. A quitclaim deed does not convey after-acquired title. Duncan v. HemPlaintiff thereafter sued CSB to invalimelwnght, 112 Utah 262. 186 P.2d 965
date the sale and to quiet title in plaintiff.
(1947). Had Barlow conveyed all of his
This appeal followed from the trial court's
interest to the entire parcel to plaintiff by
ruling in favor of CSB. The issues raised
warranty deed, the subsequent reconveyon appeal are < 1) did Barlow have any interance by Ballard and Midgley to Barlow of
est in the south portion on the date CSB
the south portion would have immediately
became his judgment creditor: »2) had title
vested title to it in plaintiff. U.C.A., 1953,
ever vested in Ballard and Midgiey because
§ 57-1-10. The antecedent quitclaim deed
of lack of consideration: and i3) were the
to plaintiff on the other hand could not and
lien rights of CSB protected against real
iid not divest Barlow of his subsequent fee
property to which Bariow purportedly held
simple iDsolute title to the south portion
no more than a bare legal title. The underafter reconveyance from Ballard and Midgying issue we must address s whether
.ey. Consequently, Bariow was the fee
Bariow owned the south portion of the land
simple owner of the south portion on May
when CSB obtained its judgment lien, and
7. 1982. when CSB became his judgment
whether quiet title .n CSB was therefore
creditor.
oroDer.

CD

i
[1] Plaintiff first contends that Barlow
did not own the property when CSB's judgment lien attached. The warranty deed of
August 20, 1979, conveyed all of Barlow's
right, title, and interest to the entire parcel
to Ballard and Midgley. Bariow's quitclaim deed of March 7. 1980, to plaintiff
had the effect 4<of a conveyance of all
rights, title, interest and estate of the
grantor in and to the premises therein described and all rights, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, at the
date of such conveyance," U.C.A., 1953,
§ 57-1-13 (emphasis added). As Barlow
had nothing left to convey, the quitclaim
deed conveyed no interest to plaintiff. A
grantee under a quitclaim deed acquires
only the interest of his grantor "be that
interest what it may." Johnson v. Bell,
Utah, 666 P.2d 308 (1983); Wallace v.
Build, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 401, 402 P.2d 699
(1965).

II
[3-8] Plaintiff next assails the validity
if the conveyance to Ballard and Midgley
for lack of consideration. The warranty
deed from Barlow to Ballard and Midgley
describing the entire parcel was properly
executed, acknowledged, and recorded on
or about August 20, 1979. A presumption
of valid delivery arises where the deed has
been executed and recorded. Baker v. Pattee, Utah, 684 P.2d 632 (1984). Plaintiff
had to overcome that presumption of delivery by clear and convincing evidence.
Gold Oil Land Development Corp. v. Davis, Utah, 611 P.2d 711 (1980); Bertoch v.
Gailey, 116 Utah 101, 208 P.2d 953 (1949).
Barlow's own affidavit shows that Ballard
and Midgley paid a consideration of $17,500
for the land refuting Barlow's claim that
the conveyance was void for lack of consideration. Plaintiffs claim that the conveyance of the entire parcel was intended by
the parties merely to facilitate financing

and was done to secure an obligation on the
northern portion does not invalidate the
conveyance. If valid on its face, the presumption is that the deed conveys fee title.
Battistone v. American Land & Development Co., Utah, 607 P.2d 837 (1980). Absent fraud, duress, mistake, or the like
attributable to the grantee, a competent
grantor will not be permitted to attack or
impeach his own ieed. Desert Centers,
Inc. v. Glen Canyon. Inc., 11 Utah 2d 166,
356 P.2d 286 (1960). As between the parties a deed is good, with or without consideration. Brown v. Peterson Development
Jo.. Utah. 822 P.2d 1175 (1980). Ballard
and Midgley's pavment of $17,500 and Bar.ow's willingness to convey the entire par:el to them, so that they could finance the
purchase of the north portion, constituted
adequate consideration to support the
transaction between the parties, and the
conveyance was valid.
Ill
[91 Plaintiff claims that at best Barlow
conveyed a bare legal title to Ballard and
Midgley wnen he conveyed the entire parcel, and that CSB's lien could not have
attached because Barlow had quitclaimed
all of his remaining interest in the property
to plaintiff. Lund v. Donihue. Utah. 674
?.2d 107 <1983) (Per Curiam), Belnap ».
Slain. Utah, 575 P.2d 696 (1978), and
Kartchner v. State Tax Commission. 4
Utah 2d 382. 294 P.2d 790 (1956), are cited
in support. None of the cited cases deals
with the issues here under review. Both in
Lund and Kartchner, the judgment creditor had attempted to place a lien against
property of the judgment debtor's grantee
after the debtor had conveyed to his grantee. In Belnap, a judgment creditor was
denied a judgment lien against land conveyed to the judgment debtor's grantee on
the ground that the encumbrances on the
conveyed land exceeded the fair market
value of the land, and the judgment debtor
thus owned merely a bare legal title. This
Court reversed, because the party attacking the validity of the lien had not presented any evidence that he satisfied the definition of a bare legal titleholder. That con-

cept requires a lienee to be the trustee of
an express, constructive, or resulting trust,
or an agent, or mere conduit for the transfer to the true owner.
Plaintiff contends, of course, that Ballard and Midgley were just that type of
bare legal titlehoiders, that title was placed
n them solely to enable them to procure a
.oan. after which thev reconveyed to Barlow. Plaintiff then extends that argument,
supported in dictum in Belnap, to arrive at
the conclusion that Barlow upon reconveyance became the bare legal titleholder and
conduit to plaintiff. There is nothing m the
record to support such tortuous reasoning.
Barlow was the fee simple absolute titleholder both oefore the conveyance to Bal;ard and Midgiey and after their reconveyance to him. He was not a trustee >i an
express, constructive, nr resulting trust tor
olaintiff. or igent, )r mere conduit for the
Transfer to piamtiff. He quitclaimed wnat^ver rights he had to the entire parcel "o
oiamtiff after he had conveyed his fee simple title to 3allard and Midgiey. CSB's
^udgment lien attacned after Ballard and
Midgley had reconveyed the south portion
to Bariow :n fee simpie absolute and before
he quitclaimed that .nterest .o plaintiff.
Title to the south portion therefore passed
subject to the lien. 'J.C.A.. 1953. § 7S-22Affirmeo.
O
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STATE of Utah. Plaintiff and
Respondent.
v.
Melvin Dean FRAME. Defendant and
Appellant. (Two Cases).
Nos. 21002. 21005.
Supreme Court of Utah.
July 31, 1986.
Defendant was convicted in the Seventh District Court, Uintah County, Rich-
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for writ of review challenging unemployment compensation award; a corporate litigant must be represented by a licensed
attorney. U.C.A.1953, 35-4-5(a), 78-51-25.
78-51-40.
Tracy-Burke Associates, pro se.
X. Allan Zabel. Salt Lake City, for lefendants.
PER CURIAM:
This petition for .vnt of review challenges an unemployment compensation
award under the 'equity and good conscience ' clause of U.C.A.. 1953, § 35-45(a). Without addressing the merits of
oiaintiff s contentions, we are constrained
"0 dismiss the petition due to plaintiff-corporation's improper attempt :o represent
tself.

-TJ
2=»
p-j

Throughout this case, plaintiff has oeen
represented by Linda Tracv. Her status as
i non-iawyer was lot questioned .n \ne
proceedings oefore :he Industrial Commission, but when she filed for judicial review
sne vas told that a corporation cannot ippear pro se before this Court. She insisted
t h a t s h e could p r o c e e d , a s s e r t i n g t h a t .ner
business functions not as a corporation out
as " T r a c y »& B u r k e , " a p a r t n e r s h i p . Without a d d r e s s i n g t h e implications of t h a t a s s e r t i o n , it is c l e a r t h a t this d i s p u t e is oet w e e n ' T r a c y - B u r k e A s s o c i a t e s " a n d one
of its f o r m e r e m p l o y e e s . T r a c y - B u r k e A s s o c i a t e s is a viable c o r p o r a t i o n r e g i s t e r e d
.n this s t a t e , a f a c t a d m i t t e d by M s . T r a c y .
A t a h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e law
j u d g e , it w a s e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t M s . T r a c y .s

plaintiffs president and Carol Burke is its
secretary-treasurer. Plaintiff in this action
s clearly a corporation and not a partnership.

that case, we quoted with approval the
following language of Paradise v. Nowlin,
86 Cal.App.2d 897, 195 P.2d 867 (1948):
A composite of the ruie in the decided
cases, overwhelmingly sustained by the
authorities, may be thus stated: A natural person may represent himself and
present his own case to the court although he is not a licensed attorney. A
corporation is not a natural person. It is
an artificial entity created by law and as
such it can neither practice law nor appear or act in person. Out of court it
must act in its affairs through its agents
and representatives and in matters in
court it can act only through licensed
attorneys. A corporation cannot appear
in court by an officer who :s not an
attorney and it cannot appear .n proDna
persona.
Citations omitted.) This is consistent with
)ur statutes ' and with *he general >aw n
other jurisdictions.-'
3ecause plaintiff ; s a corporation not represented by a licensed attorney, its petition
for writ of review must be dismissed. So
ordered.

Affirmed.
Howe. J., concurred :n the result and
tiled opinion.
Stewart. J., dissented and filed opinion.

J7\
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| KEY NUMBIR SYSTEH>

Robert L. BLACKHURST, as personal
representative of the estates of Priscilla
S. Blackhurst and Brigham Douglas
Blackhurst, Plaintiff and Respondent.
v.
TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, and Leila P. Shipp,
an individual. Defendants and Appellants.
No. 18907.

It has long been the law of this jurisdiction that a corporate litigant must be represented in court by a licensed attorney. The
rationale of this rule was explained in Tuttie v. Hi-Land Dairyman's
Association,
10 Utah 2d 195, 350 P.2d 616 (1960). In

Son, as personal representative of the
estates of his parents, brought action to

1.

2.

U.C.A., 1953, §§ 78-51-25 and -40.

enforce settlement agreements he had
reached with insurer for compensation for
injuries mother had suffered in automobile
accident. The Third District Court. Salt
Lake County, David B. Dee, J., held the
agreement enforceable, although mother
nad died prior to appointment of general
guardian and approval of settlement by
:ourt. and insurer appealed. The Supreme
Court. Durham. J., held that: <1) son. and
attorney who represented him. nad authority to compromise mother's claims: '2) insurer was estopped to deny that son had
authority to enter into binding agreement:
3) fact that agreement was completed pn)r to mother's death eliminated any possibility that her death would terminate any
'agency" son had to negotiate: (4) agreement was not conditioned on appointment
)f son as general guardian: and io) agreement was not unenforceable aue to any
nutuai mistake of fact.

Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 22, 1985.

See Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d 1073 (1968).

1. Mental Health 3=235
Usually, only general guardians can
compromise claims of an incompetent person: however, this rule is for the protection
of incompetent persons and 's not to burden or hinder them in enforcing their rights
nor confer any privilege or advantage on
persons who claim adversely to them.
2. Mental Health e=>235
Son of elderly automobile accident victim, who had been rendered incompetent
due to her injuries, and counsel hired by
him, had authority to compromise her
claims, although son had not been judicially
appointed a general guardian, allowing enforcement of settlement he had reached
with insurer.
3. Estoppel <s=*52.15
Elements of equitable estoppel are:
conduct by one party which leads another,
in reliance thereon, to adopt a course of
action resulting in detriment or damage if

first party is permitted to repudiate his
conduct.
i. Mental Health «=235
Representative
of
insurer
vas
estopped from arguing that son of victim
of automobile accident lacked authority ~o
compromise 'ier claims where he <new "ictim was ^competent md that io general
guardian had been appointed out iid not
object to authority of ^on, or :ounsel le
retained, and willingly entered nto settlement agreement with son wmcn contemolated "hat son would be aDpointed as
guardian at rhe time -hat court s aDproval
of settlement agreement was sougnt.
5. Mental Health 3=235
Even if son of mtomooile iccident '*ictim nad lacked authontv ro compromise her
:iaim m absence of lis oeine: nopomtea
general guardian, nis actions vere >uose]uently ratified oy mm after iis appointment as special administrator JI ms mother s estate, relating oacK to the ".me vnen
'he inauthonzed acts, f anv. vere lone.
o. Parent and Child >=12
Agreement between insurer ind son of
automobile accident -lctim reacned five
iays prior to victim s death vas not rendered unenforceable on theory that ner
death terminated any 'agencv" since "he
contract had been comDieted ?nor to ner
death.
7. Insurance <5=>579.3
Settlement between insurer ind son of
automobile accident "lctim was not "conditioned" on aDpointment of son as general
guardian and court aDproval, although 'etter confirming settlement agreement noted
that son would be appointed guardian and
release would be submitted to court, since
neither confirmation letter nor *estimony
indicated that contemplated occurrences
were expressed or implied conditions and
only indicated that payment was conditioned on appointment of guardian.
8. Insurance <s=>579.2
Insurer was not entitled to rescind settlement agreement reached with son of
automobile accident victim, although it was
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later learned that she had suffered from
pneumonia at the time of negotiations
which led to her death five days after
agreement was reached, since at time of
settlement both parties undertook a risk
that resolution of the uncertainty as to her
ieath might be anfavoraoie.
9. Release 3=16
An unknown consequence of known injury does not provide reiief to a parr." to a
release since party undertakes risk that
resolution of uncertainty might be unfavorable.

Wendail Bennett. Salt Lake City, for
Shipp.
Raymond M. 3errv. Robert Henderson.
Salt Lake City, for defendants and appelants.
Stuart -H. Schuitz. Salt Lake "[tv. for
Diaintiff and respondent.
DURHAM. Justice:

_^
7JE»
*55
^

Throughout February and March 1981.
the parries were unable to come to an
igreement. On March 23. 1981. Nelson
personally delivered a summons and complaint to Hess. It had not been filed with
the court. The action, entitled
Bnqham
•ind Priscilla Blackhurst
••. Leila Shipp.
Claimed 3500.000 m special damages for
Mrs. Blackhurst. SI. 000.000 in general
iamages. and .$500,000 for Mr. Blackhurst.
The next day. March 24. Hess and Nelson
orally agreed on a settlement figure of
•SI50.000. Nelson confirmed the agreement
oy letter, hand delivered that same lav.
On or around Wednesday. March 25. Nelson prepared a petition for appointment A
a :onservator for Mrs. Blackhurst and i
release in accordance with his agreement
vith Transamerica md submitted 'hem -o
"he Third District Court of Salt Lake County. The presiding probate judge requested
nat Xeison return >n Mondav Marcn .10.
vr.en the pronate cierK wouid return fmm
•acation and eouici lianole i i e filing ana
>UDmission ti the petition.

Plaintiff Robert 31acknurst brought this
iction as personal reor^sentative for "he
estates of his parents, Pnsciila and 3ngham Blackhurst. to enforce a settlement
agreement whereby the defendant insurer
had agreed to pay 8150,000 to settle Mrs.
31ackhurst's personal injury claim against
ts insured. Leila Shipp. The lower court in
I summary judgment held the agreement
enforceable although Mrs. 31ackhurst died
prior to the appointment of a general
guardian and approval of the settlement by
the court. We affirm.

Mrs. BlacKhurst iieu on Sunday. Marcn
J9. The "ause of ter ieath was "isteu is
'severe brain damage aue to a remote n]u*y -even months, possible pneumonia. '
Rooert Blackhurst was appointed special
administrator for his mother s estate m
April 1. Later that same day. Nelson .nformed Hess that Mrs. Blackhurst nad
died. Nelson was thereafter told that the
insurance company did not intend to pay
the amount named in the settlement documents.
Mr. Blackhurst died shortly
thereafter.

Mrs. Blackhurst, a relativeiy healthy 32year-old, was struck by a car driven by
Leila Shipp on August 21, 1980. Mrs.
Blackhurst suffered brain injury as a result of the accident and was rendered incompetent and unable to care for herself or
her husband. Robert Blackhurst began negotiations with Rex Hess, a Transamerica
agent, regarding his mother's personal injury claim in October 1980. In December
1980, he retained an attorney, Keith Nelson, to represent him. The insurer at all
times knew of Mrs. Blackhurst's condition.

The issue on appeal is whether the settlement agreement can be enforced by the
personal representative of Mrs. Blackhurst's estate. In an appeal from a summary judgment, we view the evidence and
all reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to
the losing party. Hall v. Warren, Utah,
632 P.2d 848, 849 (1981).
[1,2] We first address Transamerica's
argument that neither Robert Blackhurst
nor Keith Nelson had the authority to compromise the claims of Mrs. Blackhurst.

Specifically, Transamerica argues that only
general guardians can compromise the
claims of an incompetent person. We acknowledge this to be the general rule. See
Hansen t\ Gossett, Utah, -590 P.2d 1258.
1260 (1979). However, the rule requiring
guardians for incompetent persons is for
their protection. Morris >\ Russeil
120
Utah 545. 553. 236 P.2d 451. 455 il95i).
'Its purpose is not to burden nor hinder
them in enforcing their rights; nor to confer any privilege or advantage on persons
who claim adversely to them or who may
be trying to take advantage of them.' Id.
In the present case, the application of the
rule wouid not benefit the incompetent person or her estate, but rather would oenaiize
ner estate.
[31 Moreover, as plaintiff
argues.
Transamerica is estopped to deny that Nelson nad authority to enter into a oinding
settlement agreement with Transamerica
3n behaif of Mrs. Blackhurst. The elements of equitable estoppel are: ":onduct
oy one party which leads another party, .n
reliance thereon, to adopt a course of action resulting in detriment or damage if the
first party is permitted to repudiate his
conduct." United American
Life Insurmce Co. /». Zions First National
Bank.
Utah. 641 P.2d 158. 161 (1982) (footnote
omitted).
[4] In the present case, Hess. Transamerica s representative, knew that Mrs.
Blackhurst was incompetent to negotiate
on her own behalf, and he likewise knew
that no general guardian had yet been appointed. Hess nevertheless expressed no
concern about dealing with Robert Blackhurst and later Keith Nelson. No objections were raised with regard to Nelson s
authority to negotiate or enter into an
agreement. Hess willingly entered into a
settlement agreement with Nelson on
March 24 that was confirmed by the following letter from Nelson, hand delivered that
same day:
This will confirm the settlement of this
case on this date for $150,000, together
with the P I P benefits for the remainder
of the year.

Robert Blackhurst will be appointed as
guardian for Bngham and Priscilla
Blackhurst. his parents. Once this appointment has been completed, we will
present you with certified copies in exchange for the draft, and make arrangements for the filing of the appropriate
release.
Thus. Transamerica s agent Hess contemolated all along that the appointment of
Robert Blackhurst as guardian would occur
it the time the court's approval of the
settlement agreement was sought. To permit Transamerica to repudiate the agreement under those circumstances would deprive the Blackhursts" estates of the compensation the parties agreed would satisfv
Mrs. 31ackhurst's claims resulting from
*he automoDile accident and would be patently unfair. Transamerica is therefore estopped from claiming Nelson acKed authority :o negotiate as a means to avoid the
settlement agreement.
The Supreme
^ourt of Wisconsin, inder facts similar to
those in the present case, concluded that an
nsurer was estopped from objecting to an
ittorney s authority to negotiate a settlement contract on behaif of an incompetent
person where no oojection was raised at
any time during the negotiations. Carey n.
Dairyiana
Mutual
Insurance
Co.. 41
Wis.2d 107. 116-18. 163 N.W.2d 200. 20506 (1968).
[5] Finally, even if Nelson's acts on
Mrs. Blackhurst's behalf were unauthorized, as Transamerica now claims, they
were subsequently ratified by Robert
Blackhurst after he was appointed special
administrator of his mother's estate. See
Bradshaw v. McBride. Utah. 649 P.2d 74,
"8 (1982). Since ratification relates back to
the time when the unauthorized act was
done, id., the March 24 agreement between
Nelson and Hess is enforceable.
[6] Transamerica also claims that, assuming Nelson had authority to act on Mrs.
Blackhurst's behalf, her death caused such
authority to be revoked.
Restatement
(Second) of Agency § 120(1) (1958) is cited
for the proposition that the death of the
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principal terminates the authority of the
agent In our view, the agreement reached
by the parties on March 24, five days prior
to Mrs. Blackhurst's death, was a completed contract and as such is valid and enforceable. See Lawrence Construction
Co. v. Holmquist, Utah, 642 P.2d 382, 384
(1982). " 'An accord is an agreement between parties, one to give or perform, the
other to receive or accept, such agreed
payment or performance in satisfaction of
a claim.'" Id. (quoting Browning v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the
United States, 94 Utah 532, 549, 72 P.2d
1060,1068 (1937)). Therefore, whether any
"agency" terminated on the death of Mrs.
Blackhurst is irrelevant since the contract
was completed prior to her death.

3>
jj]j
^

approval would be undertaken before
Transamerica delivered its draft for $150,000, at which time the contract would be
fully performed. The equivalent of those
acts occurred when Robert Blackhurst was
appointed special administrator for his
mother's estate and special conservator for
his father and received court authorization
to execute releases in favor of Transamerica.
[8,9] Finally, Transamerica argues that
it is entitled to rescind because of a mutual
mistake of fact since neither Transamerica
nor Nelson knew that Mrs. Blackhurst had
pneumonia, which Transamerica argues
was the cause of her death. The trial court
concluded "that there is no mistake as to a
present or past fact of substantial nature
and that there is no nullification of the
agreement because of mistake." We
agree. The parties were not mistaken as
to Mrs. Blackhurst's brain injury resulting
from the accident There was, of course,
at the time of settlement negotiations, as in
every personal injury case, a conscious uncertainty regarding the medical outcome of
the victim's case. At the time of settlement both parties undertook a risk that
the resolution of the uncertainty might be
unfavorable. See Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 154(b) (1981).1 This Court will
not nullify a settlement contract because
one of the parties would have acted differently if all the future outcomes had been
known at the time of agreement

[7] Nor may Transamerica be excused
from performance on its theory that the
settlement was "conditioned" on the appointment of a general guardian and court
approval. Transamerica relies on Polyglycoat Corp. v. Holcomb, Utah, 591 P.2d 449
(1979), which held that a material breach by
one party permits the other party to rescind a contract Id at 451. That case is
inapposite here. The essential terms of the
settlement contract were agreed to by
Transamerica's representative. Nelson's
letter confirming the settlement agreement
noted that Robert Blackhurst would be appointed guardian and the release would be
submitted to the court Neither the confirmation letter nor the deposition testimony
of any of the parties indicates that these
We conclude that the trial court was
contemplated occurrences were express or
implied conditions to the $150,000 settle- correct in granting summary judgment to
ment agreement We have held previously plaintiff. Judgment affirmed. Costs to
that an enforceable accord was reached by plaintiff.
the parties. The record also supports the
conclusion that it was not the settlement
HALL, CJ., and HOMER F. WILKINagreement that was conditioned upon ap- SON, District Judge, concur.
pointment of a guardian and court approvHOWE, Justice (concurring in the result):
al. Rather, the appointment was a condition precedent to payment of the amount
I concur in the result reached by the
agreed on by the parties. The parties majority opinion but do so on different
merely agreed that appointment and court grounds.
1. Similar reasoning supports the rule that an
unknown consequence of known Injury does
not provide relief to a party to a release, Reyn-

otds v. MerriO, 23 Utah 2d 155, 156-57, 460 ?2d
323, 324 (1969). Plaintiff argues that the Reynolds reasoning is dispositive on this issue.

I view the offer made by Transamerica
to settle the personal injury claim of Priscilla Blackhurst as an option. Transamerica promised payment of $150,000 if
and when it received a legally binding release of her claim. Because Mrs. Blackhurst was incompetent neither Robert
Blackhurst nor Keith Nelson could give
any return promise that he could furnish
such a release since it did not lie wholly
within his power, control, and authority to
do so. Thus the transaction should be
viewed by principles of unilateral, not bilateral, contract
After Transamerica made its offer, Nelson set about to perform the requested act
ie.f obtain the release. He prepared and
presented to the district court a petition for
the appointment of a guardian for Mrs.
Blackhurst and for an order approving the
proposed settlement However, because
the probate clerk was absent from work
that day, the required appointment and approval could not be accomplished. Nonetheless, Nelson had begun the invited performance, with the result that the offer of
Transamerica became a binding option contract and could not thereafter be revoked.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 45
(1981) states:
§ 45. Option Contract Created by Part
Performance or Tender
(1) Where an offer invites an offeree to
accept by rendering a performance and
does not invite a promissory acceptance,
an option contract is created when the
offeree tenders or begins the invited performance or tenders a beginning of it
(2) The offeror's duty of performance
under any option contract so created is
conditional on completion or tender of
the invited performance in accordance
with the terms of the offer.
The foregoing rules were followed and
applied in Marvel v. Dannemann, 490
F.Supp. 170 (1980); Motel Services, Inc. v.
Central Maine Power Co., Me., 894 A.2d
786 (1978); Coffman Industries, Inc. v.
Gorman-Taber Co., MoApp., 521 S.W.2d
763 (1975); Sylvestre v. State, 298 Minn.
142, 214 N.W.2d 658 (1973); Weather-Gard

Industries, Inc. v. Fairfield Savings and
Loan Association, 110 Ill.App.2d 13, 248
N.E.2d 794 (1969); Marchiondo v. Scheck,
78 N.M. 440, 432 P.2d 405 (1967). Coffman Industries, Inc. v. Gorman-Taber
Co., supra, like the instant case, dealt with
the acceptance of an offer of settlement
There, an attorney for the bonding company of a general contractor transmitted an
offer to pay a subcontractor's claim if the
latter would resolve a collateral claim made
by one of his suppliers. The court held
that the beginning of negotiations by the
subcontractor to resolve the collateral
claim and his forebearing to sue the contractor were sufficient to create an option
contract which rendered the offer irrevocable. The court relied upon the principle
of law enunciated in 1 A.L. Corbin, Corbin
on Contracts § 49 (1963):
Where one party makes a promissory
offer in such form that it can be accepted
by the rendition of the performance that
is requested in exchange, without any
express return promise or notice of acceptance in words, the offeror is bound
by a contract just as soon as the offeree
has rendered a substantial part of that
requested performance.
Section 45 of the Restatement of Contracts
was also cited by the court in support of its
holding.
The death of Mrs. Blackhurst did not
terminate the offer or give Transamerica
grounds for revoking the offer. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 48 (1981)
states the general rule that an offeree's
power of acceptance is terminated when
the offeree or offeror dies but notes that
this rule does not affect option contracts
unless the death discharges the contractual
duty of the offeror because of failure of
consideration, frustration, impossibility, or
failure of condition. 1 A.L. Corbin, Corbin
on Contracts § 54 (1963) is in accord, stating that if an offer was a binding option
contract or has become so by the offeree's
action before his death, and if the contract
is not one that has become impossible of
performance by reason of the death, the
offeree's personal representatives can ac~
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cept the offer and consummate a contract
Therefore, the death of Mrs. Blackhurst did
not rob her estate of the right to complete
the invited performance and did not justify
Transamerica's attempted revocation. Neither Mrs. Blackhurst's personal involvement nor services were necessary to the
performance of the contract.
Transamerica received everything that it
had bargained for, viz., a full and complete
release of all claims of Mr. and Mrs. Blackhurst for her personal injury. It is true, as
contended for by Transamerica, that Nelson contemplated that the settlement
would have to be approved by the district
court in a guardianship proceeding for Mrs.
Blackhurst and that the release would be
signed by her legal guardian. That was
the proper procedure when she was alive.
However, it is clear that what Transamerica was bargaining for was a legally
binding release of her personal injury
claim, and the exact legal procedure by
which that release would be obtained was
not a material term of the settlement The
protection afforded to Transamerica by the
release which was actually given is not
diminished by the fact that it was executed
by the personal representative of Mrs.
Blackhurst's estate rather than by her
guardian. No claim is advanced by Transamerica that enforcement of the settlement
will leave it exposed to further liability for
Mrs. Blackhurst's personal injuries.
Contrary to Transamerica's contention,
there was no mutual mistake of fact which
would provide legal grounds for rescission
of the option contract Rex Hess, Transamerica's agent, Robert Blackhurst, and
Nelson knew of the precarious condition of
Mrs. Blackhurst and that she could die any
time or live for several years.
STEWART, Justice (dissenting):
I dissent It is uncontested that attorney
Keith Nelson had no authority to act for
Mrs. Blackhurst She was incompetent
and could not, therefore, enter into a contract herself. Since neither Mr. Nelson nor
anyone else was ever appointed guardian
for her, a Contract between her and anyone

else was void. While I have no doubt that
Mr. Nelson acted out of legitimate motivations in looking after Mrs. Blackhurst's
interests, Mr. Nelson was not, and could
not be, her agent or attorney in settling her
claim. Therefore, the agreement that Mr.
Nelson negotiated with Transamerica was
a complete nullity in the eyes of the law.
Indeed, Mr. Nelson knew he lacked authority and represented to Transamerica that
the settlement documents would be executed by a person who had authority to
sign for Mrs. Blackhurst
Not content with simply one rationale for
its conclusion, the majority advances three
reasons to support its result* (1) the settlement agreement is a valid contract because
the reasons for requiring the appointment
of a guardian were satisfied even though
not complied with; (2) Transamerica is estopped to deny that Mr. Nelson had authority to settle; and (3) even if Mr. Nelson had
no authority initially, his acts were subsequently ratified by Mrs. Blackhurst's estate. Since any one of the three, if valid,
should be satisfactory, it appears that even
the majority detects some flaw in each.
The majority states that the rule requiring appointment of a guardian was not
designed to burden or hinder an incompetent from enforcing his rights or to confer
an advantage on one who tries to take
advantage of an incompetent However,
the majority also recognizes the general
rule that only a general guardian can compromise the claims of an incompetent but
argues that in this case, application of that
rule "would not' benefit the incompetent
person or her estate, but rather would penalize her estate." In truth, application of
the rule does not penalize the estate.
It is fundamental law that Mrs. Blackhurst could not contract because she was
incompetent It is equally fundamental
that Mr. Nelson could not contract for her
because he had no authority to do so. Indeed, both orally and in its letter to Mr.
Nelson accompanying the settlement agreement Transamerica expressly conditioned
the settlement agreement upon the appointment of a genera] guardian. Mr. Nelson
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—Mrs. Blackhurst and her estate. A personal representative appointed to probate
an estate has different duties and represents different interests than a guardian of
an incompetent Each has a different legal
status, and each has different legal authority and power. It is quite true that the law
requiring the appointment of a guardian
should not be employed unfairly against an
incompetent Morris v. Russell, 120 Utah
545, 236 P.2d 451 (1951), stands for that
general statement as the majority points
out, but that case is far different on its
facts and hardly justifies overriding the
clear intent of Transamerica and Mr. Nelson that a guardian should be appointed.1
The majority's estoppel argument is also
devoid of merit The plain fact is that Mr.
Nelson, either as the putative guardian or
as the representative of the estate, did not
change his position because of any reliance
on Transamerica's representations. On the
contrary, it was Transamerica that relied
on Mr. Nelson's obligation to obtain the
requisite authority. That was an express
condition of the compromise agreement
The majority suggests that it would be
"patently unfair" to hold in favor of Transamerica because Mrs. Blackhurst's estate
would be penalized if Transamerica were
not held liable. The majority does not explain how that can possibly be; the facts
indicate quite the opposite. The settlement
was to provide Mrs. Blackhurst sufficient
money to take care of her needs until she
died. Before Mr. Nelson accepted the settlement offer of $150,000, he proposed a
settlement of $182,000 based on a yearly
maintenance figure of $26,000 per year,
assuming that Mrs. Blackhurst would live
for seven years. Other settlement figures
that Mr. Nelson proposed assumed a life
expectancy of as long as eleven years. ObFurthermore, the majority fails to distin- viously the damage calculations were inguish between two different jural entities tended to support Mrs. Blackhurst while

knew that the agreement was contingent
The majority's statement that "[n]o objections were raised with regard to Nelson's
authority to negotiate or enter into an
agreement" is plainly wrong. Transamerica's insistence upon the appointment
of a guardian was founded on the elementary proposition, accepted by everyone in
the case, that Mr. Nelson had no authority
to act for Mrs. Blackhurst. Transamerica
knew it could not settle with Mr. Nelson as
an individual. Indeed, had Transamerica
been so heedless of basic law, it could have
been compelled to pay a second time to a
duly authorized guardian. Furthermore, it
was Mr. Nelson's responsibility to obtain
the necessary judicially authorized authority. It was not the duty of Transamerica to
object to his lack of authority. The majority's position that there was in fact a contract with Transamerica simply turns the
law of contracts on its head.
To hold that Mr. Nelson entered into a
contract binding on Mrs. Blackhurst or her
guardian is fraught with far-reaching consequences. If the agreement between Nelson and Transamerica is valid in the instant
case, then it would have to be binding no
matter how improvident the terms of the
contract The law governing guardians
and the contractual capacity of incompetent
persons is designed to protect the incompetent But how can an incompetent be protected if he can be bound by contracts
made by interlopers who are not appointed
by a court? I have no doubt that Mr.
Nelson sought to protect Mrs. Blackhurst's
interest with zeal and sound judgment in
this particular case. But what if someone
else had settled Mrs. Blackhurst's claim for
one-half or one-tenth the amount? How
and by whom would the incompetent's interests then be protected?

1. In Morris v. Russet the plaintiff himself was
the incompetent who brought a contract action
for the value of services rendered. There, strict
application of the rule would have indeed hindered the plaintiff from enforcing his right In
the instant case, the incompetent is not the
plaintiff. She is deceased. Thus, Morris has no

application here. Indeed, the law, as applied,
swallows the rule requiring the appointment of
guardians and would allow an unauthorized
person to compromise a claim against an Incompetent even if it is prejudicial to the incompetent.

696

Utah

699 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

she lived and not benefit her heirs. To ble for conversion, precluding summary
give the estate the damages intended for judgment, and (2) genuine issues of fact
Mrs. Blackhurst's living and medical ex- existed with respect to whether tenant suspenses, as well as her general damages, is tained intentional infliction of emotional
not required by any notion of fairness with distress, precluding summary judgment.
which I am familiar. The estate may well
Reversed and remanded.
have had a wrongful death action for Mrs.
Stewart,
J., concurred in the result
Blackhurst's death, but that is an entirely
different cause of action based on an entirely different measure of damages. The
1. Judgment «=185.2(5)
short of it is that the majority's position
Verified complaint, sworn to upon perthat it would be "patently unfair" if Transamerica were not held liable because the sonal knowledge, sufficed to controvert afestate would be penalized is, I submit, fidavit filed by defendant in support of
motion for summary judgment
plainly in error. Enforcement of the agreement in this case simply results in a wind- 2. Judgment «=»185.1<1)
fall to the heirs of Mrs. Blackhurst
Verified pleading, made under oath
I would reverse.
and meeting requirements of affidavits established in summary judgment rule, can
ZIMMERMAN, J., does not participate be considered equivalent of affidavit for
purposes of motion for summary judgment
herein.
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 56(e).
JTIM>

_^
™
10

Lolita PENTECOST, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
M.W. HARWARD and John Does I
through III, Defendants and
Respondents.
No. 19070.
Supreme Court of Utah.
March 1, 1985.
Tenant brought action against manager and unknown owners arising out of her
eviction. The Fourth District Court, Utah
County, J. Robert Bullock, J., granted manager's motion for summary judgment, and
tenant appealed. The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held that (1) genuine issues of
fact existed with respect ^whether-inanager was acting under a privilege of his
principal and whether he could be held lia-

3. Judgment *=>185.1(8)
Although neither verification in complaint nor in affidavit submitted on motion
for summary judgment stated that facts
set forth in pleading were true and correct
to personal knowledge of signer and both
attempted to verify entire contents of
pleading, not just factual assertion, where
neither party objected to form or content of
other's verified pleading and/or affidavit,
any evidentiary objections were waived.
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 56(e).
4. Principal and Agent «= 159(2)
If agent commits tort while acting on
behalf of his principal, fact that he is an
agent does not insulate him from liability
to injured party.
5. Landlord and Tenant <&=>274(2)
Absent compliance with statutes governing landlord and tenant relationship,
seizing tenant's property by self-help is a
civil wrong and is actionable as a tort
U.C.A.19#3, 38^3-1, 3&-3-4.
6. Judgment *»181(6)
In action brought by tenant against
manager and unknown owners, genuine issue of fact existe4"as to whether manager

PENTECOST v. HARWARD
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was acting under a privilege of his principal and could be held liable for conversion,
precluding summary judgment
7. Landlord and Tenant «=»24(1)
Self-help is too likely to lead to breach
of peace to be permitted, and contractual
provisions in lease purporting to authorize
it will be void as against public policy.
8. Damages «=»49.10
Landlord and Tenant «= 180(4)
One who resorts to self-help is liable to
evicted tenant for all damages proximately
caused by eviction, including mental pain
and suffering.
9. Judgment «=>181(24)
In action brought by tenant against
manager and unknown owners arising out
of eviction, genuine issue of fact existed as
to whether tenant sustained intentional infliction of emotional distress, precluding
summary judgment
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lying instead on her complaint, which contradicted both defendant's answer and the
affidavit accompanying his motion for summary judgment The district court granted
Harvard's motion, apparently on the
ground that no counter-affidavit had been
filed. We hold that plaintiffs verified complaint, which controverted the facts set
forth in Harward's affidavit, created a material issue of fact for resolution at trial.
We further hold that even if plaintiffs
complaint had not been verified, the allegations of her complaint that were not addressed by Harward's affidavit were sufficient to support claims against him on several theories. We therefore reverse and
remand for further proceedings.

The complaint alleged that plaintiff "had
leased" an apartment from defendant; that
she resided there with her two children;
that defendants, "without court order,
forcefully and illegally evicted" plaintiff;
that plaintiff tendered payment of rent,
which defendants refused to accept; that
10. Damages *=»49.10
defendants "unlawfully retained [plainOne who intentionally causes severe tiffs personal property and refused . . . to
emotional distress to another through ex- return it to her"; that as a result of the
treme and outrageous conduct is liable to eviction, her children "were exposed to rain
that person for any resulting damages. and cold and subsequently became ill";
that defendant Harward was an agent for
Ronald E. Dalby, Provo, for plaintiff and the owner of the premises; that the actions
of defendant were intentional and maliappellant
cious; and that plaintiff was entitled to
Jay Fitt, Provo, for defendants and re- damages for conversion of her property
spondents.
and for expenses incurred as a result of the
eviction and the detention of the property,
ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
as well as punitive damages.1 Plaintiff
In this action, a tenant sued the manager also sought return of personal property
and the unknown owners) of the apart- described in a two-page list attached to the
ment in which she lived for forcibly evict- complaint This list appears to include all
ing her and her two children and for retain- property in the apartment at the time of
ing her furniture and personal possessions, eviction. Among the items listed are three
all without resort to judicial process. De- rooms of furniture, dishes and kitchen
fendant Harward, the manager, filed a ver- utensils, a clothes dryer, toilet articles from
ified answer to plaintiffs verified com- the bathroom, clothing for plaintiff and her
plaint and later moved for summary judg- children, towels and washcloths, rugs, chilment, supporting his motion with an affida- dren's toys, and a crib. The complaint was
vit Plaintiff filed no counter-affidavit, re- verified by plaintiff.*
1. Throughout the complaint, the word "defendant" appears to have been used to refer to defendant Harward, while the word "defendants"
seems to refer to all defendants.

2. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do' not
formally recognize a verified complaint, a creature well known to code pleading states. See,
e.g., Cal.Code Civ.P. § 446 (West 1973 & Supp.
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Stanley H. HONIIAM and Anne M. lionham, Boyd F. Summerhnys, and Arleen
M. Summerhays, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
Robert L. MORGAN. Utah State Engineer, Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District, a Political Subdivision of
the State of Utah and a Body Corporate, and Draper Irrigation Company, a
Utah Corporation, Defendants and Appellee.
No. 880113.
Supreme Court of Utah
Feb 23, 1989
Rehearing Denied March ?A, 1990
Action was brought challenging state
engineer's decision on permanent change
application. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, Raymond S. Uno, .1., entered
summary judgment for engineer, and plain
tiffs appealed. The Supreme Court held
that state engineer is required to undertake same investigation in permanent
change applications that statute mandates
in applications for water appropriations.
Vacated.
Norman H. Jackson, Court of Appeals
Judge, concurs.

3. Waters and Water Courses ^=145
State engineer is required to undertake
same investigation in permanent change
applications that statute mandates in applications for water appropriations. U.C.A.
1953, 73-3-3, 73-3-8.

James A. Mcintosh, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiffs and appellants.
R Paul Van Dam, Michael M. Quealy,
John H. Mabey, Jr., Salt Lake City, for
Utah State Engineer.
LeRoy S. Axland, Carl F Huefner, Kendrick J. Hafen. Salt Lake City, for Salt
Lake Water Conservancy Dist.
Lee Kapaloski, David L. Deisley, Salt
Lake City, for Draper Irrigation Co.
William J. Lockhart, Salt Lake City, for
Nat Parks and Conservation Ass'n.
Dallin W Jensen, Salt Lake City, for
Weber and Davis Counties Canal Co.
Edward W Clyde, Salt Lake City, for
Central Utah Water Conservancy Dist.
Joseph Novak, Salt Lake City, for Provo
River Water Users Ass'n.
Ray L. Montgomery, Salt Lake City, for
Salt Lake City.
Thorpe A. Waddingham, Delta, for Delta
('anal.
PKR CURIAM:

1. Appeal and Error 0=^863
Inasmuch as challenge to summary
judgment presents for review conclusions
of law only, because, by definition, summa
r
.V judgments do not resolve factual issues,
Supreme Court reviews thosp conclusions
for correctness, without according defer
ence to trial court's legal conclusions

Plaintiffs appeal from a summary judgment which denied them standing to pursue
count one of their complaint against the
state1 engineer. The summary judgment
was certified final under rule 54(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to vest this
Court with jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(e)(v)
(Supp.1988).

2. Appeal and Error <s=>842<8)
Same lack of deference which applies
to review of trial court's conclusions of law
on summary judgment motions applies to
trial court's interpretation of statutes,
which likewise poses question of law.

Plaintiff Stanley B. Bonham, who is not a
water user, protested against a permanent
change application filed under Utah Code
Ann. § 73-3-3 (1980)' in the office of the
defendant state engineer (state engineer) in
June of 1984 by defendants Salt Lake

1. Here, as well cis in the following, we confine
oui nnnlvsis to the \ersions of the Mntutes in

offer! on Deeember 26, 1985, the date of the
state enpineoi's mrniotnndum derision.
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engineer under section 1A A A The sum
mary judgment lifted the stay imposed bv
section 1A A I I on the appioval of the per
inanent change application. The order was
certified ;m final under rtile 51(1)) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Plaintiffs appealed. This Court granted
the request of the National Parks and Con
servation Association (NPCA) to intervene
as amicus curiae and granted w like re
(piest by Weber Hasin Water Conservancy
District, Weber River Water Users Associ
at ion, Mavis and Weber Counties Canal
Company. Mraper Irrigation
Company.
Sandy City. Central Utah Water Cnnsen
ancy Mistrict. Salt Pake County Water Con
servancy Mistrict. and Prove River Water
Users Association (the water users).
Plaintiffs a l i g n e d p n n p i in the trial
court's riding that (1) summary judgment
in favor* of the «;tafe engineer was proper;
(2) plaintiffs wore not "aggrieved persons"
within the meaning of section ~A A 1 J; and
(A) the state engineer's duties and responsi
bilities out liner] in section 7.'{ 'A S did not
apply to permanent change applications
covered by section 1'A 'A A. At oral argu
ment, the parties concecled that the ques
tion of whether plaintiffs are aggrieved
persons within the meaning of section 1A
A 14 turns on whether the scope of the
considerations appropriate for the state en
gineer under :\ section TA A A proceeding
for a permanent change application is the
same as that listed in section TA A S. I f it
is, the state engineer concedes that plain
t i f f s are aggrieved persons; if it is not.
plaintiffs concede that they are not ag
grieved persons and that summary j u d g
ment was proper. The issues before us
may therefore be reduced to the question
of whether in permanent change applica
tions (section ?.'* A A) the state engineer
has the same duties w i t h respect to appro\
al or rejection of applications as he has
when considering appropriation applica
tions (section 1A A H). We hold that the
state engineer's duties under the two stat
utes are the same and that plaintiffs there
fore are aggrieved persons entitled to a
2. This section was passr<| in l ( U7 and has nn
dergone slight changes twice sime 1(^Q, I 1Q86
c k 40. § 1; I 1087 < h. I M , 5 >8<> hut mill
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trial on the merits of count one of their
complaint
I I. 2 | Inasmuch as a challenge to sum
mary judgment presents for review conclusions of law only, because, by definition,
summary judgments do not resolve factual
issues, this Court reviews those conclusions
for correctness, without according deference to the trial court's legal conclusions.
Madscu r. Borthick, 7(H) P.2d 245, (Utah
1JWH). That same lack of deference applies
to the trial court's interpretation of statutes, which likewise poses a question of
law
Asm/ r Wat Inns, 751 p. 2d 1135
(Utah M>SK).
Utah Code Ann. § 1A A A (19S0),2 at the
time the state engineer rendered his decision, read in pertinent part:
Any person entitled to the use of water
may change1 the place of diversion or use
and may use the water for other purposes than those for which it was originally appropriated, but no such change
shall be made if it impairs any vested
right without just compensation. Such
changes may be permanent or temporary. Changes for an indefinite length
of time with an intention to relinquish
the original point of diversion, place or
purpose of use are defined as permanent changes
Temporary
changes include and are limited to all changes for
definitely fixed periods of not exceeding
one year. Hoth permanent and temporary changes of point of diversion, place
or purpose of use of water including
water involved in general adjudication or
other suits, shall be made in the manner
provided herein and not otherwise.
No permanent change shall be made
except on the approval of an application
therefor by the state e n g i n e e r . . . .
The
procedure in the state engineer's
office
and rights and duties of the
applicants
with respect to applications for
permanent changes of point
of
diversion,
place or purpose of use shall be the
same as provided in this title for applitetains the same PH7 language that is determinant to our decision in this case.
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er and contractor appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Davidson, J., held that: (1) lien
was untimely filed, and (2) contractor's
claim for profits was not within contemplation of mechanic's lien statute.
Affirmed.

We hold that the Air Terminal note is a
negotiable instrument and First Federal is
a holder in due course. The judgment of
the trial court is, therefore, reversed, and
the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

1. Appeal and Error <3=863
Because a summary judgment is a
matter of law, appellate court will give no
particular deference to trial court's conclusions, and will apply the same standard as
that applied by the trial court. Rules Civ.
Proc, Rule 56(c).

MY NUMUR SYSTIM>

T3

en

Jack C. DANIELS, Third-Party
Plaintiff and Appellant.
v.
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS &
LOAN ASSOCIATION, A-One Construction, Inc., Miller Brick Sales, Eugene E. Doms, and Michael R. McCoy,
Respondents.
CEN CORPORATION, Plaintiff,
Jack C. DANIELS, Debra Estes, Scott
Berry, Debra Ann Sitzberger, and
Amy Stanton Eagleson, Defendants.
No. 880135-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
April 5, 1989.
Rehearing Denied April 26, 1989.
General contractor brought action
against construction lender and others, to
foreclose mechanic's lien. In another action, current owner moved to declare lien
void. The Third District Court, Summit
County, Philip R. Fishier, J., granted summary judgment in favor of lender, and own-
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ary duty in doing so. The assignment of
the note does not vitiate Air Terminal's
claim of indemnification against Gump &
Ayers and Sunayers for funds expended to
satisfy the Morse Shortfall. In summary,
we do not find § 70A-3-304(2) defeats
First Federal's status as a holder in due
course.

GARFF and DAVIDSON, JJ., concur.

DANIELS v. DESERET FEDERAL SAV. & LOAN

2. Mechanics' Liens «= 132(7)
"Completion of the contract," within
100 days of which general contractor must
file mechanic's lien, is marked by the end
of a related series of tasks.
Sec publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
3. Mechanics' Liens «=»132(8)
Day spent by general contractor inspecting frozen water pipe damage and
contacting subcontractors to make repair
work did not substantially relate to performance of the contract but rather was
trivial, and could not be used to extend
date of completion for purposes of filing
notice of mechanic's lien. U.C.A.1953, 381-7.
4. Mechanics' Liens «=>35
General contractor's claim for profit
that he was entitled to as investor in condominium project did not constitute an "improvement to realty," or "services" or "materials" contemplated by mechanic's lien
statute. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-3.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

Gordon A. Madsen, Murray, and Robert
C. Cummings, Salt Lake City, for third-party plaintiff and appellant
David R. Olsen, Carl F. Huefner, and
Charles P. Sampson, Salt Lake City, for
respondents.

Before DAVIDSON, GARFF and
JACKSON, JJ.
OPINION
DAVIDSON, Judge:
Jack C. Daniels appeals from a summary
judgment in favor of Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Association, dismissing his
notice to hold and claim a lien on property
for which he was both a co-owner and the
general contractor. Daniels' claim concerned the timeliness of filing his notice
and the profits owed to him as a limited
partner in Park Avenue Development Company ("Park Avenue"). The trial court
held that his lien was both untimely and
invalid. We affirm.
FACTS
In 1980, Daniels invested approximately
$28,000 in the development of an eight-unit
condominium project in Park City, Utah,
thereby acquiring an interest through a
limited partnership in Park Avenue. The
agreement between Park Avenue and Daniels provided that Daniels would receive
approximately $80,000 for his share in the
profits from the sale of the condominiums
and for overhead. Park Avenue also hired
Daniels to serve as the general contractor
for the condominium project and agreed to
pay him approximately $15,000 for his services.
On August 14, 1980, Deseret approved a
construction loan to Park Avenue and construction on the project commenced. By
the end of July 1981, Daniels had completed all of the construction required pursuant
to the construction contract and Park City
issued certificates of final inspection and
occupancy for the project. Daniels was
paid $15,000 for services and labor, but was
not paid his promised share of the profits
from the sale of the condominiums.

allocate his share of the profits to him
within two weeks. In reliance on this
promise, Daniels did not file his mechanic's
lien within the requisite 100 day period.
However, the promised payment was not
made.
On December 1, 1981, several water
pipes in the condominiums froze. The owners called Daniels to inspect the pipes and
to make repairs. Daniels inspected the
pipes and made phone calls to subcontractors in order to facilitate repairs. On February 3, 1982, Daniels filed a notice of lien
against the project, claiming a lien for the
$80,000 "profit." He listed December 1,
1981, as the last day labor had been furnished on the project.
In October 1983, Daniels filed a complaint against Deseret to foreclose his
claimed lien on the property. Deseret's
construction loan to Park Avenue was secured by deeds of trust which Deseret executed February 22, 1982, and recorded
March 1, 1982. Deseret subsequently
moved to dismiss Daniels' complaint on the
basis that Daniels' lien was not filed in a
timely fashion as required by Utah Code
Ann. § 38-1-7 (1988) and therefore, Daniels had no cause of action as a matter of
law. CEN Corporation, subsequent owner
of the real property, also moved to declare
Daniels' lien void. The trial court agreed
that Daniels had not timely filed a mechanic's lien and therefore granted summary
judgment in favor of Deseret and CEN
Corporation.
Daniels raises two issues on appeal: Did
the trial court err when it found Daniels'
work on December 1, 1981, did not extend
the time limit for filing a notice to hold and
claim a lien? Did the trial court err when
it held Deseret is not estopped from raising
the affirmative defense that the mechanic's
lien was not timely filed?

Apparently, Daniels intended to file a
STANDARD OF REVIEW
notice to hold and claim a lien on the
[1]
A
court may grant summary judgproject, for the $80,000 "profit," within the
statutory period required for filing. How- ment if the evidence shows "that there is
ever, the owners of the project were trying no genuine issue as to any material fact
to obtain refinancing and they requested and that the moving party is entitled to a
Daniels not to file his mechanic's lien for judgment as a matter of law." Utah R.Civ.
the profit and overhead. In return, the P. 56(c). Because a summary judgment is
owners promised Daniels that they would a matter of law, the appellate court gives
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the trial court's conclusions no particular
deference but rather applies the same standard as that applied by the trial court.
Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah
App.1987). However, "[o]n appeal from a
summary judgment, we review the evidence in a light most favorable to the losing party." Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l
Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987); Geneva Pipe Co. v. S & H Ins. Co., 714 P.2d
648, 649 (Utah 1986).
TIME OF FILING—EXTENSION
[2] A general contractor must record a
mechanic's lien within 100 days after completion of the contract Utah Code Ann.
§ 3&-1-7 (1988). Completion is marked by
the end of a related series of tasks required
for substantial completion of the contract.
"Trivial or minor adjustments made casually or long after the main work is completed
cannot be used to tie on to as the last labor
done or materials furnished." Wilcox v.
Cloward, 88 Utah 503, 56 P.2d 1, 6-7
(1936).

"O
JJ>
m
i__i
-£*

[3] Well over 100 days after completion
of the contract, Daniels spent a day inspecting the damage from the frozen water
pipes and calling subcontractors in order to
make repairs. Daniels contends that this
extends the period for filing his mechanic's
lien. However, the trial court found:
The work the owners wanted done in
December of 1981 was not a continuation
of the earlier project, but merely repairs.
If repairs to a completed project could be
construed as extending the time in which
a mechanic's lien could be filed, mechanic's [sic] liens could be filed many years
after a project had been completed.
We agree with the trial court's findings.
In order to extend the time for filing his
mechanic's lien, the work Daniels did in
December 1981 would have to substantially
relate to the performance of the contract
"The work done or material furnished must
be something substantial in connection
with the performance of the contract and
this is not satisfied by trivialties which may
be used as a pretext to extend the lien
period." Palombi v. D & C Builders, 22
Utah 2d 297, 452 P.2d 325, 327 (1969).

In Palombi the original contractor argued that the date of completion was the
date on which the building permit was obtained and some remaining building materials were removed from the property owner's residence. The court held that these
were trivial activities in light of the substantial completion of the contract, and
they could not be used to extend the date
of completion. Similarly, the inspection
and repairs undertaken by Daniels in December 1981 were not services used in the
construction, alteration, or improvement of
the building, nor did the services add directly to the value of the property. Therefore, the inspection cannot'extend the time
period for filing notice of a mechanic's lien.
Daniels contends that Park Avenue and
subsequent owners are estopped from
pleading untimely filing of the notice of the
lien as an affirmative defense because he
was induced by the project owners not to
file a lien within the requisite 100 day filing
period. Deseret contends that it had no
knowledge of the agreement between Park
Avenue and Daniels and that it was not in
privity with Daniels. Therefore, Deseret
argues, estoppel cannot be asserted against
it
SERVICES AND MATERIALS
FURNISHED
[4] We do not need to reach the merits
of the estoppel argument Even if Daniels
had filed a timely notice for the $80,000
owing to him for "profit and overhead/'
this amount was not owed to him for the
value of the services he rendered or for
materials furnished but from his ownership
in Park Avenue as a limited partner. Utah
Code Ann. § 38-1-3 (1988) provides that
contractors, subcontractors, and laborers
who furnish material, provide services, or
bestow labor for the construction, alteration, or improvement of a building or structure shall have a lien upon the property for
the value of the services and material provided. The value of the services provided
by Daniels in his performance as general
contractor, was approximately $15,000, for

1

which he was compensated.
The purpose of the mechanic's lien law
"is to preclude landowners from having
their lands improved by others, without
becoming personally responsible for the
reasonable value of materials and labor."
Cox Rock Prod. v. Walker Pipeline
Constr., 754 P.2d 672 (Utah App.1988). In
order to ascertain when an improvement
has been made upon the land, for purposes
of determining whether notice of a mechanic's lien can validly be filed, it is necessary
that "there be an annexation to the land, or
to some part of the realty; or a fixture
appurtenant to it, and this must have been
done with the intention of making it a
permanent part thereof." King Bros., Inc.
v. Utah Dry Kiln Co., 374 P.2d 254, 256
(Utah 1962).
Daniels' claim is for the profits he was
entitled to as an investor and not for any
services or materials that he provided as a
contractor. The profits a person is entitled
to as the result of an investment do not
constitute improvements to the realty nor
do they fall within the statutory meaning
of services or materials as contemplated in
the mechanic's lien law statutes. Accordingly, Daniels' notice to hold and claim a
lien, for the profits allegedly owing to him,
is invalid. Therefore, the summary judgment in favor of Deseret is affirmed.
GARFF and JACKSON, JJ., concur
in the result.
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Sharon Kay REDDISH, Plaintiff,
v.
SENTINEL CONSUMER PRODUCTS;
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah,
and Second Injury Fund, Defendants.
No. 880272-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
April 6, 1989.
Workers' compensation claimant obtained writ of review appealing an order of
the Industrial Commission denying claim
for benefits. The Court of Appeals, Robert
L. Newey, Senior Judge, sitting by special
appointment, held that temporary disability
benefits were properly terminated.
Affirmed.
1. Workers' Compensation <*»854
Critical point for termination of temporary disability benefits is "medical stabilization," defined as time when period of
healing has ended and condition of claimant
will not materially improve.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

2. Workers' Compensation «=»854
Medical stabilization, which is critical
point for termination of temporary disability benefits, is independent of ability of
claimant to return to work.
3. Workers' Compensation «=»854
Temporary disability benefits were
properly terminated upon finding of medical stabilization, even though worker's
compensation claimant's attending physician continued to advise her not to return
to work.
John T. Caine, Ogden, for plaintiff.
James Black and Wendy Moseley, Salt
Lake City, for defendants.
Before DAVIDSON, NEWEY» and
ORME, JJ.

1. It is undisputed that approximately $15,000
was paid to Daniels for his services as contractor. What the "overhead" represented is unclear. In any case, failure to properly preserve
the lien right precludes any claim that this overhead should be the subject of a lien.

1. Robert L. Newey, Senior Juvenile Court
Judge, sitting by special appointment pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. section 78-3-24<l)(j) (1987).
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FMA ACCEPTANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
LEATHERBY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Globe General Agency, Carl A. Hulbert,
and Carl F. Warnick, Defendants and
Respondents.
Nos. I587I, 15914.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 17, 1979.

Company which had contracted in writing with insurer to finance insurance premiums brought suit against the insurer, its
officers and directors and others, seeking to
recover for alleged negligence and conversion. The Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, David B. Dee, J., dismissed plaintiffs cause of action against the individual
officers and directors for failure to state a
claim and refused to grant plaintiffs motion to amend the complaint. Plaintiff appealed, and the Supreme Court, Hall, J.,
held that summary judgment was precluded
by the existence of substantial issues of
material fact relating to the conversion and
negligence claims.
Vacated and remanded.

1. Corporations «=» 310(2)
Under the standard of care that is applicable to directors and officers of a corporation, directors must exercise ordinary
care, skill and diligence and must give the
business under their care such attention as
an ordinarily discreet business person would
give to his own concerns under similar circumstances.
2. Insurance <*=»35
In suit wherein company which contracted with insurer to finance insurance

premiums sought to recover from directors
and officers of the insurer for negligence
and conversion, questions whether the directors and officers converted unearned
premiums and whether they exercised ordinary care, skill and diligence over the insurer's business affairs should have been reserved for the finder of fact.
3. Judgment «= 181(3)
Summary judgment is appropriate only
when the favored party makes a showing
which precludes as a matter of law awarding any relief to the losing party. Rules of
Civil Procedure, rule 56(c).
4. Negligence «=» 136(8, 9, 14)
Issues of negligence ordinarily present
questions of fact to be resolved by the fact
finder; it is only when the facts are undisputed and but one reasonable conclusion
can be drawn therefrom, that such issues
become questions of law.
5. Judgment <t» 181(23)
In suit wherein company which contracted with insurer to finance insurance
premiums sought to recover from the insurer and from its directors and officers for
negligence and conversion, summary judgment was precluded by the existence of
substantial issues of material fact relating
to the conversion and negligence claims.
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 56(c).

Milo S. Marsden and David F. Klomp, of
Marsden, Orton & Liljenquist, Salt Lake
City, for plaintiff and appellant.
Ray R Christensen, Donald J. Winder,
Salt Lake City, for defendants and respondents.
HALL, Justice:
Plaintiff, FMA Acceptance Company,
(hereinafter "FMA"), appeals from a summary judgment of dismissal of its cause of
action against defendants, Carl F. Warnick,

(hereinafter "Warnick"), and Carl A. Hulbert, (hereinafter "Hulbert"), for failure to
state a claim for negligence and conversion.
FMA also appeals the refusal of the trial
court to grant its motion to amend the
complaint and the granting of costs to Hulbert and Warnick.
Defendant, Globe General Agency, (hereinafter "Globe"), is the corporate agent of
defendant, Leatherby Insurance Company,
(hereinafter "Leatherby"), and Hulbert and
Warnick each hold individual agent's certificate of appointment from the State of
Utah as agents of Leatherby. Hulbert
founded Globe and is the sole shareholder
(with the exception of qualifying shares).
Warnick is president and Hulbert is secretary-treasurer and director of Globe.
FMA contracted in writing with Globe to
finance insurance premiums. FMA would
pay the insurance premiums of Globe's customers desiring financing and take an assignment of the insured's interest in the
insurance contract. The contractual agreement, and the insurance policies as well,
provided that Globe would pay over to FMA
all unearned premiums resulting from policy cancellations.
No unearned premiums were refunded.
FMA made claim for $34,945.48 and negoti- ,
ated with Hulbert and Warnick for payment. This resulted in a referral to a certified public accountant for an audit which
confirmed that the sum of $26,035.44 was
owing but that the remaining sum of
$8,909.64 required further analysis.
Globe sold its business to Leatherby without completing the accounting and without
making any refunds and such prompted the
filing of this action.
As indicated by the trial court, its summary judgment resolved two issues: (1)
that Hulbert and Warnick were not agents
1. 19 Utah 289, 57 P 287 (1899)

within the meaning of U.C.A., 1953, 31-1722(2) so as to place them in the capacity of
fiduciaries requiring them to account for
unearned premiums, and (2) that there was
no actionable negligence on the part of
Hulbert and Warnick in the management of
the corporate affairs of Globe. In regard to
the latter determination, the trial court relied upon the case of Warren v. Robison,1
stating in its memorandum decision "that
Warnick and Hulbert
meet the
standards of Warren v. Robinson [Robison]
and therefore they are dismissed
under plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action."
(Emphasis added.)
In addition to its memorandum decision,
the trial court saw fit to formulate written
findings of fact,2 and the following excerpts
therefrom are further demonstrative of its
ruling9. Defendants Warnick and Hulbert
did not convert to their own use any
unearned premium monies or credits.
10. As officers and directors of defendant Globe General Agency, defendants Warnick and Hulbert exercised ordinary care, skill and diligence over the
business affairs of defendant Globe General Agency.
The Warren2 case appears to be at the
very nub of this appeal. Despite the fact
that the trial court relied upon Warren in
reaching its decision, Hulbert and Warnick
urge this Court to expressly overrule it.
They no doubt do so in recognition of the
fact that said case is not supportive of
summary judgment and, on the contrary,
would appear to dictate that a trial be had
on the merits.
[1] In Warren, the plaintiffs therein
sued the directors and officers of a bank for
negligence in the management of a bank.
12 or 56 or any other motion except as provided in Rule 41(b)

2. See URCP, Rule 52(a) which renders such
unnecessary on decision on motions under Rule 3. Supra, footnote 1

1334

Utah

594 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

3>
CT>
*—»
^

that factual issues such as are present here
may be determined summarily. In fact, the
result therein is to the contrary.

The rule most in harmony with
the character and well-being of such an
institution appears to be that the directors, in administering its affairs, must
exercise ordinary care, skill, and diligence. Under this rule, it is necessary
for them to give the business, under their
care such attention as an ordinarily discreet business man would give to his own
concerns under similar circumstances, and
it is therefore incumbent upon them to
devote so much of their time to their
trust as is necessary to familiarize them
with the business of the institution, and
to supervise and direct its operations.
If, however, directors, acting in
good faith, and with reasonable care,
skill, and diligence, nevertheless fall into
a mistake, either of law or fact, they will
not be liable for the consequences of such
mistake. [Emphasis added.]

[2] Inherent in the trial court's conclusion "that Warnick and Hulbert
meet the standards of Warren v. Robinson
[Robison]" and that "Warnick and Hulbert
did not convert
any unearned
premiums," and that they "exercised ordinary care, skill and diligence over the business affairs of Globe," is the determination
of disputed issues of fact, viz., conversion
and negligence. Said issues should have
been reserved for the finder of fact.
[3] A summary judgment is appropriate
only where the favored party makes a
showing which precludes, as a matter of
law, the awarding of any relief to the losing
party.1
The case of Webb v. Olin Mathieson
Chemical Corporation1 stated the following:
It is the declared policy of this
court to zealously protect the right of
trial by jury and not to take issues from
them and rule as a matter of law except
in clear cases.

We are not convinced that the standard
The court therein cited Newton v. 0. S. L.
of care espoused in Warren should be dis9
turbed. Although there is some division of R. Co. which stated the following:
4
unless the question of negliauthority, the standard is well-supported
gence is free from doubt, the court canby respected authority.*
not pass upon it as a question of law;
Turning now to the matter of the trial
if
the court is in
court's reliance upon Warren, it appears
doubt whether reasonable men, .
that such reliance was somewhat misplaced.
might arrive at different conclusions,
This is so since, although Warren does esthen this very doubt determines the questablish the standard of care to be applied, it
tion to be one of fact for the jury and not
stands as no authority for the proposition
one of law for the court.
4. See annotation in 29 A.L.R.3d 660

FMA ACCEPTANCE CO. v. LEATHERBY INS. CO.
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The trial court granted a nonsuit, and plaintiffs appealed. This Court determined that
directors and officers may be personally
liabie for negligence in the management of
corporate affairs, reversed the trial court,
and remanded the matter for trial. In doing so the following standard of care was
established:

6. U.R.C.P.. Rule 56(c); see Tanner v. Utah
Poultry & Farmers Cooperative, 11 Utah 2d

5. Taylor v.'Alston, 79 N.M. 643. 447 P2d 523 353. 359P.2d 18(1961).
(1968); Ftxuitjcr Milling A Elevator Co. v. Roy
White Cohp. Merc. Co.. 25 Idaho 478. 138 P.7. 9 Utah 2d 275, 342 P.2d 1094 (1959).
829 (1914); Preston-Thomas Const., Inc. v.
Central Leasing Corp.. OkLApp.. 518 P2d 11258. 43 Utah 219. 134 P. 567 (1913).
(1974); sfe also. 3A. W. Fletcher. Private Corporations, Sec*. 1J35, 114L

[4] Issues of negligence ordinarily
present questions of fact to be resolved by
the fact-finder. It is only when the facts
are undisputed and where but one reasonable conclusion can be drawn therefrom that
such issues become questions of law.'
[5] Applying the foregoing principles to
the instant case, it would appear that substantial issues of material fact exist that
preclude summary judgment.
The propriety of the trial court's determination that U.C.A., 1953, 31-17-22(2) does
not support a private action was not raised
on appeal, yet Hulbert and Warnick addressed that issue in their brief. They contend that the case of Milliner v. Elmer Fox
and Co.1* is supportive of the ruling below.
However, that case did not interpret the
statute presently before us, but concerned
an action brought under the Uniform Securities Act u which makes it unlawful to
make an untrue statement of a material
fact or employ any deceptive practice in the
offer, sale or purchase of a security. In
declining to overturn the dismissal for failure to state a claim on various grounds,12
the Court observed that although the statute made certain practices unlawful, it
made no provision for a private right of
action for its violation, and the Court refused to invade the province of the legislature
by fashioning a remedy from it.

before us. That case involved an action by
an automobile insurer against its agent to
recover unremitted insurance premiums.
In affirming a judgment in favor of the
insurer, the Court held as follows:
In view of the fact that the plaintiff
actually furnished this insurance coverage to Nielson at the request of the defendant Hackett; and Hackett received
payment therefor, we are entirely in accord with the findings and judgment of
the trial court that he should remit the
money he so received to the plaintiff.
This is as required by Sec. 31-17-22(2),
U.C.A.1953, which states that: 'All funds
representing premiums
received by an agent, solicitor or broker,
shall be held by him in his fiduciary capacity, and shall be promptly accounted
for and paid to the insured, insurer, or
agent as entitled thereto.'

The facts in Hackett closely parallel those
of the instant case and the holding therein
appears to dictate a result contrary to that
of the trial court. Irrespective thereof, we
deem the matter to be moot because the
trial court clearly recognized that the statute in no way infringed upon or limited the
mode of exercising any and all causes of
action otherwise available under the common law.14 This is evident from the findings of fact, supra, which specifically refer
to FMA's claims of conversion and negligence, both of which were ruled upon, as a
The holding in Milliner must necessarily matter of law, independent of the statute.
be viewed in the light of the facts peculiar
The foregoing observations on the questo that case and, when so viewed, it is not
in conflict with the prior case of Citizens tion of mootness of issues applies equally
Casualty Company of New York v. Hack- well to FMA's further claim of error on the
ett1* which did interpret the statute now part of the trial court in refusing to permit
». Deshazer v. Tompkins, 89 Idaho 347. 404 P 2d
604 (1965).
10. Utah. 529 P.2d 806 (1974)
11. U.C.A.. 1953, 6I-1-I, et seq.
12. (1) No privity of contract: (2) no showing of
negligence; (3) failure to join an indispensable
party; and (4) inapplicability of the statute.

13. 17 Utah 2d 304. 410 P 2d 767 (1966).
14. U C A , 1953. 68-3-1. adopting the Common
law of England so far as not repugnant or in
conflict with Constitution or laws.
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an amendment of the complaint to include a not inconsistent with this opinion. Costs on
claim for conversion. Said issue was ex- appeal to FMA.
pressly ruled upon by the court and without
CROCKETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN,
objection. Consequently, said issue remains
WILKINS
and STEWART, JJ., concur.
before the court on remand. However, in
the interest of orderly procedure, it may be
advisable to again consider the matter of
WMBCRSYSTEliS
( o IKEYNUMI
appropriate amendments to the pleadings.
The summary judgment is vacated and
set aside, including the award of costs. The
case is remanded for further proceedings

STATE v. OLSON
Cite as, WaslL, St4 PM

92 Wash.2d 134

The STATE of Washington, Respondent,
v.
Ernest L. OLSON, Petitioner.
No. 45641.
Supreme Court of Washington,
En Banc.
May 10, 1979.

At the close of State's case-in-chief in a
first-degree perjury prosecution, the Superior Court, Snohomish County, Robert C.
Bibb, J., entered an order of dismissal, and
State appealed. The Court of Appeals, Ringold, J., 19 Wash.App. 885, 578 P.2d 866,
reversed. On review, the Supreme Court,
Rosellini, J., held that although defendant
had delivered county property to "Spane
Building," negative answer to grand jury
interrogator's question as to whether he
had delivered such property to "Spane Mill"
could not form basis for perjury charge
since question could literally and truthfully
have been answered in the negative.
Reversed.
Dolliver, J., dissented and filed opinion.

Wash. 1 3 3 7
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which is positive and directly contradictory
to defendant's oath and another such direct
witness or independent evidence of corroborating circumstances of such a character as
clearly to turn the scale and overcome the
oath of defendant and legal presumption of
innocence. RCWA 9A.72.020.
4. Perjury «=»12
Generally, a perjury charge cannot be
maintained where testimony of accused was
literally, technically, or legally true where
answer given by accused is responsive to
question asked him. RCWA 9A.72.020.
5. Perjury «=»12
Perjury statutes are not to be loosely
construed, nor are they to be invoked simply because a wily witness succeeds in derailing questioner, so long as witness speaks
the literal truth. RCWA 9A.72.020.
6. Perjury <>==>12
Precise questioning is imperative as a
predicate for perjury and burden is on questioner to pin witness down to specific object
of inquiry. RCWA 9A.72.020.
7. Perjury *»12
Although defendant had delivered
county property to "Spane Building," negative answer to grand jury interrogator's
question as to whether he had delivered
such property to "Spane Mill" could not
form basis for perjury charge since question
could literally and truthfully have been answered in the negative. RCWA 9A.72.020.

1. Criminal Law <*=»752
Challenge to sufficiency of evidence admits truth of opposing party's evidence and
8. Perjury <*=»12
all inferences which reasonably may be
For purposes of perjury charge, it is
drawn from such evidence, and requires
not
accused's
knowledge of questioner's inthat evidence be interpreted in light most
tent which controls, but his knowledge of
favorable to that party.
falsity of his answer; if answer is literally
true, it cannot form basis of charge.
2. Perjury *=»33(1)
Requirements of proof in a perjury RCWA 9A.72.020.
case are the strictest known to the law,
outside of treason charges. RCWA 9A.72.Luvera & Mullen, G. E. Mullen, Mount
020.
Vernon, for petitioner.
3. Perjury *»34(1)
Robert E. Schillberg, Snohomish County
In a perjury case, State must present Pros. Atty., Don J. Hale, Deputy Pros.
testimony of at least one credible witness Atty., Everett, for respondent.
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prevent them from refusing to admit
morally incompetent persons to practice,
nor compel them to retain such upon the
roll. If 3uch were the law, then the verdicts of juries or the notions of prosecutors or legislators, and not the deliberate
judgment of the courts, would control in
such matters. The courts, and not juries
or legislators, must ultimately determine
the qualifications and fitness of their officers."
Is there any apparent conflict between a
subsequent judicial integration with a prior
legislative integration? There should not
be if each department remains within the
scope of its constitutional function.

12
O
rri

F—»
^°

regarded as fixing the minimum and not as
setting the bounds beyond which the judicial department cannot go. The court stated it would regard such specifications as
limitations, not upon the judicial department, but upon the individuals seeking admission to the bar. The court emphasized
there was no power in the legislative department to compel the judicial department
to admit as attorneys those deemed to be
unfit to perform the duties and exercise the
prerogatives of an attorney a t law.

3. Landlord and Tenant «=> 164(1)
To invoke rule incorporating existing
law in lease, party must show existence of
statute or ordinance, that statute or ordinance was intended to protect class of persons which includes party, that protection is
directed toward harm which has in fact
occurred as result of violation, and that
violation of ordinance or statute was proximate cause of injury complained of.

KEYNUMBERSYSTEM

5£>

The court in the case of Re Opinion of the
Justices, 279 Mass. 607, 180 N.E. 725 (1932),
deemed legislative enactments concerning
qualifications for admission to practice as
an aid to the courts in performance of their James R. HALL. Brenda Hall, and Brenda
Hall, as Guardian ad Litem for Karla
duties. The court further acknowledged
Hall, a minor. Plaintiffs and Appellants,
that some statutes have been enacted in the
exercise of the police power to protect the
v.
public from those deficient in ability, learnHarold WARREN, Raur Warren, Gary
ing, or moral qualities, and thus incapable
Warren and Newell Warren, Defend°f maintaining the high standard of conants and Respondents.
duct to be expected by members of the bar.
However, the court emphasized that no
No. 16735.
statute can control the judicial department
Supreme Court of Utah.
in the performance of its duty to decide
who shall enjoy the privilege of practicing
June 30, 1981.
law.
The court explained that some statutes
respecting admissions to the bar, which afford appropriate instrumentalities for ascertaining the qualifications of applicants,
are not an encroachment on the judicial
department. They are convenient to enable
the judiciary to perform this duty. The
court cited as an example the statute establishing the state board of bar examiners.
Statutes of that nature are valid insofar as
they do not infringe on the right of the
judicial department to determine who shall
exercise the privilege of practicing in the
courts and under what circumstances and
with what qualifications persons shall be
admitted to that end. The court's point of
delineation was that statutes specifying
qualifications and accomplishments will be

2. Landlord and Tenant «=»162
Pertinent safety standards established
by building codes are considered as much
part of lease as if expressed in contract.

Tenants brought action against landlord for personal injuries resulting from
emission of gases from defective floor furnace. The Fourth District Court, Uintah
County, J. Robert Bullock, J., entered summary judgment in favor of landlord, and
tenant appealed.
The Supreme Court,
Stewart, J., held that disputed issues of
material facts existed on parties' knowledge
of defect, precluding summary j u d g m e n t
Reversed and remanded.

1. Landlord and Tenant *»162
Duty of landlord to use reasonable care
to protect lessees may rest on common-law
principles of negligence.

4. Negligence <*=»6
As a general rule, a violation of standard of safety set by statute or ordinance is
prima facie evidence of negligence.

John C Beaslin, Vernal, for defendants
and respondents.
STEWART, Justice:
Plaintiffs seek reversal of an adverse
summary judgment in an action to recover
damages against their landlords for personal injuries sustained as a result of a malfunctioning floor furnace in a rental unit.
Plaintiffs rented the residence on an oral
month-to-month rental agreement commencing in February of 1976. At the time
of the accident plaintiffs had occupied the
rental property for approximately three
years. On January 2, 1979, the floor furnace began to emit gases which resulted in
the asphyxiation of plaintiffs. Emergency
medical treatment was required and administered.

Plaintiffs claim they were unaware of
5. Negligence s=>6
Violation of standard of safety set by any defect in the floor furnace and as a
statute or ordinance, which is prima facie result had contacted neither defendants nor
evidence of negligence, may be subject to the Utah Gas Service Company for the purjustification or excuse if defendant's con- pose of having the furnace repaired. Beduct could nevertheless be reasonably said fore the accident plaintiffs had had little
to fall within standard of reasonable care occasion to use the floor furnace, since alternative heating units had been sufficient
under the circumstances.
prior to the severe weather conditions
6. Landlord and Tenant *=» 164(7)
which occurred at the time of the accident.
Even if tenant has actual knowledge of
Plaintiffs also claim that at the time of
defect in leased premises, landlord may still moving in, and possibly one time thereafter,
have duty to provide protection regardless they were informed by defendants that the
of knowledge of tenant.
defendants intended to repair the floor furnace.
7. Landlord and Tenant «=» 168(1)
If tenant knows of danger in leased
premises and subsequently fails to exercise
due care, defense of contributory negligence is available to landlord in tenant's
action for damages.
8. Judgment <*=» 181(24)
In tenants' action against landlord for
personal injuries resulting from the emission of gases from defective floor furnace,
disputed issues of material facts existed on
parties' knowledge of defect, precluding
summary judgment.

Robert M. McRae, Vernal, for plaintiffs
and appellants.

Plaintiffs based their claim for damages
on three theories: negligence, breach of
implied warranty, and strict liability. The
trial court treated defendants' motion to
dismiss as one for summary judgment and
entered a judgment against plaintiffs on
the ground that as a matter of law plaintiffs were not entitled to relief. We reverse and remand for trial.
On this appeal we view the evidence and
all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to t h e
losing party, Durham v. M&rgetts, Utah,
571 P.2d 1332 (1977); Thompson v. Ford
Motor Co., 16 Utah 2d 30, 395 P.2d 62
(1964).

GRAHAM v. SAWAYA
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The duty imposed upon landlords by legislative enactment and judicial decree clearly create grounds upon which the allegations in the complaint state a cause of action.

CD

o

Under familiar legal principles the provisions of the city's housing code relating
to minimum housing standards were by
implication read into and became a part
of the rental agreement between Shirley
Steele and Marvin E. Latimer. The per[1] The duty of the landlord to use reatinent rule of law is summarized in 17
sonable care to protect lessees may rest on
Am.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 257, pp. 654-656:
common law principles of negligence. In
"It is a general rule that contracting
Stephenson v. Warner, Utah, 581 P.2d 567
parties are presumed to contract in ref(1978), the Court held that a landlord had a
erence to the existing law; indeed,
duty to use reasonable care to prevent the
they are presumed to have in mind all
occurrence of dangerous conditions. The
the existing laws relating to the conCourt stated:
tact, or to the subject matter thereof.
It is not to be doubted that a landlord is
Thus, it is commonly said that all existbound by the usual standard of exercising
ing applicable or relevant and valid
ordinary prudence and care to see that
premises he leases are reasonably safe
statutes, ordinances, regulations, and
and suitable for intended uses, nor that
settled law of the land at the time a
under appropriate circumstances he may
contract is made become a part of it
be held liable for injuries caused by any
and must be read into it just as if an
defects or dangerous conditions which he
express provision to the effect were
created, or of which he was aware, and
inserted therein, except where the conwhich he should reasonably foresee would
tract discloses a contrary intenexpose others to an unreasonable risk of
tion
" [Id. at 309-10.]
harm. [581 P.2d at 568.]
This obligation is in accord with the con[2] In addition, a landlord may be sub- temporary approach toward leased habitaject to a duty of care imposed by a statute tions which emphasizes the contractual naor ordinance. The City of Vernal has ture of the relationship between the landadopted by ordinance the Uniform Building lord and tenant instead of viewing a lease
Code, 1976 Edition. Pertinent safety stan- simply as demise of real estate.
dards established by the Code are con[3] To invoke the rule, a party must
sidered as much a part of a lease as if
expressed in the contract. Javins v. First show (1) the existence of the statute or
National Realty Corp., 42S F.2d 1071 (D.C. ordinance, (2) that the statute or ordinance
Cir.1970); Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, was intended to protect the class of persons
which includes the party, (3) that the pro521 P.2d 304 (1974).
tection is directed toward the type of harm
The principle applies to oral leases, as which has in fact occurred as a result of the
well as written leases. In Steele plaintiff violation, and (4) that the violation of the
entered into a month-to-month oral lease. ordinance or statute was a proximate cause
Notwithstanding the oral nature of the
of the injury complained of.
lease, the court read, by implication, the
provisions of the City's housing code relat[4,5] As a general rule, violation of a
ing to minimum housing standards into the standard of safety set by a statute or ordirental agreement between plaintiff and de- nance is prima facie evidence of neglifendant:
gence. 1 Such a violation may be subject to
1. This Court at an early date held that violation
of a statute or ordinance whose purpose is to
protect life, limb or property constituted negligence per se. Smith v. Mine & Smelter Supply
Co., 32 Utah 21. 88 P. 683 (1907).
But the rule has undergone an evolution.
Subsequent to Smith, the per se rule was modi-

fied to apply only in cases involving dangerous
instrumentalities. White v. Shipley, 48 Utah
496. 160 P. 441 (1916). Since the case before
us does not concern a dangerous instrumentality, the prima facie, rather than negligence per
se. rule is applicable.

Utah
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justification or excuse if the defendant's negligence. Moreover, the record reveals
conduct could nevertheless be reasonably disputed issues of material facts.
said to fall within "the standard of reasonaWe deem it inappropriate in this case to
ble care under the circumstances." Thomp- address the issues of whether there is a
son v. Ford Motor Co., 16 Utah 2d 30, 33-34, duty on the landlord imposed by implied
395 P.2d 62, 64 (1964). Accord, Intermoun- warranty of habitability or strict liability
tain Farmers Ass'n v. Fitzgerald, Utah, 574 because of the abbreviated briefing of these
P.2d 1162 (1978).
See
Restatement issues.
(Second) of Torts 2a, § 288A (1965), which
The judgment is reversed and the case
enumerates the following defenses:
remanded for further proceedings.
(a) the violation is reasonable because
Costs to Appellants.
of the actor's incapacity;
(b) he neither knows nor should know
HALL and CROCKETT/ JJ., and
of the occasion for compliance;
TUCKETT, Retired Justice, concur.
(c) he is unable after reasonable diliMAUGHAN, C. J., does not participate
gence or care to comply;
herein; TUCKETT, Retired Justice, sat.
(d) he is confronted by an emergency
WILKINS, J., heard the arguments but
not due to his own misconduct;
(e) compliance would involve a greater resigned before the opinion was filed.
risk of harm to the actor or to others.

SS>
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[6,7] In the instant case defendants
contend that they should have been notified
by plaintiffs if they had a complaint regarding the furnace. The record at this
point does not establish that plaintiff had
actual knowledge of the defect which
caused the accident. 2 On the other hand,
plaintiffs allege that defendants, on two
occasions, expressly notified plaintiffs of
their intent to repair the furnace. On both
counts the issues are factual and must be
tried.

Stephen F. GRAHAM and Gerald L.
Jackson, Plaintiffs,
v.
The Honorable James S. SAWAYA,
Judge, Third Judicial District Court,
State of Utah, Defendant

[8] The summary judgment in the instant case cannot be sustained. The allegations, if proven, may support a claim in

In original proceeding, plaintiff sought
issuance of extraordinary writ compelling

No. 17604.
Supreme Court of Utah.
July 6, 1981.

We note, however, that some jurisdictions
have held that a violation of a city building
code constitutes negligence per se. HarbourLongmire Building Co. v Carson, 201 Okl. 580,
208 P.2d 173 (1949). See also Lapp v. Rogers,
265 Or. 586. 510 P.2d 551 (1973). Restatement
(Second) of Torts, § 288B (1965). also recognizes the per se rule:
(1) The unexcused violation of a legislative
enactment or an administrative regulation
which is adopted by the court as defining the
standard of conduct of a reasonable man, is
negligence in itself.
The unexcused violation of an enactment or
regulation which is not so adopted may be

relevant evidence bearing on the issue of negligent conduct.
2.

Even if plaintiff has actual knowledge of the
defect, the defendant may still have a duty to
provide protection regardless of the knowledge
of the plaintiff. Lapp v. Rogers, 265 Or. 586.
510 P.2d 551 (1973). Of course, if plaintiff
knows of the danger and subsequently fails to
exercise due care, the defense of contributory
negligence is available. See Jacobsen Construction Co., Inc. v. Structo-Lite Engineering,
Inc., Utah. 619 P.2d 306 (1980).

* Crockett. Justice, concurred in this case before
his retirement.
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HANSEN v. MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY CO.

Utah 971

Cite as 858 P.2d 970 (Utah 1993)

and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
STEWART, J., concurs in the dissenting
opinion of Associate Chief Justice HOWE.

O
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alleged respiratory symptoms were caused
by workers' exposure to asbestos at building, and (2) to recover medical monitoring
damages, plaintiff must prove exposure to
toxic substance, which exposure was
caused by defendant's negligence, resulting
in increased risk of serious disease, illness,
or injury for which medical *-est for early
detection exists and for which early detection is beneficial, meaning that treatment
a
xists that can alter course of illness, and
which test has been prescribed by qualified
physician according to contemporary scientific principles.

Tom HANSEN, an individual; Douglas A.
Hilton, an individual: Mike MacKinAffirmed in part, reversed m part, and
tosh. an individual; Bruce Silcox. an
remanded.
individual; and Russell Vickers. an inZimmerman. J . tiled opinion concurdividual. Plaintiffs and Appellants,
ring in part and concurring in result, in
v.
-vnich Hall. C.J.. and Howe. Associate C.J.,
MOUNTAIN F l EL SUPPLY COMPANY, and Stewart. J . joined.
a Utah corporation: Roger Barrus, an
individual: Roger Morse, an individual:
1. Appeal and Error ^=842(1)
and John Does I through XXV. DefenBecause cnailenge ~o nummary judgdants and Appellees.
ment presents only issues of ,aw, Supreme
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY: Court gives ao leterence :o trial court's
Roger Barrus. an individual: and Rog- conclusions, but instead reviews those contusions for correctness.
er Morse, an individual. Third-Party
Plaintiffs.
2. Negligence o= 134(11)
Evidence in renovation workers suit
CCI MECHANICAL, INC.. a Utah corpo- against building owner to recover for exporation (formerly known as Climate sure to asbestos was insufficient to show
Control. Inc.). Third-Party Defendant. that workers' alleged respiratory symptoms were caused bv exposure to asbestos
No. 900420.
at building; evidence included medical testimony that workers exposure was limited
Supreme Court of Utah.
and perhaps inconsequential, and that
Aug. 4, 1993.
workers did not show signs of respiratory
disorders that could be meaningfully related to that specific exposure.
Renovation workers brought action
<
against owner of office building asserting 3. Damages 3=>43
ciaims for personal injury, negligent inflicTo recover medical monitoring damtion of emotional distress, and cost of medi- ages, plaintiff must prove exposure to toxic
cal monitoring, arising from alleged expo- substance, which exposure was caused by
sure to asbestos while performing renova- defendant's negligence, resulting in intion work a t building. The Third District creased risk of serious disease, illness, or
Court, Salt Lake County, James S. Sawaya, injury for which medical test for early deJ., entered order of summary judgment tection exists and for which early detection
from which workers appealed. The Su- is beneficial, meaning that treatment exists
preme Court, Durham, J., held that: (1) that can alter course of illness, and which
evidence was insufficient to establish that test has been prescribed by qualified physi-

,'ian according to contemporary scientific
principles.
4. Damages <s=»43
For purposes of component of test for
determining whether to award medicai
monitoring costs, requiring plaintiff to
prove "exposure*' to toxic substance, 'exposure" is defined as ingesting, inhaling,
•meeting, or otherwise absorbing substance
n question into body
See publication Words and Phrases
tor other judicial constructions and
definitions.
5. Damages @=43
For purposes of component of test for
determining whether to award medical
monitoring costs, -equinng plaintiff ro
orove exposure to "*oxic" substance, toxc ' is defined by reference *o "poison.'
vnich in turn is defined as substance rhat
-hrough its chemical action usuallv kills,
njures, or impairs organism: substance
must be *oxic to numans rather than *o
other forms of life
See oublication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions ana
aehmtions.

ordinary course may result in significant
impairment or death.
See publication Words and Phrases
tor other judicial constructions and
definitions.
3. Damages <5=>43
For purposes of components of test to
determine whether to award medical monitoring costs, requiring plaintiff *o prove
-hat exposure to toxic substance resulted in
ncreased risk of serious disease and requiring that medical rest m question must
lave been prescribed bv qualified physician
according to contemporary scientific principles, plaintiff must prove that by reason of
exposure to toxic substance caused by defendant's negligence, reasonable physician
vould prescribe for her or him a monitoring regime different r han one that -vould
nave been oresenbed m absence of that
)articular exoosure
9. Damages ^ 4 3
Plaintiff may recover damages r'or
nedical monitoring <*o*»ts oniv <f defeniant s wrongful acts ncreased nlaintiff s
ncremental nsk of n c u r n n g narm oroluced bv :o\ic substance enougn *o -variant cnange m medical monitoring 'hat otherwise would oe oresenbed for r hat plaintiff, a change that .vould represent inTeased cost to plaintiff: tor example, if
plaintiff is exposed to -oxic aUDStance in
arge quantity or for ong duration and
later is negligently exposed to 3 ame substance in small quantity or for snort duration by defendant, there should oe no recovery from one causing later exposure if
it does not change monitoring regime that
would have been appropriate to plaintiff
before that exposure.

<5. Damages s=>13
For purposes of component of le^t for
determining whether to award medical
monitoring costs, requiring plaintiff to
prove that exposure to toxic substance resulted m increased risk of serious disease,
illness, or injury, plaintiff must prove that
exposure was of sufficient intensity ano/or
duration to mcrease risk of anticipated
harm significantly over plaintiff's risk prior
to exposure; no particular level of quantification is necessary to satisfy this requirement of significantly increased risk, and
plaintiff need not prove probability of actually experiencing toxic consequence of ex- 10. Damages <3=43
Under component of test for determinposure.
ing whether to award medical monitoring
7. Damages <3=>43
costs, requiring that advisable medical testFor purposes of component of test for ing for specific plaintiff must be shown to
determining whether to award medical be consistent with contemporary scientific
monitoring costs, requiring plaintiff to principles and reasonably necessary, test
show that exposure to toxic substance re- must be shown by expert testimony to be
sulted in increased risk of serious illness, one that reasonable physician in area of
"serious illness" means illness that in its specialty would order for patient similarly
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situated, i.e., facing similar risk of same
serious illness from same cause.
11. Damages <3=»43
Only medical monitoring costs found to
be reasonable and necessary will be compensable in action arising from exposure to
toxic substance.
12. Damages <3=>43
In action arising from exposure to toxic substance, medical monitoring costs are
recoverable only for duration of latency
period, if known, of illness in question.
13. Damages <s=»43

>
w
ho

Charles E. Greenhawt, Salt Lake City, for
defendants.
DURHAM. Justice:
Plaintiffs were exposed to asbestos while
performing renovation work for Mountain
Fuel. They appeal from an order of summan* judgment on their claims for personal
injury, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and the costs of medical monitoring
granted on the ground that plaintiffs have
not suffered bodily injury. We reverse the
order regarding the claims for medical
monitoring but affirm the rulings on personal injury and negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Remedy of plaintiff alleging need for
medical monitoring resulting from expo[11 In reviewing a summary- judgment,
sure to toxic substance shouid be limited to we consider the facts in the light most
providing plaintiff with medicai monitoring favorable to the nonmoving party. We afthat has been necessitated by the actions of firm only when there is no material issue of
-hat defendant; remedy shouid provide for disputed fact and the moving party is enticost of medicai monitoring actually re- tled to judgment as a matter of law. D &
ceived by plaintiff, not for damages; trial L Supply r. Saunm. 775 P.2d 420. 421
:ourt should not order payment to plaintiff, •Utan 1989). Further, because a challenge
n lump sum or otherwise, or damages rep- to a summary jud^mtnt presents only isresenting costs of future monitoring.
sues of law. we give no deference to the
trial court's conclusions: -nstead. we re14. Damages <3=>43
view those conclusions for correctness.
Deposits in Court =£=>!
Bonham >\ Morgan. 788 P.2d 497. 499
To assure that plaintiff who establish- (Utah 1990) (per curiam).
es that exposure to toxic substance resultPlaintiffs Hansen. Hilton, MacKintosh,
ed in need for medical monitoring is provid- Silcox. and Vickers were employees of CCI
ed only with cost of medical monitoring Mechanical. Inc. ("CCI"). CCI had conactually received, it is suggested that trial tracted with Mountain Fuel to do renovacourt consider court-supervised fund to ad- tion work in the basement of Mountain
minister medical surveillance payments, or, Fuel's downtown Salt Lake City office.
in the alternative, it is suggested that de- The project included rerouting asbestos-infendant might be ordered to pay for insur- sulated piping and equipment. As part of
ance to fund plaintiffs future medical mon- the project, brick insulation was removed
itoring needs: if court establishes trust from a breach in the basement area and
fund and all of it is not used to pay for piled nearby: it was later moved and
medical monitoring actually incurred by stacked in an adjacent walkway. Someplaintiff, remainder should be returned to time in August 1986, plaintiffs expressed
defendant.
concern about the composition of the insulation. A Mountain Fuel representative
told the CCI foreman that the insulation
James E. Morton, Ronald C. Wolthuis, was not asbestos, that all the asbestos in
the area had been removed seven years
Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs.
earlier, and that it was a harmless subSpencer E. Austin, Gordon L. Roberts, stance, calcium silicate. During plaintiffs'
William J. Evans, Ray G. Groussman, work, the insulation was crushed and
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tracked through the work site. Because
of some ventilation problems, the particles
became airborne and the workers had to
take periodic breaks to clean the dust from
their noses and mouths. In November
1986, Vickers agam expressed concern to
defendant Roger Barrus, the safety director for Mountain Fuel, that the insulation might be asbestos. Barrus had the
material tested and learned that it was 60>)5 percent amosite asbestos and less than 1
percent crysotile asDestos. Mountain Fuei
subsequently had the asbestos removed
from the project.
Plaintiffs allege that they experienced
coughing, wheezing, shortness of breath,
chest tightness, headaches, and severe eye
irritation as a result of their exposure.
They also claim that they suffered anxiety
and sleeplessness stemming from their fear
)i contracting serious diseases as a result
)f their exposure to asbestos. None of
them currently suffer from any asbestosrelated disease. Aside from initial examinations that revealed no illness that could
be traced to their exposure, plaintiffs have
had no further medical examinations, nor
have they incurred any medicai expenses or
-:iaimea lost wages or income as a result of
tneir exposure.
I. CURRENT INJURY
[2] Plaintiffs first contend that their exposure to asbestos resulted in "severe
coughing, respiratory distress, chest tightness, headaches, severe eye irritations and
nausea" and that they should be compensated for those injuries.2 They have not
presented sufficient evidence, however, to
show that these symptoms were caused by
their exposure at Mountain Fuel. In 1987,
Hansen. Hilton. Silcox, and Vickers were
examined by Dr. Battigelli at the Occupational Clinic for the Department of Family

and Preventive Medicine at the University
of Utah. After the examination, Dr. Battigelli concluded that plaintiffs' exposure
was "limited and perhaps inconsequential"
and that "[n]one of these individuals presented at our examination evidence of respiratory disorders which could be meaningfully related to that specific exposure."
We have found no other evidence in the
record regarding any illness or symptoms
suffered by MacKintosh. Thus we have
nothing more than plaintiffs' bare allegations to support their claims of narm.
Such allegations are insufficient to withstand summary judgment. See Thornock
". Cook. 604 P.2d 934. 936 (Utah 1979).
Plaintiffs may, of course, bring another
action if and when they do develop a serious disease as a result of their exposure.
Defendants nave conceded that pursuant to
the discovery rule, the statute of limitations wouid not bar such a future claim.
II. NEGLIGENT INFLICTION )F
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS :
Defendants contend that plaintiffs cannot recover tor negligent infliction of emotional distress ("NIED") because they have
not demonstrated that their emotional distress resulted in illness or bodily harm.
We have never squarelv considered whether a plaintiff seeking recovery for NIED
must demonstrate that the emotional distress has manifested itself in physical
symptoms.
In Johnson r. Rogers. 763 P.2d 771 (Utah
1988), we first recognized an action for
negligent infliction of emotional distress.
In Johnson, the plaintiff and his eightyear-old son were waiting at a crosswalk
when a truck jumped the curb, injuring the
plaintiff and killing his son. The plaintiff
theory. But see Ayers v. Township of Jackson.
106 N J . 557, 525 A.2d 287, 304-08 (1987) (declining to recognize cause of action for unquantified enhanced risk of disease). Therefore, we
do not address the merits of such an action.

1. Apparently, none of the plaintiffs participated
in the actual removal of the insulation.
2. Although some courts have recognized that
significant exposure, standing alone, is a sufficient injury to maintain a claim for enhanced
risk of future disease, see, e.g., Gideon v. JohnsManville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1137 (5th
Cir.1985), plaintiffs have specifically conceded
that they are not pursuing a claim under this

3.

The discussion in this section does not represent the views of a majority of the court. See
Justice Zimmerman's opinion concurring in
part and concurring in the result.
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claimed damages for the emotional distress
suffered as a result of the incident This
court sustained the plaintiff's cause of ac
tion and adopted the approach set forth in
section 313(2) of the Second Restatement of
Torts (the "zone of danger" rule) for deter
mining liability for the negligent infliction
of emotional distress Johnson, 763 P 2d
at 785 Section 313 provides
(1) If the actor unintentionally causes
emotional distress to another he is sub
ject to liability to the other for resulting
illness or bodily harm if the actor
(a) should have realized that his con
duct involved an unreasonable risk of
causing the distress otherwise than by
knowledge of the harm or penl of a third
person, and
(b) from facts known to him should
have realized that the distress if it were
caused might result m illness or bodilv
harm
(2) The rule stated in subsection 1)
has no application to illness or bodilv
harm of another which is caused bv emotional distress arising solel) from harm
or peril to a third person, unless the
negligence of the actor has otherwise
created an unreasonable nsk of bodily
harm to the other
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 313 (1965)
In Johnson, we were primarily concerned
with the application of the rule outlined in
subsection (2) In the instant case, plaintiffs are not seeking recoverv for trauma
inflicted on them because of harm or peril
to one nearby, plaintiffs allege that they
themselves inhaled asbestos 4 See Johnson, 763 P2d at 781-82 (opinion of Dur
ham, J ) (discussing distinction between by
stander and direct victim NIED) Thus
subsection (1), rather than subsection (2),
applies to this case Subsection (1) provides liability only for "resulting illness or
4. In some cases, a plaintiff may be eligible to
recover for NIED although no one in the case
was subject to bodily harm See Hanke v Glob
al Van Lines, Inc, 533 F2d 396 400 (8th Cir
1976) (moving company that delayed delivery of
plaintiffs goods for 100 days after repeatedly
assuring her that delivery was imminent could
be subject to NIED action) In that event, a

bodily harm" Defendants contend that
plaintiffs do not meet this requirement
Most courts require some sort of injury
or physical manifestation of distress as a
prerequisite to recovery for NIED See,
eg, Keck v Jackson, 122 Ariz 114, 593
P2d 668, 669 (1979), Brown v Cadillac
Motor Car Div, 468 So 2d 903, 904 (Fla
1985), Brown v Matthews Mortuary, Inc,
801 P2d 37, 42 (Idaho 1990), Payton v
Abbott Labs 386 Mass 540, 437 N E 2d
171 178-80 (Mass 1982), Thorpe v Department of Corrections, 133 N H 299,
575 A 2d 351 353 (1990) Such a requirement provides a check on feigned disturbances, thereby ensuring the genuineness
of claims Moreover, emotional disturbance that is not severe enough to result in
illness or physical consequences is likely to
be in the realm of the trivial Such a
disturbance is likelv to be so temporary
and subjective that to attempt to compensate it would undulv burden detendants
and the courts See Restatement (Second)
ot Torts § 43bA cmt b (1965) Payton, 437
\ E 2d at 178-79 (citing the Restatement)
Although many courts agree that a plaintiff must establish some accompanying
phvsical manifestation in order to recover
for MED thev differ widel) regarding the
nature of evidence sufficient to establish
such harm See e g DeStorxes v City of
Phoenix, 154 Ariz 604, 744 P 2d 705, 710
(Ct App 1987) (defining standard for injury
as 'physical harm or medically identifiable
effect"), Cathcart v Keene Indus Insulation, 324 Pa Super 123, 471 A 2d 493, 508
(1984) (same), Laxton v Orkin Exterminating Co, 639 SW2d 431, 434 (Tenn
1982) (recognizing ingestion of frightening
or noxious substance as sufficient physical
injury) The language used in section 313
of the Restatement provides some guidance Subsection (1) allows recovery for
'illness or bodily harm" Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 313(1) (1965) (emphasis
foreseeabihty test as outlined in subsection (1)
of section 313 would be appropriate to evaluateliability The plaintiffs in the instant case, however, were exposed to bodily injury I would
leave to a future case the parameters of a pure
foreseeabihty test but I note that such a test is
appropriate under subsection (1)

added) The drafters' use of 'or' rather
than 'and" shows an intention to allow a
plaintiff to recover not only where bodily
harm results from emotional trauma, but
where "illness" results as well 'Illness"
is 'an unhealthy condition of body or
mind ' Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 566 (1981) From this we conclude
that either physical or mental illness may
support the NIED cause of action
A rule allowing recovery for mental illness as well as physical injury serves a
major purpose of the injury requirementensuring genuineness of claims Given recent medical advances in the fields of psychiatry and psychology, it is now possible
to establish emotional illness3 with some
degree of certainty See Terry M Dwor
km, Fear oj Disease and Delayed Manifestation Injuries A Solution or a Pandoras Box? 53 Fordham L Rev 527, 532-33
(1984) A plaintiff who can establish
through appropriate expert testimony that
he or she suffers from mental illness as a
result of a defendants negligent conduct
may maintain an action for MED
We emphasize, however that the emotional distress suffered must be severe it
must be such that 'a reasonable [person ]
normally constituted would be unable to
adequatelv cope with the mental stress en
gendered by the circumstances of the
case ' Rodngues v State 52 Haw 156
472 P 2d 509 520 (1970), see also Molten v
Kaiser Found Hosp, 27 Cal 3d 916, 167
Cal Rptr 831, 836-39 616 P 2d 813, 818-21
(Cal 1980) Further, in cases such as this,
which deal with emotional distress result
ing from fear of developing a disease in the
future, the fact finder should also consider
the likelihood that the disease will actually
occur in determining the reasonableness of
the fear Potter v Firestone Tire & Rubber Co, 15 Cal App 4th 490, 274 Cal Rptr
885, 893 (Ct App 1990) The fact finder
should further consider the duration and
nature of the exposure to the toxic sub-

stance Such requirements will ensure
that defendants and the courts face only
cases involving serious emotional distress
Given that almost everyone is exposed
from time to time to toxic substances in
one form or another it is important that
only those who have had significant exposure leading to serious emotional distress
recover for NIED

5 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the
American Psychiatric Association (DSM-III),
which catalogues mental illnesses, is the most
authoritative reference on the subject It repre
sents the current consensus of the professional
community diagnosing mental illness

6. To prevent confusion we wish to point out
that the claim for medical monitoring damages
is separate and distinct from recovery for the
enhanced nsk of contracting a serious illness
due to exposure See supra note 2 For a
thoughtful comparison of the two claims see

The plaintiffs m the instant case fail to
meet the above standards as a matter of
law They allege only that thev suffered
transitorv anxiety and sleeplessness as a
result of their exposure to asbestos Such
symptoms do not constitute illness or mju
ry within the meaning of section 313(1)
Everyone must deal with stress and an\i
ety in daily life most of us experience
occasional sleeplessness Transitory sleeplessness and anxietv do not amount to the
type of emotional distress with which a
reasonable person normally constituted
would be unable to cope See Burns v
Jaquays Mining Corp 156 Ariz 375 752
P2d 28 32 (AnzCt App 1988) (headaches
depression and insomnia are onlv transi
tory physical phenomena' and are not the
type of phvsical injurv that would sustain
the NIED action) Plaintiffs have not prof
fered any ev idence indicating that their dis
tress is sufficiently severe to constitute
mental illness nor do we have evidence
that their distress has resulted in physical
symptoms Plaintiffs mere unsubstantiat
ed opinions that they have suffered severe
anxiety as a result of their exposure do not
create a triable issue of fact that would
withstand summary judgment
Conse
quently, their claims for NIED fail
III

MEDICAL MONITORING
A

Introduction

Plaintiffs also claim that they are entitled to medical monitoring damages as a
result of their exposure to asbestos 6 They
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contend that because they have been exposed, they must undergo periodic medical
tests to facilitate early diagnosis and treatment of diseases stemming from their exposure. They contend that but for their
exposure to asbestos, they would not be
obligated to incur these additional medical
expenses and that defendants are obligated
to compensate them. Defendants counter
that plaintiffs have proffered no medical
evidence showing that they require anything more than routine health maintenance.

>

a
M
to

Plaintiffs' claim presents a question of
first impression in Utah; however, many
other jurisdictions have recognized the legitimacy of medical surveillance damages
for toxic-tort plaintiffs.7 Two common law
principles underlie the theory of a plaintiffs right to recover medical monitoring
expenses. Allan T. Slagel, Note, Medical
Surveillance Damages: A Solution to the
Inadequate Compensation of Toxic Tort
Victims, 63 Ind.LJ. 849, 863-64 (1988)
[hereinafter Slagel]. First, the doctrine of
"avoidable consequences" mandates that
the plaintiff submit to medically advisable
treatment. Failure to do so may destroy
the plaintiffs right to recover for a condition that he or she could have thereby
avoided or alleviated. See Hagerty v. L. &
L. Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 319
(5th Cir.), modified on other grounds, 797
F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1986). Second, the rule
Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 106 N.J. 557, 525
A.2d 287. 297-313 (1987).

allowing prospective medical damages supports a plaintiffs right to recover for reasonably anticipated medical expenses, including periodic diagnostic examinations:
" 'A plaintiff ordinarily may recover reasonable medical expenses, past and future,
which he incurs as a result of a demonstrated injury.'" Id. (quoting C. McCormick, The Law of Damages § 90 (1935));
see also Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 106
N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287, 310 (NJ.1987).
Thus, medical surveillance damages promote early diagnosis and treatment of disease or illness resulting from exposure to
toxic substances caused by a tort-feasor's
negligence. Ayers, 525 A.2d at 311.
Allowing recovery for such expenses
avoids the potential injustice of forcing an
economically disadvantaged person to pay
for expensive diagnostic examinations necessitated by another's negligence. Indeed, in many cases a person will not be
able to afford such tests, and refusing to
allow medical monitoring damages would in
effect deny him or her access to potentially
life-saving treatment. It also affords toxictort victims, for whom other sorts of recovery may prove difficult/ immediate compensation for medical monitoring needed as
a result of exposure. Additionally, it furthers the deterrent function of the tort
system by compelling those who expose
others to toxic substances to minimize risks
and costs of exposure. Slagel at 869. Al-

8. Other forms of recovery are often unattainable for persons exposed to toxic substances,
largely because the phvsical injury resulting
While judicial recognition of the enhancedfrom the exposure usually does not emerge for
nsk cause of action has been infrequent, at least
many years. If a plaintiff sues immediately
one commentator advocates the need for a
after exposure, he or sne faces the nearly insurgrowing acceptance of the claim and suggests
mountable task of proving the exact nature and
that the trend has begun. See generally Knsten
extent of the injury suffered and the certainty of
Chapin, Comment, Toxic Torts, Public Health
developing the feared disease in the distant fuData, and the Evolving Common Law: Compenture. Conversely, a plaintiff who waits until the
sation for Increased Risk of Future Injury, 13 J.
Energy Nat. Resources & Envtl. L. 129 (1993)
disease develops bears the burden of demon[hereinafter Chapin].
strating that exposure many years earlier caused
the illness. Further, even tf the plaintiff can
establish causation, the responsible parties may
7. For discussions of medical monitoring claims,
be
difficult to locate or bankrupt by the time the,
see Allan T. Slagel, Note, Medical Surveillance
Damages: A Solution to the Inadequate Compen- illness develops. The defendant may also claim
sation of Toxic Tort Victims, 63 Ind.LJ. 849
that a statute of limitations or repose bars the*
(1988) [hereinafter Slagel]; Leslie S. Gara, Complaintiffs action. Consequently, toxic-tort
ment, Medical Surveillance Damages: Using
plaintiffs face significant obstacles to recovery*
Common Sense and the Common Law to MitiSee generally Slagel at 852-56; Chapin at 129-33
gate the Dangers Posed By Environmental Haz(describing the barriers to recovery toxic-tort
ards, 12 Harv.Entl.L.Rev. 265 (1988).
victims face under traditional tort rules).

lowing such recovery is also in harmony
with "the important public health interest
in fostering access to medical testing for
individuals whose exposure to toxic chemicals creates an enhanced risk of disease."
Ayers, 525 A.2d at 311.
Despite these policy arguments, some
contend that medical monitoring should be
allowed only for those able to show actual,
present, physical injury. Because of the
latent nature of most diseases resulting
from exposure to toxic substances, however, most toxic-tort plaintiffs cannot establish an immediate physical injury of the
type contemplated in traditional tort actions. Slagel at 859-60: Kristen Chapin,
Comment, Toxic Torts, Public Health
Data, and the Evolving Common Law:
Compensation for Increased Risk of Future Injury, 13 J. Energy Nat. Resources
& Envtl. L. 129, 134 (1993) [hereinafter
Chapin]. Instead, the physical injury resulting from exposure to toxic substances
usually manifests itself years after exposure. Although the physical manifestations of an injury may not appear for
years, the reality is that many of those
exposed have suffered some legal detriment; the exposure itself and the concomitant need for medical testing constitute the
injury. See, e.g., Friends For All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746
F.2d 816, 826 (D.C.Cir.1984) ("it is difficult
to dispute that an individual has an interest
in avoiding expensive diagnostic examinations just as he or she has an interest in
avoiding physical injury."); Slagel at 86465. This conclusion is consistent with the
definition of "injury" in the Restatement of
Torts. Friends, 746 F.2d at 826 (discussing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 7).
Courts have recognized that claims for
medical monitoring implicate injuries or
detriments warranting recovery. For example, in Miranda v. Shell Oil Co., 12
Cal.App. 4th 28, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 574
(Ct.App.1993),9 the California Court of Appeal construed the term "detriment" in its

damages statute as including a "demonstrated need to undergo future medical
monitoring as a result of exposure to toxins." The court analogized a toxic-tort victim to an automobile-accident victim who
suffers no visible injury but undergoes
medically necessary testing to diagnose potential internal injuries. Just as that plaintiff is entitled to recover costs, so is the
toxic-tort victim: "The outcome should be
the same when the operative incident is
toxic exposure rather than collision and the
potential future harm is disease rather
than physical impairment." Id. at 572 (citation omitted).

9. The California Supreme Court has recently
granted review of the Miranda decision. Miranda v. Shell Oil Co., 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 608. 847
P.2d 574 (1993). Under California law, the
opinion of the Court of Appeal is superseded by

the grant of review and consequently has no
precedential value in California. However, we
remain persuaded by its reasoning and adopt it
to the extent noted above.

The United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia applied similar
reasoning to a cause of action for medical
monitoring in Friends. 746 F.2d at 816-38.
Friends involved the crash of an airplane
carrying orphans leaving Vietnam during
the 1975 evacuation. The complaint alleged that the decompression and impact of
the crash caused 149 surviving children to
suffer minimal brain dysfunction, a neurological brain disorder. Because of delays
in the trial, the court invited motions for
summary judgment on the defendants' liability for diagnostic examinations and medical treatment. After considering the motions, the trial court ordered Lockheed to
create a fund to pay for diagnostic examinations. The court of appeals affirmed,
holding that a reasonable need for medical
examinations is compensable, even absent
proof of other injury. The court stated:
To aid our analysis of whether tort law
should encompass a cause of action for
diagnostic examinations without proof of
actual injury, it is useful to step back
from the complex, multi-party setting of
the present case and hypothesize a simple, everyday accident involving two individuals, whom we shall identify simply as
Smith and Jones:
Jones is knocked down by a motorbike
which Smith is riding through a red
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light. Jones lands on his head with
some force. Understandably shaken,
Jones enters a hospital where doctors
recommend that he undergo a battery
of tests to determine whether he has
suffered any internal head injuries.
The tests prove negative, but Jones
sues Smith solely for what turns out to
be the substantial cost of the diagnostic examinations.
From our example, it is clear that even
in the absence of physical injury Jones
ought to be able to recover the cost for
the various diagnostic examinations proximately caused by Smith's negligent action. A cause of action allowing recovery for the expense of diagnostic examinations recommended by competent physicians will, in theory, deter misconduct,
whether it be negligent motorbike riding
or negligent aircraft manufacture. The
cause of action also accords with commonly shared intuitions of normative justice which underlie the common law of
tort. The motorbike rider, through his
negligence, caused the plaintiff, in the
opinion of medical experts, to need specific medical services—a cost that is neither inconsequential nor of a kind the
community generally accepts as part of
the wear and tear of daily life. Under
these principles of tort law. the motorbiker should pay.
Friends, 746 F.2d at 825.
We agree with the analyses in Friends
and Miranda and apply them to both initial
diagnostic examinations and recurring medical monitoring. A plaintiff forced to incur
the cost of medical monitoring as a result
of a defendant's negligent conduct should
be entitled to compensation for those expenses. Mere exposure to an allegedly
harmful substance, however, is not enough
for recovery. Courts have set forth several criteria for determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to recover the costs of medical monitoring. Such criteria prevent unnecessary litigation and unwarranted recoveries. By imposing these requirements
on plaintiffs, courts seek to ensure that
only those plaintiffs who need monitoring
above and beyond basic medical care will

recover costs. Miranda, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d at
574. We will examine some of the approaches used and then outline the criteria
necessary to maintain a cause of action for
medical monitoring in Utah.
B. Other Jurisdictions
The New Jersey Supreme Court considered a medical monitoring claim in Ayers,
where the plaintiffs' well water was contaminated by toxic pollutants. The plaintiffs were awarded medical surveillance
damages in response to proof of increased
risk of cancer and other diseases. 525 A.2d
at 308-13. The court held that medical
surveillance damages are appropriate when
a plaintiff can establish that monitoring is
reasonable and necessary, stating:
[W]e hold that the cost of medical surveillance is a compensable item of damages where the proofs demonstrate,
through reliable expert testimony predicated upon the significance and extent of
exposure to chemicals, the toxicity of the
chemicals, the seriousness of the diseases for which the individuals are at
risk, the relative increase in the chance
of onset of disease in those exposed, and
the value of early diagnosis, that such
surveillance to monitor the effect of exposure to toxic chemicals is reasonable
and necessary.
Id. at 312; see also Miranda, 15 Cal.
Rptr.2d at 572-73 (discussing same factors
for recovery); Habitants Against Landfill
Toxicants v. City of York, 15 Envtl.L.Rep.
(Envtl.L.Inst.) 20937 (Pa.Ct.C.P. York Co.
May 20, 1985) (upholding "necessary" medical surveillance damages).
A federal district court in Pennsylvania
articulated similar criteria in Merry v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp., 684 F.Supp.
847 (M.D.Pa.1988). Under the Merry test,
a plaintiff must establish "(1) exposure to
hazardous substances; (2) the potential for
injury; and (3) the need for early detection
and treatment" to recover medical monitoring expenses. Id. at 850; see also In re
Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829,
852 (3d Cir.1990) (outlining medical monitoring criteria).
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C. Utah Test for Recovery of Medical
Monitoring Damages
[3] The Ayers and Merry standards are
instructive as we formulate our own standard. Building on the foundation they provide, we establish the following test for
Utah courts to use in determining whether
to award medical monitoring costs. To recover medical monitoring damages under
Utah law, a plaintiff must prove the following: ,0
(1) exposure
(2) to a toxic substance,
(3) which exposure was caused by the
defendant's negligence,
(4) resulting in an increased risk
(5) of a serious disease, illness, or injury
(6) for which a medical test for early
detection exists
(7) and for which early detection is beneficial, meaning that a treatment exists
that can alter the course of the illness,
(8) and which test has been prescribed
by a qualified physician according to
contemporary scientific principles.

must prove that the exposure to the toxic
substance was caused by the defendant's
negligence, i.e., by the breach of a duty
owed to the plaintiff.
[6] Fourth, the plaintiff must prove
that the exposure was of sufficient intensity and/or duration to increase his or her
risk of the anticipated harm significantly
over the plaintiffs risk prior to exposure.
No particular level of quantification is necessary to satisfy this requirement of significantly increased risk. We reemphasize
what should be apparent from our earlier
discussion: Because the injury in question
is the increase in risk that requires one to
incur the cost of monitoring, the plaintiff
need not prove that he or she has a probability of actually experiencing the toxic consequence of the exposure. It is sufficient
that the plaintiff show the requisite increased risk.11

[7] Fifth, the plaintiff must prove that
the illness, the risk of which has been increased by exposure to the toxin, is a serious one. By this we mean an illness that
in its ordinary course may result in significant impairment or death.
[4,5] First, the plaintiff must prove exSixth, the plaintiff must prove that a test
posure, which we define as ingesting, inhaling, injecting, or otherwise absorbing the exists for detecting the onset of the illness
substance in question into the body. Sec- before it would be apparent to the layperond, the plaintiff must prove that the sub- son. If no such test exists, then periodic
stance to which he or she was exposed is monitoring is pointless and 12no cause of
In such a
"toxic." We take our definition from the action for monitoring exists.
dictionary, which defines toxic by referring situation, the potential plaintiff is not
to "poison," a word that in turn is defined harmed until the onset of the actual illness.
she can bring an action
as "a substance that through its chemical At that time, he or
13
action usually kills, injures, or impairs an for actual injury.
organism." Webster's New Collegiate DicSeventh, the plaintiff must prove that
tionary 881 (1981). We note that the sub- the periodic administration of the existing
stance must be toxic to humans rather than test would be beneficial to him or her, i.e.,
to other forms of life. Third, the plaintiff that a treatment exists that is more effec10. Proof of these elements will usually require
expert testimony. See Slagel at 872.

utilizing it, if all other elements of the cause of
action are present.

11. One commentator has suggested that government data may provide toxic-tort plaintiffs with
an inexpensive and convenient source of proof
of increased risk. See Chapin at 148-57.

13. The statute of limitations certainly will not
run on a cause of action when a critical element
of that cause, actual injury, has yet to evidence
itself. See Klinger v. Kightly, 791 P.2d 868. 869
(Utah 1990); cf. Wrolstad v. Industrial Comm'n,
786 P.2d 243 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (striking down
statute of repose barring workers' compensation
for asbestosis victim as violative of open courts
provision of the Utah Constitution).

12. Of course, if a test is later developed that will
detect the disease, a plaintiff would retain the
right to demonstrate at some later date the
effectiveness of the test and be compensated for
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tive in curing or ameliorating the conse
quences of the illness if administered before the onset of the illness becomes appar
•mt to a layperson \gain unless a treat
ment is available that would be more beneficial to the plaintiff if administered before
he illness becomes obvious then there is
no cause of action because medical monitor
ng cannot fulfill its purpose The plaintiff
can await the onset ot the illness to ->ue
Eighth it is not enough that early detec
ion and treatment are shown to be theoret
callv beneficial It also must be shown
hat administration of the test to a specific
olaintiff is medically advisable tor that
olamtiff To illustrate a monitoring re
gime might be of theoretical value in de
ecting and treating a particular illness but
f a reasonable phvsician would not orescribe it for a particular plaintiff because
he benefits of the monitoring would oe
)utweighed b> the costs which ma\ n
lude among )ther things the burdensome
requencv A the monitoring procedure ts
excessive price :>r ts risk or iarm to he

toxic substance caused by the defendants
negligence a reasonable physician would
prescnbe tor her or him a monitoring regime different than the one that would
hav e been prescribed in the absence of that
particular exposure George W C McCar
er Medical Sue-Veillance A History
ind Critique of the Medical Monitoring
Remedy in Toxic Tort Litigation 45 Rut
gers L Rev 227 266-67 (1993) [hereinafter
McCarter] This is because under this
cause }f action a plaintiff may recover
mlv if the defendant s ^rongtul acts in
reased the Dlaintiff s incremental risk of
ncurnng he harm produced bv the toxic
substance enough to warrant a change in
rhe medical monitoring that otherwise
.vould be prescribed for that plaintiff a
thange that would represent increased
osts 'o the olamtiff For example if the
plaintiff is exposed to i toxic substance in
arge quantities or for a long duration and
ater s neghgentlv exposed to the same
instance in I mail quantitv )r ^or a short
Juration b\ he lefendant there hould be
10 rpco\en, mm he me causing the later
jatient hen reco\er\ would not be al
owed This conrorms with he fact hat ^xDOsure it it ioes not oninge the monitor
that would have been appropn
he substantive injurv being remedied is ng regime
r
he defendant s significantlv increasing rhe Tate o the olamtiff before that exposure
olamtiff N risk of harm so that the plaintiff hat oerson or entitv would not have
aused the Dlaintiff to incur i monitoring
must near medical monitoring expenses
\bsent the advisabilit\ )f monitoring ^ r ->\Dense that he or she would not otherwise
hat particular plaintiff the injury is not nave nad and the elements of the ause of
omplete ind no cause of action exists A.s action would not be complete
s the case where a test or a treatment does
[101 We emphasize that the advisable
not exist the plaintiff mav sue when and if
medical testing tor a specific plaintiff must
the illness occurs
be shown to be consistent with contempo[8,9] A. word about the interaction of rary scientific principles and reasonably
he eighth and fourth elements is warrant necessar>
Ayers 525 A 2d at 309 We
ed The fourth element requires proof that theretore require not only that a doctor
he exposure caused by the defendants prescribe the test for this plaintiff but also
negligence significantly increased the plain that the test is shown by expert testimony
iff s risk over whatever level of risk exist to be one a reasonable physician in the area
ed before that exposure The eighth ele of specialty would order for a patient simi
ment requires a showing that monitoring is larly situated 1 e , facing a similar nsk of
not only theoretically beneficial for earlv the same serious illness from the same
detection and treatment of the harm for cause Cf Slagel at 875 ("[Defendant
which the plaintiff is more at risk, but that should not be required to provide the plain
the monitoring is medically advisable for tiff with untried tests of speculative val
that plaintiff In operation these two ele ue ') This dual requirement prevents rements require a particular plaintiff to covery for costs of treatment not generally
prove that bv reason of the exposure to the accepted by the medical community
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[11,12] Guiding this entire inquirv ot
course is the general requirement that
compensation for medical expenses m a
ort action be reasonable and necessary
Lharles J McCormick Handbook on the
Law of Damages § 90 at 323-27 (1935) 1
Jacob \ Stem Stein on Personal Injury
Damages §§ 5 1-5 3 (2d ed 1991) See
generally 22 Am Jur 2d Damages §§ 197206 (1988) That is only medical monitor
ing costs found to be reasonable and neces
This require
3arv will be compensable
Tient adds vet another check to ensure rhat
mlv meritorious claims are compensated
and also demonstrates that this measure )t
damages is entirelv consistent with basic
tort principles Fmallv medical monitoring
costs are recoverable onlv tor the duration
ot the latency period if known ot the
illness in question McCarter at 261
D

Application of the Medical
Monitoring Test

In granting letendants motion tor >um
man udgment in this case the trial ourt
based ts ruling m he ground that io
bodilv njurv has been manifested n an\
plaintiff
In so ruling the trial court lp
plied what we now determine to be the
wrong legal standard Having articulated
the orrect legal standard ve vacate he
aumman judgment and remand for turther
proceedings consistent with this opinion
In so doing we acknowledge that olain
tiffs have not as yet protfered sutficient
evidence to establish the criteria outlined
above For example under our medical
monitoring cause of action plaintiffs an
recover only if medical monitoring is adus
able as a result of their exposure Howev
er the only evidence offered below by
plaintiffs on this point was a letter trom
Dr Battigelli who examined Hansen Hil
ton Silcox and Vickers at the Occupational
Clinic for the Department of Family and
Preventive Medicine The letter states
In summary we conclude that the expo
sure experienced by these workers while
working at the Mountain Fuel Supply
building throughout the 6 months of
their employment there, was limited and

perhaps inconsequential This statement
is based on the following grounds
2 The duration of exposure albeit
leplorable in its lack of warning and
absence of personal protective equipment was admittedly limited in intensit\
and duration
3 The workers by and large denied
acute bouts )t coughing chocking [sic]
and related symptoms which would sug
.jest overwhelming exposure—nor do the
procedures [used bv the vorkers] sug
.jest a large and intense generation n
Just
4 It is impossible for us to dismiss
entirely the claim these workers present
relating adverse etfects ot this exposure
netting to heir health However the
v.onsequences[ ] if anv will ippear n
ears to come—tifteen and twentv vears
n tact usuailv elapse between exposure
o asbestos and significant adverse et
ects There is no iay to eithu intui
pate heir yccurrente )r o tismiss t
utoatther it his ime
) This examination may be followed
n two or three vears with repeat hest <.
"avs tor exclusion >l asbestos effect)
Emphasis added i The suggestion in para
^rapn h that plaintilfs mav ->eeK chest v
r
avs in wo or hree vears o exclude as
otstos etfects is simplv not enough to with
tand summarv judgment as ^o the medical
advisabiht\ element Indeed is he em
Dhasized portion ot he letter ndicates
rather than stating that medical monitoring
is advisable the tetter mav impiv that med
ical monitoring is in tact unnecessary
Having acknowledged that plaintiffs
showing below was insufficient we think
that in light ot the unsettled state of the
law 3n medical monitoring in Ltah the
only fair course is to remand this matter to
permit plaintiffs to attempt to meet the
newly articulated standard This is espe
cially so since plaintiffs claimed in their
final motion before the trial court that dis
covery was incomplete and represented to
the court that further medical consultation
was anticipated If after a fair opportuni
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ty, plaintiffs cannot satisfy the standard
we articulate today, their claim should fail.
E. Remedy
[13,141 We add a final note on remedy.
Should plaintiffs in this or any other medical monitoring case present a valid claim,
the remedy should be limited to providing
each plaintiff with the medical monitoring
:hat has been necessitated by the actions of
that defendant. This requires a word of
explanation.

>

a
w
to

Because the cause of action we craft
today provides a remedy for a plaintiffs
need to incur future costs for medically
advisable monitoring—a need caused by
the defendant's negligence—and because
iDsent an actual need for monitoring, no
recovery can be had, the remedy should
provide for the cost of medical monitoring
actually received by the plaintiff, not for
lamages. For if monitoring is not actually
provided to the plaintiff, rhen a significant
theoretical element of his or her injury is
missing, as our discussion ibove makes
Diam.

Although trial courts have ample equitable powers to assure that this remedy is
provided, we suggest consideration of a
court-supervised fund to administer medical surveillance payments. In the alternative, a defendant might be ordered to pay
for insurance to fund the plaintiff's future
medical monitoring needs. See Ayers, 525
A.2d at 313-14: Burns v. Jaquays Mining,
156 Ariz. 375, 752 P.2d 28. 34 (Ct.App.
1988). As the Ayers court observed:
In our view, the use of a court-supervised fund to administer medical-surveillance payments .. is a highly appropriate use of the Court's equitable powers
Such a mechanism offers significant advantages over a lump-sum verdict
. . . [A] fund would serve to limit the
liability of defendants to the amount of
expenses actually incurred. A lump-sum
verdict attempts to estimate future expenses but cannot predict the amounts
that actually will be expended for medical purposes
The public health interest is served by a fund mechanism

that encourages regular medical monitoring for victims of toxic exposure. .
Although there may be administrative
and procedural questions in the establishment and operation of such a fund, we
encourage its use by trial courts.. .
Ayers, 525 A.2d at 314.
We agree with the rationale of the Ayers
court. Although we do not mandate a
trust fund, leaving it to the trial court to
fashion a suitable equitable remedy, we do
hold that any award must provide for the
defendant's payment of only the costs of
the medical monitoring services that will
actually be provided to the plaintiff. The
trial court should not order payment to the
plaintiff, in a lump sum or otherwise, of
damages representing the costs of future
monitoring.
If the court establishes a
trust fund and all of it is not used ro pay
for medical monitoring actually mcurred by
the plaintiff, the remainder should be returned to the defendant.
For useful
thoughts on the crafting of a remedy, see
McCarter at 253-b'4.
IV.

DISPOSITION

We affirm the trial court s ruling on
plaintiffs* negligent infliction of emotional
distress claim, but reverse the ruling regarding medical monitoring. We remand
for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
ZIMMERMAN. Justice, concurring in
part and concurring in the result:
[ concur in parts I and III of Justice
Durham's opinion. I join in the conclusion
of part II and agree that plaintiffs' allegations are insufficient as a matter of law to
support an action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress. However, I do not join
in part IPs wide-ranging dictum to the effect that mental illness, in the absence of
physical manifestation, is sufficient to support a claim. There is no need to attempt
to decide this question for the purposes of
this appeal, since under any theory plaintiffs' allegations are insufficient. Moreover, Justice Durham's dictum conflicts not
only implicitly with the approach of a ma-

jonty of this court in Johnson v. Rogers,
763 P.2d 771, 784 (Utah 1988) (opinion of
Zimmerman, J., joined by Hall. C.J., Howe,
Assoc. C.J., and Stewart, J.), but explicitly
with what I think are the better-reasoned
authorities she cites but does not follow.

of Appeals: and (3) California judgment
was "final" for full faith and credit purposes, as it was not appealed.
Reversed.

1. Appeal and Error e=842(l)
HALL, C.J., and HOWE, Associate C.J.,
and STEWART. J., concur in the
concurring opinion of ZIMMERMAN, J.

9(R SYSTEM>

Supreme Court reviewed trial court's
ruling that, as matter of law, California
judgment regarding real property was invalid and not entitled to full faith and cred.t independently and without deference <"o
'rial court. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 4. § i.
2. Judgment 0=815

In the Matter of the ESTATE OF
Herbert Lee JONES, deceased.
Linda Cameron Anglesey, Appellant.
No. 900170.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 9. 1993.

Testator's son objected to petition for
formal probate of will, claiming to be pretermitted child. The Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, Homer F. Wilkinson. J..
denied son's objections, and he appealed.
The Court of Appeals. 759 P.2d 345, vacated and remanded. On remand, the District
Court. James S. Sawaya, J., held that California judgment which was entered prior to
Court of Appeals' decision and which distributed testator's California real property
was invalid, and ordered real property distributed according to Utah law. Estate appealed. The Supreme Court, Zimmerman,
J., held that: (1) even if California court
applied California, rather than Utah, law,
that fact did not invalidate its decision for
purposes of determining whether to afford
California judgment full faith and credit;
(2) California judgment was not rendered
invalid for full faith and credit purposes by
estate's alleged failure to bring to California court's attention fact that appeal of
Utah trial court's ruling on pretermitted
child claim was pending before Utah Court

Generally, only judgments that are
both valid and final are entitled to full faith
and credit. U.S.C.A. ^onst. Art. 4. § 1.
J. Judgment 3=815
Even if California >'ourt applied California, rather than Utah, 'aw m distributing Utah testator's California reai 'jroper:v. that fact did not nvalida^jts lecision
for purposes of determiningNjwhether to
afford California judgment full faith and
credit. U.S.C.A. Const. A r t . S § 1.
1. Descent and Distribution9^3
Status of heir is determined according
to laws of state where person is domiciled.
5. Judgment 3=819
Foreign judgment :hat is both valid
and final cannot be collaterally attacked
even if grounded on errors of law or fact.
U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 4. $ I.
6. Judgment <3=815
To be "valid" for purposes of full faith
and credit, judgment must have been rendered by court with competent jurisdiction
and in compliance with constitutional requirements of due process.
U.S.C.A.
Const. Art. 4, § 1.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
7. Judgment <s=»815
Foreign judgment rendered without
subject matter jurisdiction or jurisdiction
over either parties or res is not entitled to
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thereto. Parsons r. Rice, 81 Mont 509, 264 P. and there Is no suggestion tn the record thatf
396.
plaintiff intended, or that defendant thought
(9-1 f] 4. It is next contended that the ver- he intended, to again violate the law, If acdict is against law, in that the jury did not corded possession of the dining room. She
follow the Instructions of the court that, "un- merely denied that she rented the dining
less you believe, from a preponderance of the room to him; while plaintiff testified that
evidence, that the defendant in this action re- she did, but refused to give him possession
ceived 1100 from the plaintiff for which she because she said another party had offered
agreed to rent to plaintiff the room on the her more money for it.
west side of the Park Hotel, known as the
No reversible error appearing in the recdining room, together with the rear room on ord, the judgment is affirmed,
the east side thereof, and she refused to turn
said room over to plaintiff, then your verdict
CALLAWAY, C. J., and GALEN, FORD,
should be for the defendant as to the plain- and ANGSTMAN, JJ., concur.
tiff's cause of action."
It will be noted that, while the instruction
contains the Insert, "together with the rear
room on the east side thereof in effect in
parenthesis, the slngjlar is thereafter used,
"and she refused to turn said room over to
T A N N H A U S E R v. S H E A .
the plaintiff.'* The antecedent of "room" is
No. 6723.
the dining room, and the jury might well
have understood that the instruction had
tkipreme Court of Montana.
reference only to the dining room, although
Dec 26, 1930.
mentioning the small room. However, where
defendant does not stand upon his motion for
Rehearing Denied Jan. 28, 1931.
nonsuit and introduces testimony, he does so
at the risk of supplying any deficiency in t. Novation «=»!.
plaintiff's case (Staff v. Montana Petroleum
Essential requisites of novation are previCo, 87 Mont
, 291 P 1042), as did defend- ous valid obligation, agreement of parties to
ant here when she testified to having ar- new contract, extinguishment of old contract
ranged for the occupation by defendant of a and validity of new one (Rev. Codes 1921, ft
small room on the west side of the basement, 7460-7462).
thus in a measure supporting plaintiff's allegation relative to that room; it is true she 2. Novation £=»!.
Novation constitutes new contractual retestified that plaintiff agreed to pay her $10
l>er week for the use of this room, but in this lation and is based upon new contract by all
*he was contradicted by the plaintiff. The parties interested (Rev. Codes 1921, 55 7460question of who told the truth was addressed 7462).
to the jury. Under the circumstances, the
use of the singular "room" for the plural 3. Novation 4=>5»
"rooms'* to the latter portion of the instrucAgreement that employer would pay
tion could not have prejudiced defendant. judgment against employee who was to be reOn the whole record, the verdict was Justified leased held a "novation" (Rev. Codes 1921, H
under the instruction above.
7460-7462).
5. Finally it is said that the premises dePlaintiff had sued employer and emscribed were rented for an illegal purpose, to
ployee for damages in automobile colliwit, the sale therein of intoxicating liquor in
sion. Judgment had been taken against
violation of the federal Prohibition Act
employee by default, and nonsuit had been
The fallacy here is that, in order to hold
rendered in favor of employer. Plaintiff
that the contract was illegal, we must adopt
regarded employee as insolvent, and emdefendant's definition of a "soft drink parlor"
ployee was threatening to move to have
as "a term used to describe a place where injudgment set aside. Plaintiff had right of
toxicating liquor Is sold in violation of law."
appeal from the nonsuit or conld have
The record discloses that, with the knowlbrought new suit against the employer.
edge of defendant, plaintiff had conducted a
[Ed. Note.—For other definitions of
"soft drink parlor" In the former barroom of
"Novation," see Words and Phrases.]
the hotel, and that, in December, 102$, that
room was abated because of the violation of 4. Frauds, statute of *=>32.
the Prohibition Law therein by plaintiff It
Promise to pay another's antecedent obis dedudble from the evidence that "plaintiff ligation in consideration of Its cancellation la
1
Intended td open a soft drink parlor in the" ordinal undertaking not required by statute*
dining room, bul the term "soft drink'' Is used" of frauds to be in writing; (Rev. Codes 1921, fl
in£c6ntfadMlnctibn*to {intoxicating liquor5'»r 8175, subsec. 8).
t
B$R m ali S^-Nuttbewd Jtert^aadlladSM^ ,«, ^

in that action, Walsb as the employer of Shea,
5. Novation £*«.
Judgments are-as much the subject of for himself and the corporation, agreed to
employ counsel to defend Shea, and Walsh
novation as simple contract debts.
did employ counsel, who for some reason appeared only for the defendant corporation,
6. Jury <8=»28(6).
Plaintiff held to have waived jury trial and as a result default judgment was entered
by offer to stipulate and by failure to object against the defendant Shea ex parte, without
his knowledge; that subsequently the action
to trial as in equity.
came on for trial against the corporation and
Plaintiff moved to try cause to court,
a nonsuit was entered against the plaintiff
and, upon motion being resisted, announcTannhauser; that as a result of the attored that he would stipulate that court might
neys' failure to appear in that action for the
submit case to jury on question of fact,
defendant Shea, he was prevented from availand that verdict would be advisory. Case
ing himself of the defense interposed by the
was then tried as one in equity, and special
corporation, and that had he been permitted
verdict submitted to jury without objecto defend, no judgment would have been ention to it, or to instructions pertaining
tered against him. The defendant further althereto,
leges that thereafter the plaintiff and himself
met with M. J. Walsh, now deceased, the lat7. Trial <S=>370(2).
ter acting for himself and the Walsh corpoCourt may direct jury to find special ver- ration, and It was thereupon agreed. In condict upon any issues in case (Rev. Codes 1921. sideration of this answering defendant Shea
§ 9361).
agreeing to forbear from any effort to have
his default in that action set aside, that Walsh
8. Novation <§=M3.
or the Walsh Company would pay the judgWhere evidence is conflicting, issue of ment, and the plaintiff thereupon promised
novation Is one of fact for jury or court try- and agreed to extinguish the debt and release
Shea therefrom, and to look entirely and
ing case without jury.
alone to Walsh and the Walsh corporation for
Appeal from District Court, Silver Bow payment; that Shea, believing he was released, kept his portion of the agreement;
County; Frank L Riley, Judge.
that Walsh died prior to the commencement of
Action by Frank J Tannhauser against this action, leaving no estafiri that he
Dennis A. Shea. From a judgment for de- plaintiff did not issue executiorFon the judg
fendant, plaintiff appeals.
ment within six years, or attempt to colAflirmed.
lect the same from the defendaraj; and that
Lowndes Maury and R. Lewis Brown, both he was thereby lulled Into secuwfy
It is further averred by the dp^ndant that
of Butte, for appellant.
* t a l k e r A Walker and C. S. Wagner, all of the promise of the plaintiff was false, and
untrue,
and was discovered by the defendant
Butte, for respondent.
to be false and untrue upon the filing of the
plaintiff's complaint in this action (December
GALEN, J.
Plaintiff Instituted this action on December 27, 1927); by reason whereof he prayed dam30, 1927, to recover from the defendant on a ages in the sum ot $1,000. By reply the plainjudgment rendered by the district court of tiff admitted the entry of the judgment, that
Silver Bow county on December 2, 1918, for the suit was a joint one, and that on the trial
the sum of $1,000, together with Interest and a nonsuit was entered In favor of the corporacosts. By answer the defendant admitted the tion, which was owned and controlled by M
entry of the Judgment, that the plaintiff was J. Walsh, and that the acts and doings of
the owner and holder of It, and that nothing Walsh were the acts and doings of the corhad been paid thereon; and by way of affirm- poration and bound it, that Walsh died leavative defense and counterclaim alleged that ing no estate; and denied all of the ojther afthe judgment was entered against him in a firmative allegations of the answer.
On April 24 and 25, 1929, the cause was
certain action for the recovery of damages
because of an automobile collision, entitled tried to a jury and treated by the court and
Iftrank J. Tannhauser v. M. J. Walsh Com- counsel as one in equity. The defendant unpany, a corporation, and Dennis Shea It is dertook the burden of proof. At the concluaverred that Shea, at the time of the acci- sion of all of the evidence, the court submitted
dent, was driving an automobile belonging to to the jury a form of special verdict readthe 1 C J. Walsh Company; that the Walsh - ing as follows: "We, the jury In this action,
Company »waa owned and controlled by M. J- find the following special verdict in said acWateh, and that the acts and doings of Walsh tion: Question: Did the plaintiff; Tann- f
were the acts,of the Walsh .Company, and hauser, and the defendant, Shea, and.the late
bound ) t ; that after the service of summons M. J. Walsh, |n the month of January, 19J$,
4s>For other ease* Metometopic and KEY-NUMBER laldl Key-Ntnnberod DlgfcU and Indttes•sair:
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enter into an oral agreement that Walsh tion of a new obligation for an existing oiiSl
would pay to Tannhauser the amount of his Section 7460, Rev. Codes. 1921. It Is accojn
judgment against Shea; that Shea would not plished in three ways: "l. By the substttjl
take any steps to have set aside said judgment tion of a new obligation between the sanfl
or to open the default in connection there- parties, with intent o extinguish the old Jflg
with, and that Tannhauser would accept the ligation; 2. By the substitution of a nefl
promise of Walsh to pay said judgment and debtor in place of the old one, with intent 9
would relieve said Shea therefrom?" The release the latter; or, 3. By the substitutes}
jury was instructed to make answer to the of a new creditor in place of the old one, witB
question submitted* either "yes" or "no," and intent to transfer the rights of the latterJB
it made answer in the affirmative.
the former" Id. S 7461. It is affected 1 3
Thereafter the plaintiff moved the court to contract, "and is subject to all the rules COM
reject the finding of the jury and to find in cerning contracts in general." Id. 5 74621
his favor, and the defendant asked that the "In every novation there are four essential
finding of the jury be adopted by the court. prerequisites: (1) A previous valid obligal
The court made its findings of fact and conclu- tion; (2) the agreement of all the parties tfl
sions of law adopting the finding of the jury, the new contract; (3) the extinguishment of]
and on November 6, 1929, entered judgment the old contract; and (4) the validity of thg
on the merits, dismissing the plaintiff's com- new one. It constitutes a new contractual rej
plaint The plaintiff moved for a new trial, lation and is based upon a new contract bn
which was denied, and the cause Is now be- all parties Interested/' Kirkup v. Anacondaj
Amusement Co., 59 Mont 469, 197 P. 1005J
fore us on appeal from the judgment
1011, 17 A. L. R. 441.
*|j
Of the several specifications of error by the
plaintiff assigned, there is but one question
[3] Admittedly M. J. Walsh and the MJ
meriting serious consideration in disposition J. Walsh Company were one and the samel
of this appeal, viz.: Was the court In error in and it appears that Shea owed Tannhauser al
Its conclusion that a novation existed which liquidated sum of money, evidenced by a]
relieved the defendant from the obligation of judgment entered by default; that Shea was'
the judgment?
threatening within his rights to move the!
The court found* "That the plaintiff here- court to set aside the judgment because ofj
in, the defendant herein, and said Walsh, in fraud or excusable neglect; and that Tann?
the month of January, 1919, entered into an hauser considered Shea to be insolvent andy
oral agreement that Walsh, in consideration knew that there was a possibility of Shew
of the release of the defendant Shea from having the judgment set aside. Walsh knew]
said Judgment would pay, and did agree to or should have known, that Tannhauser hadj
pay, to plaintiff the amount of his judgment a right of appeal or could institute a new easel
against defendant Shea; that Shea, in consid- upon the same cause of action because thej
eration of his release from said judgment nonsuit entered as to Walsh and his company*]
would not take, and agreed not to take, any did not constitute a trial on the merits. Hej
steps to have set aside said judgment or to wished to rid himself of the litigation. She*
open the default in connection therewith; was Walsh's employee and Walsh apparently]
and that plainuif, in consideration of the said felt morally bound to relieve Shea from the]
promise of Walsh to pay said judgment and of burden of the judgment A legal duty rested/
the forbearance of said Shea to take steps to upon the defendant Shea at the time of enjj
have set aside said judgment or to open the tering into the agreement with Walsh andj
default in connection therewith, would ac- Tannhauser to pay the judgment and by reaj
cept ai*d <*W agree to accept, and did accept son of such agreement Shea was released o i
the promise of Walsh to pay said judgment such obligation, Tannhauser agreeing to ac$j
m
and would relieve, and did relieve, said Shea cept Walsh in substitution of Shea,
therefrom; that the defendant executed his amounted to an agreement to substitute a nevfi
part of said agreement by forbearing to take debtor (Walsh) in place of the old one (Shea»
any steps or action in court to open said de- with intent to release the latter—a "novafl
cM
fault or set aside said judgment within the tion" as defined by our statute.
time allowed by law, or at all; that defendant at all times after the rendition of said
(4, 5] And the rule Is that where the prom?
judgment against him, was solvent and able ise is made to pay the antecedent obligation <8
to pay the same, but that plaintiff did not is- another upon the consideration that the paHg
sue execution on said judgment, within the receiving it will cancel such antecedent obtfj
time allowed by( law, or at all."
gatlon, accepting the new promise in substg
tution therefor, it is an original undertaking
And vas va conclusion of law it was found i tor
agreement and not a mere promise to a]S
that $bere was a novation resulting in Shea's swer'for the debt of another within the meall
release, from (he obligation of the judgment" tag of the statute of frauds and need noj: b e j a
il/2J<Althdugh ihe evidence is^ln direct* writing; and judgments are as'mdeh the sura
conflict ther£ fe lestbnbriy In support of such JeciB of novation as simple contract d e $ g |
n^dinganof ?*Ct^ ^ o v a t i o n & th$ aubstitu-~ 46 O. J. 583, 584, :J. But It is contended ^ S j

HENDERSON * LAND

Wyo.
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I

^ne consideration was unlawful, in that it
HENDERSON V. LAND.
*as based upon an agreement as to the charNo. 1603.
acter of testimony Shea would give in the action against Walsh. There is nothing in the
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
l? record to indicate that Shea was to testify
Jan. 14, 1931.
falsely or to in any manner deviate from the
| facts in the case.
t. Appeal and error <&=>l 078(1).
| [6] Many of the plaintiff's assignments of
Where several errors were assigned In
f error are based upon the fact that the cause specification, but only one argued in brief,
I was tried as one in equity rather than at law, only It could be considered.
t and that the plaintiff was in consequence deInied his constitutional tight of a trial by 2. Negligence $=>I2.
Before sudden emergency rule applies, it
jLjury. Counsel now concede,, as they must
I that the action is one at law rather than in must be clear emergency existed through
lequity; however, the plaintiff entirely over- no negligence of person in peril, and that reflooks the fact that by his consent appearing sultant injury could not be prevented after
fjn the minutes of the court a trial by jury peril had passed.
boras expressly waived. At the trial the plain£tiff made motion to dismiss the jury and to 3. Automobiles <8=>246(2I).
Refusing instruction, under sudden
'try the cause to the court upon five specific
grounds, among which It was contended that emergency doctrine, negativing Inference of
negligence
arising from motorist's being on
|the defendant is "estopped to deny the case
pis in equity"; that the equitable powers of wrong side of street when striking pedestrian
[ tbe court having once taken jurisdiction, "the at intersection, held proper, injury occurring
tase remains within the jurisdiction of equity after passing of emergency and being pre^throughout the entire proceedings"; and that ventable by motorist
I t is perfectly proper for an equitable case
, to be tried to the court with no jury." This
Appeal from District Court, Laramie Coun•, motion was resisted bf the defendant, and ty ; Cyrus O. Brown, Judge.
'plaintiff's counsel thereupon announced that
Action by Elizabeth J. Henderson against
* he would "stipulate that the court may submit Edwin Land. From a judgment in favor of
r the case to the jury on the question of fact plaintiff, defendant appeals.
f and that the verdict of the jury will be advisAffirmed.
fjory to the court" Consequently, the case
|fwas tried as one In equity and a special ver
George P. Guy, of Cheyenne, for appellant
f'dict submitted to the jury without objection
Lee A Lee, of Cheyenne, for respondent
| to it, or to the court's instructions pertaining
ttthereto. We hold that the plaintiff waived
RINER, J.
Phis right to a jury trial, and that his objection
This case, here by direct appeal, arose In
Incomes too late.
consequence of injuries inflicted by an autoE [7,1] The judgment was properly predi- mobile driven by Edwin J. Land, the deg^cated upon the jury's special verdict, as the fendant below and appellant here, against
p court is authorized in all cases to direct "the the plaintiff and respondent Elizabeth J-.
TJury t 0 And a special verdict in writing upon Henderson, as she was crossing O'Neil street
gal! or any of the issues" presented In a case. on her* way along the north side of TwentyPfiection 9361, Rev. Codes 1921. The rule is Fifth street at the intersection of the two
jfthat: "Whether it was the intention of the streets in the city of Cheyenne.
Frparties to a particular transaction to effect a
Plaintiff's amended petition charged that
pnovation or not Is ordinarily a question of the accident happened because the defendant
T^act for the jury, if the terms of the agree- negligently drove his car on the wrong side
m e n t are equivocal or uncertain. Upon simi- of the street and at an excessive rate of
Pl&r principles, where the evidence is conflict- speed. The defense Interposed was a geni n g , the Issue of novation Is one of fact for eral denial, with the assertion of contribuK&e Jury or for the court, where the case Is tory negligence on the part of the plaintiff.
juried without a jury-* 40 C. J. p. 630. In the A jury trial resulted in a verdict and JudgKtlgfat of the evidence, it was proper in this ment In her favor, in a sum not so very
gc&se to submit the question to the jury for de- greatly In excess of the amount claimed by
Rrermlnatlon.
her for medical and hospital expenses inKuTor the reasons stated, the judgment is af- curred In consequence of the injuries suffered.
pJAArmed.
[1] While a number of errors were assignI^OALLAWAY, C. J.,r and MATTHEWS, ed in the specification of errors filed, ^nty
one
has been argued 'In appellant's brief,
SpRJ>, kndANGSTMAN, JJ.t concur.
H
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2) Judgment by default. A judgment Oy default
shail not be different in kind from, or exceed in amount.
:hat specifically prayed for in the demand for judgment,
d) Costs.
1) l b whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute of this state or in
these rules, costs shail be allowed as of course to che
prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs: prodded, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for
review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in
connection with such appeal or other proceeding for
review, shall abide the final determination of the cause.
Costs against the state of Utan. its officers and agencies
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law.
2) How assessed. The partv who claims his costs
-nust within five days after the entry of judgment serve
upon the adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a
copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and
necessary disbursements in the action, and tile with the
court a like memorandum thereof duiy verified stating
:hat to affiant's knowledge the items are correct, and that
the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the
action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs
claimed may, within seven days after service of the
memorandum of costs, rile a motion to have the bill of
costs taxed by the court in which 'he judgment was
rendered.
A memorandum of costs served and riled after the
verdict, or at the time of or subsequent to the service and
filing of the findings of fact and inclusions or law. but
before the entry of judgment, snail nevertheless be considered as served and iled on -he late ucgment s
entered.
3), 4) LDeieted.j
') Interest and costs to be included in the judgment.
cierk must include in any judgment signed oy him any
rest on :he verdict or lecision from :he time t was
lereo. and the costs, f the same nave oeen taxed T
Ttainea. The cierk must, within two days after the costs
? oeen taxed jr ascertained. :n any case where not med :n the judgment, insert the amount thereof in a olank
in the judgment for 'hat purpose, and make a simiiar
tion thereof in the register of actions ana in the judgment
;et.
ended effective January 1. 1985..
j 55. Default.
Default.
1) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for
affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise
iefend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to
ippear the clerk shall enter his default.
2) Notice to party in default. After the entry of the
lefault of any party, as provided in Subdivision <a)(l) of
his rule, it shall not be necessary to give such party in
lefault any notice of action taken or to be taken or to serve
ny notice or paper otherwise required by these rules to
e served on a party to the action or proceeding, except as
rovided in Rule 5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or in the event that
; is necessary for the court to conduct a hearing with
jgard to the amount of damages of the nondefaulting
arty.
Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as
s:
(1) By the clerk. When the plain tiff's claim against a
sfendant is for a sum certain or for a sum which can by
mputation be made certain, and the defendant has been
srsonally served otherwise than by publication or by
trsonal service outside of this state, the clerk upon
quest of the plaintiff 3hall enter judgment for the
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imount aue and costs against 'he defendant, if he has
)een iefauited for failure co appear and if he is not an
nfant or incompetent person.
2' 3y the court. In all other cases the oarty entitled
*o a judgment by default shail apply to the court therefor.
if. ;n order *o enanie -.he court *o enter judgment or to
carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to
letermine the amount )f damages or to establish the
ruth of any averment oy evidence or *o make an investigation of anv other matter, 'he court may conduct such
searings or order such references as it deems necessary
md proper.
c Setting aside default. 7or ^ood cause shown the court
may set aside an entry of default ana. .fa judgment by default
nas oeen entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with
?.uie o0(b;.
d) Plaintiffs, counterciaimants. oross-claimants. The
provisions of this rule apply whether -he party entitled to the
judgment by default is a plaintiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a
party who nas pieaded a cross-ciaim or counterclaim. In all
:ases a judgment by default :s subject to the limitations of
Rule o4ic\
e) Judgment against the *tate or officer or agency
thereof. No judgment by default snail be entered against the
state of Utah or against an officer or agency thereof unless the
claimant establisnes his claim or -:gnt :o reiief by evidence
satisfactory fo the court.
Amended effective Sevt. ;. 1985.
Ruie ,56. Summary judgment.
a i For claimant. A oarty seeding to recover upon a ciaira.
;ountemaim >r :ross-eiaim T 'O jotain a declaratory judgment may, at anv time after the expiration of 20 aays from the
commencement of the action :r liter iervice of a motion for
summary judgment oy the adverse oarty, move with or without supporting affidavits for i -ummary judgment in nis favor
ipon iii >r any pan thereof.
b» For defending party. .* oarty igainst whom a ciaim.
:ounterc:aim. or cross-ciaim :s asserted >r a declaratory judgment s sought, ciay, it my time, move with or without
supporting iifidavits for a summary judgment n nis favor as
:o ail jr any oart thereof.
a Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall
be served at ieast 10 davs before the rime fixed for the heanng.
The idverse oarty prior 'o "he iav ::' heanng may serve
opposing iffidavits. The .'udgment sought shail be rendered
forthwith if the oieaoings. leoositions. answers to interrogatories, and admissions on rile, together wich the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party s entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although
there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion
under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case
or for ail the relief asked and 3 trial is necessary, the court at
the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the
evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial
controversy and what material facts are actually and in good
faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy,
including the extent to which the amount of damages or other
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial
shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shail be made on
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be
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idmissible in evidence, and shail show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred
:o in an affidavit shail be attacned thereto or served therewith.
r
he court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed oy depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this ruie. an adverse party may not
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this
ruie, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary
udgment. if appropriate, shall be entered against mm.
f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear
-'rom the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he
:annot for reasons stated present bv affidavit facts essential to
astify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for
udgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to oe
)Otained or depositions to oe taken or discovery to oe had or
may make such other order as is just.
g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the
satisfaction of the court at any time that any of the affidavits
oresented pursuant to this ruie are presented in bad faith or
solely for the purpose of delay, the court snail forthwith order
:he party emplovmg them :o oay to me other oarty the
imount of the -easonable expenses wnich the filing of the
iffidavits caused him to incur, including reasonaole attorneys
ees. and any offending oarty or attorney may oe adjudged
,-uilty of contemDt.

Rule

f Judgment by confession. Whenever a /aagmer
lonfession 13 authorized oy -uatute. :ne oartv ieeKimj
same must hie with the cleric of the court :n which
judgment is to oe entered a statement, enfied by the di
iant. to the following effect:
1) If the judgment to oe confessed is for money ai
to oecome aue. it snail conciseiv state the ciaim and
:ne sum confessed therefor is justiy aue or to cecome
2) if the judgment to be confessed :s for tne ouroo
securing the piaintiff igainst l :ontingent iaoiiit
must state concisely the ciaim and that the sum confe
therefor does not exceed the same;
3) It must luthonze -he entrv yf judgment :•:
specified sum.
"he cierK snail •hereupon endorse anon tne statement,
mter n the judgment iocKet. i augment of the court rbr
imount confessed, vith :osts of entry. ;f my.
Amended effective SeDt. -4. 1985: Jan. ... 1987.

Ruie 58B. Satisfaction of judgment.
-i< Satisfaction by owner or attorney, A judgment ;
•)e satisfied, in wnoieor in oart. as to any or ail of the juagrr
debtors, oy the owner thereof, or -w the attorney ~>f recor
the .udgment creditor wnere no issignment of 'he judgrr
has oeen ilea and men. attorney executes sucn satisfac
vithm eight --ears ifter the entry of -he ;udgment. n
:biiowing manner: 1 ^y wntten nstrurnent. iuiy acxnc
edged bv >ucn owner or attorney: or ' _: bv ocxnowieo^men
sue.n satisfaction signed bv tne owner or attorney and ente
.n :ne :ocket if :he udgment n :he :ountv vrier*1 '
Rule 57. Declaratory judgments.
locKetec. vun he late iffixeo ino vntnesseo v.- tne :u
The oroceoure for obtaining a declarator.' judgment oursu- I very satisfaction f a cart u tne judgment, or as to mt
int to Chapter o3 n Title ~S. U.C.A. '..953. snail oe n
more f the ^uagment :eotors. snaii state -he imount o
accordance with these rules, and the right to tnai by jurv mav tnereon or for -he -eiease -jfsuch lebtors. -aming -.-.em.
:e demanded 'inder the circumstances ind :n the manner
b Satisfaction by >rder of court. Vhen i udgm
orovnded in Rules ;8 ind -39. The existence of mother aueauate remedy ioes not preclude a judgment for leciaratorv snail have oeen fuiiy oaio and not satisfied of recorc. ^r wi
-eiief in cases where it :s aoproDnate. "he court may oroer I "he satisfaction of-'uegment shail have been ost. -.ne couri
vn:ch .ucn judgment vas "^covered may, :Don motion
iDeedy neanng of an iction 'br a declarator/ judgment and
-atisfactor/ orooi. luthonze ne ittomey :f tne idgmi
may advance it on the calendar
jreoitor -.o satisn' -he same. :r may enter in order leciar
he same satisfied and direct satisfaction -.o oe entered ;t
Ruie 58A. Entry.
a) Judgment upon the verdict of a j u r y Uniess he :he aocxet.
c Zntry by cierk. Loon recemt of i satisfaction of ;ui
:ourt otherwise directs and suoject to the orovisions of Ruie
ment. auiv executed and acxnowieogeo. the cierk snail hie '
54(bj, judgment UDon the verdict of a jury snail be forthwith
;ame -vitn the oaDers in :he case, ind enter :t on tne regis
signed by the cierk ana riled. If there is a special veroict or a
n' ictions. ^e nail nso enter i )nef statement if '
general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories
iUDStance thereof, nciuoing the amount caia. in he man
-eturned by a jury pursuant to Ruie 49, the court snail direct
jf the .udgment aocKet. vuh the aate of hiing of rucn sat
the appropriate judgment which snail be forthwith signed bv
the cierK and tiled.
•'action.
b) Judgment in other cases. Sxcept as provided n
d' Sffect of satisfaction. When i uogment -nail ha
tjuodivision <a) hereof and Subdivision bxl) of Ruie 55, aii oeen satisfied, n vnoie ir in part, or is to anv udgmc
judgments shail be signed by :ne judge and riled -vith the aeotor, and such satisfaction entered icon .he docket bv :
Merk.
:ierK. sucn judgment snail, to tne extent of such satisfactu
c) When judgment entered: notation in register of oe aiscnarged and :ease to oe I lien. In :ase n oart
actions and judgment docket, A judgment is complete and satisfaction. :f any execution shall thereafter oe issued on t
shall be deemed entered for all purposes, except the creation of .udgment. such execution snail be endorsed with a memora
a lien on real property, when the same is signed and filed as ium of such partial satisfaction and shail direct the officer
herein above provided. The cierk shail immediately make a collect only the residue thereof, or to collect oniy -'rom t
notation of the judgment m the register of actions and the judgment debtors remaining liable thereon.
judgment docket.
e> Filing transcript of satisfaction in other countU
;d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment. The prevail- When any satisfaction of a judgment shail have been enter
ing party shall promptly give notice of the signing or entry of on the judgment docket c: the county where sucn judgme
judgment to all other parties and shall file proof of service of was first docketed, a certified transcript of satisfaction, or
such notice with the clerk of the court. However, the time for certificate by the cierk showing sucn satisfaction, may oe fil<
filing a notice of appeal is not affected by the notice require- with the clerk of the district court in any other county whe
ment of this provision.
the judgment may have been docketed. Thereupon a simil;
(e) Judgment after death of a party. If a party dies after entry in the judgment docket shail be made by the cierk
a verdict or decision upon any issue of fact and before such court: and such entry shail have the same effect as in tl
judgment, judgment may nevertheless be rendered thereon.
county where the same was originally entered.
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JULY 10, 1995
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Filing Date: 06/30/94
Judge: Sheila K. McCleve
MONDAY

Case
: 940008147 CV Civil
Case Title:

ROCKY MOUNTAIN MACHINERY COMPANY VS MATTINSON, RON
:! ! !

'I V

M/rifii

!!:r-'iii"«"j'(99fi"1j

Cause of Action:
GOODS AND/OR SERVICES
Amount of Suit.:
Return Date....:
Judgment
:
Disposition....:

)!
I .* <[<

l

t n

, I

j
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1/

$12637.10
Date:
Date:

Amt: .

$•00

No Court Settings
Tracking.:

11/27/95

Return Date

No Accounts Payable Activity.
Transaction:
Civil File Fee

Party..: PLA
Name...:

Date:
06/30/94

Cash-in
.00

Plaintiff

ROCKY MOUNTAIN MACHINERY COMPA
NY

Party..: DEF
Name...:

Defendant

MATTINSON, RON

Party..: DBA
Name...:

Doing Business As

R&R SERVICES
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100.00
.00

Total
100.00

D O C K E T

Page
;
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT - SLC
MONDAY
JULY 10, 199!
11:18 AT
Case
: 940008147 CV Civil
Filing Date: 06/30/9-*
Case Title:
Judge: Sheila K. McCleve
ROCKY MOUNTAIN MACHINERY COMPANY VS MATTINSON, RON

Party..: ATP
Name...:

Atty for Plaintiff

LEE, SCOTT W

06/30/94 Began tracking Return Date
Review on 12/27/94
Case filed on 06/30/94.
941270177 Civil complaint fee
100.00
07/11/94 FILED AMENDED COMPLAINT
07/29/94 FILED SUMMONS ON RETURN - SERVED RON MATTINSON DBA R&R SERVICES,
BY SERVING DEBBIE MATTINSON (WIFE)
08/02/94 FILED ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT
12/29/94 Return Date
Review date changed to 03/27/95
03/09/95 FILED AFFIDAVIT OF LYNN HOLT
FILED AFFIDAVIT OF CRAE BAKER
FILED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
FILED MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
03/21/95 FILED DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME
03/22/95 FILED DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES RESISTING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
FILED AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT RESISTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
03/28/95 Return Date
Review date changed to 11/27/95
05/23/95 FILED OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME
FILED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME
05/26/95 FILED NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION
05/30/95 ** FILE SENT TO JUDGE MCCLEVE
06/01/95 JUDGE MCCLEVE SUSTAINED PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO ENLARGEMENT OF
TIME TO RESPOND TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT. IF DEFENDANT FAILS TO
RESPOND TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT WITHIN 10 DAYS FROM (SIGNED) ENTRY
OF ORDER SUSTAINING OBJECTION, COURT WILL RULE ON SUMMARY
JUDGMENT WITH PLEADINGS AS NOW STAND.
PLAINTIFF TO PREPARE ORDER
COPY OF DOCKET ENTRY SENT TO EACH PARTY
06/07/95 FILED ORDER
** FILE SENT TO JUDGE MCCLEVE
06/08/95 JUDGE MCCLEVE ENTERED ORDER SUSTAINING OBJECTION
07/05/95 ** FILE SENT TO JUDGE MCCLEVE
07/10/95 JUDGE MCCLEVE GRANTED PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
PLAINTIFF TO PREPARE ORDER
COPY OF DOCKET ENTRY SENT TO EACH PARTY
End of the docket report for this case,
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—
Filing Date: 06/30/94
Judge!-Sheila K. McCleve

Case
: 940008147 CV Civil
Case Title:

ROCKY MOUNTAIN MACHINERY COMPANY VG MATTINSON, RON

Imli'irMW
]

ti

Cause of Action:
GOODS AND/OR SERVICES
Amount of Suit.:
Return Date....:
Judgment
:
Disposition....:

1

THURSDAY

~.iW~o vpnr
• 1 \ M ' »«

$12637.10

Date:
Date:

Amt

$.00

No Court Settings.
Tracking.:

11/27/95

Return Date

No Accounts Payable Activity.
Date:
06/30/94

Transaction:
Civil File Fee

Party..: PLA
Name...:

Cash-in
.00

Plaintiff

ROCKY MOUNTAIN MACHINERY COMPA
NY

Party..: DEF
Name...:

Defendant

MATTINSON, RON

Party..: DBA
Name...:

Doing Business As

R&R SERVICES

PAGE 33

Check-in Check-out
100.00
.00

Total
100.00

D O C K E T
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT - SLC

Page
2
JUNE 1, 1995
2:24 PM
Filing Date: 06/30/94
Judge: Sheila K. McCleve
THURSDAY

Case
: 940008147 CV Civil
Case Title:

ROCKY MOUNTAIN MACHINERY COMPANY VS MATTINSON, RON

Party..: ATP
Name...:

Atty for Plaintiff

LEE, SCOTT W

06/30/94 Began tracking Return Date
Review on 12/27/94
Case filed on 06/30/94.
941270177 Civil complaint fee
100.00
07/11/94 FILED AMENDED COMPLAINT
07/29/94 FILED SUMMONS ON RETURN - SERVED RON MATTINSON DBA R&R SERVICES,
BY SERVING DEBBIE MATTINSON (WIFE)
08/02/94 FILED ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT
12/29/94 Return Date
Review date changed to 03/27/95
03/09/95 FILED AFFIDAVIT OF LYNN HOLT
FILED AFFIDAVIT OF CRAE BAKER
FILED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
FILED MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
03/21/95 FILED DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME
03/22/95 FILED DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES RESISTING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
FILED AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT RESISTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
03/28/95 Return Date
Review date changed to 11/27/95
05/23/95 FILED OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME
FILED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME
05/26/95 FILED NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION
35/30/95 ** FILE SENT TO JUDGE MCCLEVE
36/01/95 JUDGE MCCLEVE SUSTAINED PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO ENLARGEMENT OF
TIME TO RESPOND TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT. IF DEFENDANT FAILS TO
RESPOND TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT WITHIN 10 DAYS FROM (SIGNED) ENTRY
OF ORDER SUSTAINING OBJECTION, COURT WILL RULE ON SUMMARY
JUDGMENT WITH PLEADINGS AS NOW STAND.
PLAINTIFF TO PREPARE ORDER
COPY OF DOCKET ENTRY SENT TO EACH PARTY
End of the docket report for this case.
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A. W. LAURITZEN
ATTORNEY AT LAW
P.O. BOX 171
LOGAN, UTAH 84321
(801) 753-3391

May 25,1995

Scott W. Lee
139 East South Temple, Suite 330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1169
RE: Rocky Mountain Machinery Company vs. Ron Mattison
dba R&R Services
Dear Mr. Lee,
Apologies are now in order and I extend mine to you. When
prepared the response to your Motion for Summary Judgement we
were on a deadline and my client living in Salt Lake had to
obtain a notary on his signature so I faxed the items to him.
Mr. Mattison assures me that he executed the Affidavit before a
notary and filed the Response together with the Affidavit with
the court but advises me that he took no steps to file copies
with you. In examining my file I likewise find no indication
that I mailed copies of the documents to you which was a grave
oversight.
Enclosed find the documents which I timely filed with the
court and now belatedly file with you and ask your forgiveness
for this oversight.
Ver

A. x ^ J ^ u r i t z e n
Attorney at Law
(

AWL/vj
bsmattlee.ltr(3)
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SCOTT W. LEE - NO. 4750
RANDLE, DEAMER, ZARR & LEE, P.C.

MAR

Attorneys for Plaintiff
139 East South Temple, Suite 330
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1169
Telephone: (801) 531-0441
Fax: (801) 531-0444

1

M ll

i

() jtirji;

t

"X".

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROCKY MOUNTAIN MACHINERY
COMPANY,

AFFIDAVIT OF LYNN HOLT

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 940008147-CV
RON MATTINSON dba R & R SERVICES,
Judge Sheila K. McCleve
Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

On this Ji 7 day of February, 1995, personally appeared before me, a Notary Public,
Lynn Holt, who being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

Affiant is employed by Plaintiff as a repair person and is familiar with the

transaction that forms the basis of the above-referenced litigation.
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2.

The statements made herein by Affiant are made of Affiant's own knowledge

and are such statements as Affiant would or could make under oath in court if called upon to
do so.
3.

On or about April 22, 1993, Affiant was dispatched to Oceda, Nevada (near Ely,

Nevada) from Salt Lake City, Utah to repair a dozer owned by Defendant.
4.

Affiant traveled to Oceda, Nevada where Affiant located and inspected

Defendant's equipment. The examination revealed the problem was not a convertor problem
as Defendant had suspected.
5.

Affiant discussed the problem with Defendant's on-site representative, noted that

there was transmission oil in the radiator and received permission to complete the repairs
actually needed to restore Defendant's equipment to operating condition.
6.

Affiant thereupon returned to Salt Lake City to obtain the appropriate parts, have

appropriate work done and assemble the equipment as necessary whereafter Affiant returned
to Oceda, Nevada and completed the repairs.
7.

Upon completion of the repairs, Affiant tested Defendant's equipment for proper

function and found it to perform within the manufacturer's specifications.
8.

At no time did Defendant, Defendant's on-site representative or Defendant's

agents request that Affiant use remanufactured or rebuilt parts in performing the repairs or
otherwise make any indication that the costs of the repairs might cause Defendant to consider
purchasing a new machine rather than repair the existing machine.
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DATED this ^ 7

day of February, 1995.

L/n^dC^?fiant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me.

Notary Public
DEBBIE SCHIAPPA
2320 West 1500 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104
My Commission Expires
March 27.1996
State of Utah

•
1
I
J
I
I
J

NOTARY PUBLIC V 7 '
Residing at:
My Commission Expires:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF
LYNN HOLT, this JW

day of

, 1995, postage prepaid, to the following:

A. W. Lauritzen
Attorney for Defendant
610 North Main
P. O. Box 171
Logan UT 84321

*r-\

\L

2sw!.!92
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SCOTT W. LEE - NO. 4750
RANDLE, DEAMER, ZARR & LEE, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
139 East South Temple, Suite 330
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1169
Telephone: (801) 531-0441
Fax: (801) 531-0444
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROCKY MOUNTAIN MACHINERY

AMENDED COMPLAINT

COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
v.
:
RON MATTINSON dba R & R SERVICES
:
Defendant.

Civil No. 940008147-CV
Judge Sheila K. McCleve

COMES NOW Plaintiff and alleges as follows:
1.

Plaintiff is a Utah corporation with its principal place of business in Salt Lake

County, Utah.
2.

Defendant is an individual residing and doing business as R & R Services in Salt

Lake County, Utah.
3.

Venue is proper because the transactions that form the basis of this action

occurred in Salt Lake County, Utah.
4.

The amount that is the subject of this action is less than $20,000, exclusive of

costs.
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5.

During May, 1993, Defendant requested that Plaintiff provide certain products

and services to repair machinery owned or used by Plaintiff.
6.

Plaintiff provided said products and supplies during said period, as requested,

and has performed all acts to be performed herein by Plaintiff.
7.

Defendant has refused and failed to pay Plaintiff, after proper demand has been

made, and currently owes to Plaintiff the sum of $12,637.10, together with interest as specified
by U.C.A. § 15-1-1, et seq. from June 1, 1993 until collected in full, plus costs incurred
herein.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendant as follows:
1.

Judgment in the principal sum of $12,637.10, together with interest as specified

by U.C.A. § 15-1-1, et seq.. from June 1, 1993 until collected in full, plus costs incurred
herein; and
2.

For such further relief as the Court deems just in the premises.

DATED this ^ L day of July, 1994.
RANDLE, DEAMER, ZARR & LEE, P.C.

^-Scott W. Lee
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Plaintiffs Address:
2320 West 1500 South
Salt Lake City UT 84126
27sbswl.314l
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A. W. Lauritzen (1906)
Attorney at Law
ftttdmey for Defendant
610 North Main
P?0?rBox 171
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (801) 753-3391
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROCKY MOUNTAIN MACHINERY
COMPANY
Plaintiff,

ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT

vs.
RON MATTINSON dba R&R SERVICES

Case No. 940008147-CV
Judge Sheila K. McCleve

Defendant.
COMES NOW the Defendant with this his answer to Plaintiff's
Complaint and alleges:
1.

Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted.
2.

Admits paragraphs one and two.

3.

Denies or is without sufficient knowledge to admit

and

therefore denies paragraph three.

fact

4.

Admits paragraph four, and five.

5.

Denies paragraph six and affirmatively alleges that in

Plaintiff

did

not

perform

requested products.
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requested

repairs

or

provide

6.

Denies paragraph seven nonetheless admitting that the

Defendant has refused and failed to pay Plaintiff but denies the
balance of the paragraph.
7.

As

an

affirmative

defense

alleges

failure

of

consideration.
8.

As an affirmative defense alleges no consideration.

9.

As an affirmative defense alleges breach of warranty.

10.

Reserves the right to assert additional

affirmative

defenses after discovery is complete.
WHEREFORE: Defendant prays judgement against the Plaintiff no
cause of action with his costs
DATED this
is dP)(3L\
£f?&

day
day of
of V/////
Q(itL

b:»attrckj.ans(2)

2
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, 1994.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT postage prepaid, to the
f,o 1,1 owing listed below on thi s ^ / ^ a y of

Sqo'tt W. Lee
139 East South Temple, Suite 330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1169
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h%: WL - Lauritzen (1906)
Attorney at Law
Attorney for Defendant
610 North Main
P.O. Box 171
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (801) 753-3391
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT
RESISTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGEMENT

ROCKY MOUNTAIN MACHINERY
COMPANY
Plaintiff,
vs.
RON MATTINSON dba R & R SERVICES
Defendant.

Case No. 940008147-CV
Judae Sheila K. McCleve

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE}
}ss
}

STATE OF UTAH

Ron Mattinson being first duly sworn does depose and say:
1.

That I have done business in the past as R6.R Equipment

Sales and I did indeed contact Rocky Mountain Machinery Company and
specified that certain repairs be done on a Komatsu dozer.

At the

time of my callf I specified that they check the torque converter
and replace the torque converter as needed and check the glow plugs
because the engine was hard starting.

After talking to the service

manager, he gave me an estimate over the phone of $3500.00 which
would

be

the

cost

of

removing the
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old

torque

converter

and

replacing it with a rebuilt unit.

T limited the nasi

of repairs

specifying that he spend no more than that amount.
2.

I was involved in some work in Salt Lake and the dozer was

located in a remote location and I heard nothing further from the
Plaintiff until I received a bill which, oddly enough, specified my
order at the top and then went on to list a whol^ bunch of parts
that had nothing to do with the order I had made.

I called and

complained about the bill to no avail and this litigation followed,
3.

I specifically had not wanted the repairman to deal with

theuoil cooler and the radiator because if that turned out to be
the

difficulty

with

the machine,

I

already

had

those

parts

available to me at a very nominal cost i.e. $1500.00.
4.

I

have

no

idea

who

the

person

that

Plaintiff's

representative spoke to in Oceola Nevada was but I suspect it was
one of the employees of a gold mine which was operating in that
area.

When I went back to the area and retrieved my dozer and my

other machinery from the site, the mine had been closed down and
there was no one at the site at all.
Interestingly enough I only paid $15,000.00 for the dozer to
start with and the repairs accomplished by Plaintiff were very near
that amount; with that value situation in mind, it strikes me as
very peculiar that Plaintiff would not have taken it upon himself
2
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to check before expending that amount of money particularly when I
was available in the Salt Lake area either by railing my home or by
calling my cellular phone which is always with me rather than going
out on that much of a limb without confirmation of the order.
5.

Under no circumstances would I have assented to a repair

of that magnitude on a machine of that value, particularly when I
had the parts available to me and I could have accomplished the
repair myself for less than a third of what the charges for the job
as made the Plaintiff.

The torque converter px^hange on the other

hand, was beyond my expertise and T did not have a serviceable one
at hand.
DATED this

day of

, 1995.

^ K o n "Mattinson
Personally did appear before me Ron Mattinson and did
acknowledge to me that he has read the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF
DEFENDANT RESISTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT and knows the
contents thereof to be true and correct on this
_
day of
, 1995.

SEAL:
NOTARY PUBLIC
b:nattison.aff(3)
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